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The First Apocalypse of James: Martyrdom and Sexual Difference 
Abstract 
 My dissertation presents a new reading of a rarely-studied early Christian text, the First 
Apocalypse of James, and seeks to intervene in major scholarly debates concerning martyrdom, 
scriptural interpretation and sexual difference. I begin by showing how the text exhorts its 
readers and hearers toward martyrdom by narrating the progress of James, the brother of Jesus, 
in overcoming his fear and preparing for martyrdom. Here Jesus’ revelation to James sets out a 
ritual of ascent that constitutes the martyr’s confession of faith—a previously unattested form to 
articulate the meaning of dying for God. I use intertextual methods to identify an interpretation 
of the Gospel of John in which Jesus’ statements of identity in John are read as descriptions of 
the true nature of the perfected martyr. This analysis locates scripturally-based debates about the 
nature of Christ within a context in which practices of preparation for martyrdom are being 
devised. 1ApocJas also reads Isaiah to identify female heroes whose example it exhorts James to 
follow. I use this reading of 1ApocJas to challenge the notion that a strict gendered hierarchy 
was reinscribed equally by Christian martyrdom texts. Through comparison to select examples of 
Valentinian theology, I establish that 1ApocJas envisions a productive tension in the divine 
realms between lower and higher female divine figures. By associating female martyrs with the 
higher female divinities and contrasting them to the lower female divinities, 1ApocJas valorizes 
martyrs as female and thus complicates any straightforward masculinization of the martyrs. My 
reading of 1ApocJas broadens our understanding of how Christians prepared themselves for 
martyrdom by interpreting scripture in innovative ways, devising new ritual practices, and 
developing distinctive articulations of human and divine sexual difference. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Since you asked about femaleness, listen,” says Jesus at the beginning of the First 
Apocalypse of James (epeidh [a]kv[i]n/e/ etbe tmNtsHime swt[µ]; 10.19–20).1 Yet, in the text 
up to this point, there has been no question asked about femaleness. The subsequent narrative of 
1ApocJas is structured primarily as a dialogue between Jesus and his brother, James, in which 
James asks questions and Jesus provides revelation. It begins, however, with an answer to an 
unknown question. I suggest that 1ApocJas begins with a puzzle—what was this question?—in 
order to highlight the importance of the concept of “femaleness.” In this dissertation, I will seek 
to address the unraised question about femaleness from the first page of the text. As 1ApocJas 
moves forward, Jesus explains the nature of femaleness through theological revelation and 
through discussions of female disciples and martyrs. These martyrs, I will argue, along with 
“femaleness” provide the keys to understanding 1ApocJas.  
The text concludes with James’ martyrdom. The beginning and the end of the text thus 
bring forth the central concerns of 1ApocJas, sexual difference and martyrdom. The narrative arc 
of the text can also be understood in terms of martyrdom. James asks questions of Jesus and 
receives revelation. As he receives revelation, he grows progressively more prepared for 
martyrdom, confident in his knowledge and no longer wracked by fear. These revelations 
principally concern the nature of “femaleness” as a figure in the divine realms, and through them 
Jesus provides James the knowledge he needs to endure persecution. Further, James takes as 
                                                 
1
 There are two extant versions of the First Apocalypse of James, both written in Coptic, one in the Tchacos Codex 
and the other in Nag Hammadi Codex V. I have quoted here from the Tchacos Codex, which is the better preserved 
of the two. My practice through this dissertation will be to cite first from the Tchacos Codex version, unless in rare 
instances the Nag Hammadi version contains a more complete record. For the lines quoted here, the parallel in Nag 
Hammadi Codex V is practically identical, lacking only the command to listen. “Since you asked about femaleness” 
(epidh akvi[n]e Nsöa TmNtsHime; V 24.26–27). I will discuss the manuscript evidence for 1ApocJas below on 
pages 21–26. William R. Schoedel, “The (First) Apocalypse of James,” in Nag Hammadi Codices V,2–5 and VI with 
Papyrus Berolinensis 8502, 1 and 4 (ed. Douglas M. Perrott; NHS XI; Leiden: Brill, 1979), 65–104; Rodolphe 
Kasser and Gregor Wurst, eds, The Gospel of Judas: Critical Edition (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic, 
2007). 
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moral exemplars in his preparation a set of female martyrs. The two leading, interrelated 
concerns of the First Apocalypse of James, then, are martyrdom and sexual difference.      
This is a common concatenation of themes in early Christian literature. Christians and 
other persecuted groups developed notions of martyrdom in response to the risk of persecution 
and execution under Roman law.2  Such notions of martyrdom were significantly determined by 
the usual space in which executions took place, the Roman arena. The arena was a key location 
for the working out of gendered power relations in the ancient Mediterranean world.3  Within 
literature on martyrdom, the logic of the arena pressed upon the persecuted communities a need 
to embody certain virtues coded as male within ancient understandings of sexual difference.4 As 
                                                 
2
 G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, “Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted?” Past and Present 26 (1963), 6–38; A. N. 
Sherwin-White, “Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted? —An Amendment,” Past and Present 27 (1964), 23–
27; de Ste. Croix, “Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted? —A Rejoinder,” Past and Present 27 (1964), 28–33; 
A.N. Sherwin-White, “The Early Persecutions and Roman Law,” in The Letters of Pliny (ed. A. N. Sherwin-White; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 772–787; Timothy D. Barnes, “Pre-Decian Acta Martyrium,” Journal of 
Theological Studies 19 (1968), 509–531; Gary Bisbee, Pre-Decian Acts of the Martyrs and Commentarii (HDR 22; 
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988); Candida Moss, The Other Christs: Imitating Jesus in Ancient Christian Ideologies of 
Martyrdom (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). Scholarly consensus holds that persecutions of Christians 
were sporadic and local until the reign of Decius around 250, and still rare until the early fourth century CE. A 
general precedent (not an official law) that Christianity was illegal seems to have existed by the early second century 
CE, as attested in Pliny’s letters, but it may not have been universally recognized, and governors and other 
authorities had broad discretion over the interpretation of the precedent. An ongoing scholarly discussion treats the 
question of the “origins” of martyrdom. In this dissertation I will treat martyrdom as discourse and practice, 
constantly in a process of development and not determined by its origins. See below, pages 10–15. W.H.C. Frend, 
Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of a Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1981); G. W. Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); Daniel Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Early Christianity and 
Judaism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
 
3
 Monique Clavel-Lèvêque, “L’Espace des jeux dans le monde romaine: Hégémonie, symbolique et practique 
sociale,” ANRW 2.16.3 (1986), 2406–2563; Carlin Barton, The Sorrows of the Ancient Romans: The Gladiator and 
the Monster (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Erik Gunderson, “The Ideology of the Arena,”  
Classical Antiquity 15 (1996), 113–151; Alison Futrell, Blood in the Arena: The Spectacle of Roman Power (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1997), 77–120; Elizabeth Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory: Early Christian Culture 
Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 104–133; Christopher Frilingos, Spectacles of Empire: 
Monsters, Martyrs, and the Book of Revelation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
 
4
 There is an extensive recent literature on martyrdom and sexual difference. See Castelli, “I Will Make Mary Male: 
Pieties of the Body and Gender Transformation in Early Christianity,” in Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of 
Gender Ambiguity (ed. Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub; New York: Routledge, 1991); Chris Jones, “Women, 
Death, and the Law during the Christian Persecutions,” in Martyrs and Martyrologies (ed. Diana Wood; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993), 23–34; Castelli, “Visions and Voyeurism: Holy Women and the Politics of Sight in Early 
Christianity,” in Protocol of the Colloquy of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies, 6 December 1992 (ed. 
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Erik Gunderson argues, “Nearly every major theme of the Roman power structure was deployed 
in the spectacles,” and this included the strict hierarchy maintained by “repression of women and 
exaltation of bellicose masculinity.”5 Truly “bellicose” masculinity was unavailable to prisoners 
about to be killed, but martyrdom texts offer another strategy: emphasizing the masculine self-
control and steadfast endurance of martyrs.6 The texts employ gendered notions of philosophical 
virtue to establish the masculine character of the martyrs. As Elizabeth Castelli argues, “The 
masculine ideal of stoic fortitude dominates the arena, and it is so crucial to Christian claims to 
virtue that women can provisionally embody it.”7   
In the Martyrdom of Polycarp, for instance, a voice comes from heaven as Polycarp 
enters the arena, saying, “Play the man.”8  Polycarp will give a great performance of self-control 
and endurance in the arena, which will demonstrate his masculinity. In early Christian literature, 
as Castelli points out, it was not only men who might embody masculinity in the arena. In the 
Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas, when Perpetua has a vision of herself engaging in combat 
                                                                                                                                                             
Christopher Ocker; Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Hermeneutical Studies, 1994), 1–20; Virginia Burrus, “Reading 
Agnes: The Rhetoric of Gender in Ambrose and Prudentius,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 3:1 (1995), 25–46; 
Brent D. Shaw, “Body/Power/Identity: Passions of the Martyrs,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 4:3 (1996), 
269–312; Tessa Rajak, “Dying for the Law: The Martyr’s Portrait in Jewish-Greek Literature,” in Portraits: 
Biographical Representation in the Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Period (ed. M.J. Edwards and Simon 
Swain; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 39–68; Janice Capel Anderson and Stephen D. Moore, “Taking It Like a 
Man: Masculinity in 4 Maccabees,” Journal of Biblical Literature 117.2 (1998), 249–273; Boyarin, Dying for God; 
Moore, God’s Beauty Parlor: And Other Queer Spaces in and around the Bible (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2001); Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory; Frilingos, Spectacles of Empire; Burrus, “Torture and 
Travail: Producing the Christian Martyr,” in A Feminist Companion to Patristic Studies (ed. Amy Jo Levine and 
Maria Mayo Robbins; New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 56–71; Stephanie Cobb, Dying to Be Men: Gender and 
Language in Early Christian Martyr Texts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 
 
5
 Gunderson, “The Ideology of the Arena,” 140. 
 
6
 On the valuation of “endurance” as the paradigmatic masculine virtue of the martyr, see Shaw, 
“Body/Power/Identity,” 284–291. For a critique of Shaw’s emphasis on the feminine quality of endurance in ancient 
thought, see Cobb, Dying to Be Men, 134–135. 
 
7
 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 121.  
 
8
 Martyrdom of Polycarp 9.1. The Greek is ἀνδρίζου. For the text and translation, see Herbert Musurillo, Acts of the 
Christian Martyrs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 106-131. See also the discussion in Castelli, Martyrdom and 
Memory, 61–62. 
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in the arena, she imagines, “suddenly I became a man” to fight her opponent. She says that she 
interpreted this vision to mean that she must die in the arena.9 In order to reclaim an honored, 
masculine position, Christians determined that martyrs had to display masculine virtue. Both 
male and female martyrs might attain self-mastery and demonstrate their fortitude, but always 
within a system where the virtuous Christian is the masculine one. As Castelli puts it, “the 
gender binary need not always be binding though its intrinsic value system (the masculine is 
always necessarily more positively charged than the feminine) remains relentlessly intact.”10 
This relentless hierarchical model structures early Christian martyrdom literature and enables, in 
Castelli’s reading, only certain strategies for authorizing martyrs.    
Stephanie Cobb argues that Christian martyrdom texts make use of a set of feminizing 
strategies which contrast to the masculinizing ones. Cobb demonstrates first how martyrdom 
texts depict female martyrs as masculine, or even as becoming male, in order to show the 
greatness of the Christians.11 Yet, Cobb also shows how Christian texts used strategies of 
feminizing women martyrs—emphasizing their beauty, their motherhood, the physical character 
of their bodies on display in the arena. In the Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas, the depiction 
of the martyrs’ deaths includes a story of Perpetua and Felicitas being sent into the area “stripped 
naked” to the prurient horror even of the crowd.12  Cobb argues that this inverse strategy of 
feminizing the martyrs served to blunt the possibly radical nature of these texts’ masculinizing 
claims.  
                                                 
9
 Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas 10.7 (Musurillo). 
 
10
 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 63. 
 
11
 Cobb, Dying to Be Men, 97–107. See also Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 62–67 and 121–122.  
 
12
 Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas 20.2 (Musurillo). 
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The texts, therefore, in various ways, attempt to balance appropriate behavior by, on the 
one hand, illustrating the necessity and possibility of women moving toward the ideals of 
masculinity, and, on the other hand, ensuring that the female martyr is placed safely back 
within the confines of proper, domestic femininity.13  
  
The reading depends on identifying strategies as either masculinizing or feminizing, with one 
side empowering Christian women and the other restraining them. Cobb’s critique usefully 
challenges assumptions in the field that early Christian martyrdom texts simply and 
straightforwardly masculinize martyrs in order to valorize them. At the same time, Cobb 
suggests that “masculinization” and “feminization” are complementary strategies. The same 
hierarchical model of sexual difference is maintained. Masculinizing martyrs serves to authorize 
the Christian community to outsiders, while feminizing martyrs keeps women in their place 
inside the community.  
Against these descriptions of relentlessly hierarchical gender distinctions, Virginia Burrus 
suggests that martyrdom texts exhibit a more “complex gendering” than has often been 
acknowledged.14  She argues that the process of audience identification with the female martyrs 
opened up, first, “spaces for the production of novel female subjectivities that may provide sites 
of ambivalent identification for female readers.” At the same time, “for male authors and readers, 
they also, I suggest, offer an ambiguously ‘feminized’ male subjectivity.”15 Burrus suggests that 
strategies perhaps aimed at maintaining the gendered hierarchy of the arena also produced 
opportunities for more complex articulations of sexual difference. The female martyr who is both 
unexpectedly masculinized and hurriedly feminized becomes a site of complex identifications. 
                                                 
13
 Cobb, Dying to Be Men, 122–123. 
 
14
 Burrus, “Torture and Travail,” 56. 
 
15
 Ibid., 70–71. 
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I believe the First Apocalypse of James can offer new insights to this debate. First, as I 
will show, 1ApocJas features an exhortation to James that he imitate the example of female 
disciples and martyrs. This process by which a male Christian takes on a female martyr as moral 
exemplar seems to embody precisely the “ambiguous” identification that Burrus suggests. 
Further, the extended discussion of the category of “femaleness” suggests a deeper and more 
direct engagement with questions of sexual difference than most of the traditional martyrdom 
texts. Within these theological discourses, 1ApocJas develops multiple overlapping methods for 
authorizing female martyrs. These methods do not simply reduce to masculinizing or feminizing 
the martyr. Rather, the text seeks out different articulations of sexual difference which can 
authorize a set of female martyrs as moral examplars. I will ask, by what logic do these 
articulations of sexual difference work? What resources do they draw upon to articulate these 
improvisational visions of sexual difference?  
Given that 1ApocJas offers a rich discussion of martyrdom and sexual difference, why 
has it been so little studied within these scholarly discussions? This is partly a function of the 
manuscript evidence. There are only two extant versions of the text, and one of them, from the 
Tchacos Codex, was published only in 2007.16  While the other, from Nag Hammadi Codex V, 
had been available for decades, a number of the most important passages on sexual difference 
found in the TC version of 1ApocJas are riddled with lacunae in their NHC V parallels.17 The 
publication of the Tchacos Codex, then, opens up new opportunities to bring 1ApocJas to bear 
on scholarly discussions of martyrdom and sexual difference. In addition, I argue that 1ApocJas 
                                                 
16
 For the full narrative of the Tchacos Codex’ path to publication, see Herbert Krosney, The Lost Gospel: The Quest 
for the Gospel of Judas Iscariot (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic, 2006). The edited codex was published as 
Kasser and Wurst, eds, The Gospel of Judas: Critical Edition.  
 
17
 Compare for example TC 25.17–29.15 and NHC V 39.15–43.19.  
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has rarely been discussed in these scholarly discussions due to the lasting imprint of the 
discourse of heresy and orthodoxy.  
 
The Discourse of Orthodoxy and Heresy 
1ApocJas has been commonly labeled by modern scholars as “Gnostic.” Such an 
appellation derives from an ancient discourse of orthodoxy and heresy. Early Christian leaders 
developed the category of “heresy” to distinguish between true and false Christians, and in so 
doing to draw the boundaries of normative Christianity.18 The use of such a power-laden 
category of approbation for historical analysis has consistently produced misleading and 
incomplete depictions of Christian history.  Karen King’s genealogy of Gnosticism demonstrates 
that a certain incoherence in the category of “Gnosticism” is in fact essential to its use. “The 
discourse of orthodoxy and heresy has been employed to construe the relationship of Gnosticism 
and Christianity almost solely in terms of difference, and the relationship of widely varying so-
called Gnostic materials in terms of similarity.”19 The purpose of “Gnosticism” within the 
discourse of orthodoxy and heresy was to lump together unlike things to provide an imagined 
other useful to self-definition. Scholarship which depends on the term “Gnostic” often 
undermines its own analysis by presuming the similarity of highly divergent ancient Christian 
materials. 
 One of the related problems produced by the modern deployment of the distinction 
between orthodoxy and heresy is the tendency to segregate “heretical” and “orthodox” materials. 
                                                 
18
 Alain LeBoulluec, Le Notion d’hérésie dans la literature grecque IIe–IIIe siècles (Paris: Études augustiennes, 
1985). 
 
19
 Karen King, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, Mass.: Havard University Press, 2003), 53. On the incoherence of 
scholarly categories of “Gnosticism,” see also Michael Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for 
Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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The history of early Christianity has often been written based on a presumption that “Gnostic” 
was equivalent to non-Christian. Because 1ApocJas has been considered one of these heretical 
materials, it has often been excluded from discussions of martyrdom and sexual difference in 
early Christianity. In response, this dissertation aims to consider 1ApocJas outside of the 
framework of orthodoxy and heresy, locating it among comparands within a capacious category 
of ancient Christian materials. I do not categorize the text as “Gnostic,” and I will not be asking 
whether the text exhibits “orthodox” or “heretical” features. Instead, I will consider how 
1ApocJas fits among ancient discourses and practices of martyrdom and sexual difference, 
drawing comparisons to Clement of Alexandria’s Stromateis, the Martyrdom of Polycarp, and 
Heracleon, among many.  
Before turning to discussion of martyrdom, I need to address one problematic ancient 
category which I do intend to use. A number of recent studies have proposed that Valentinianism 
remains a useful category for the study of ancient Christianity. The term itself is not without 
difficulty. There is little evidence of people who self-designated as “Valentinians,” and there 
remains significant scholarly debate as to the doctrine or practice of Valentinus himself, a 
Christian teacher who lived in Rome in the middle of the second century CE.20  Einar Thomassen 
summarizes well the general scholarly argument for the continuing use of the term. “Nonetheless 
the movement possessed enough continuity, coherence, and specificity, and enough of a 
                                                 
20
 Christoph Markschies, Valentinus Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zu valentinianischen Gnosis mit einem Kommentar 
zu den Fragmenten Valentin (WUNT 65; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1992); Gilles Quispel, “The Original Doctrine 
of Valentinus the Gnostic,” Vigiliae Christianae 50.4 (1996), 327–352; Einar Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed: The 
Church of the “Valentinians” (NHMS 60; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 417–429; Ismo Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism: 
Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 35–74; 
Dunderberg, “The School of Valentinus,” in A Companion to Second-Century Christian “Heretics” (ed. Petri 
Luomanen and Antti Marjanen; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 64–99. Christoph Markschies has argued that the thought of the 
“Valentinians” bears little or no necessary relationship to the man Valentinus. Gilles Quispel argues by contrast for a 
close relation between Valentinus and the Valentinians. I prefer Ismo Dunderberg’s model, in which he does not 
presume to delineate Valentinianism in order to exclude Valentinus but understands takes the category as a historical 
construct to include the thought and practice of Valentinus and those who followed him.  
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historical relation to Valentinus, to make it possible to identify various groups as ‘Valentinians’ 
over a span of at least 250 years.”21 This coherence can be seen in the highly consistent set of 
texts which scholars identify as “Valentinian,” and the First Apocalypse of James appears among 
them in every case.22   
The discussions of “femaleness” in 1ApocJas build from questions about the relationship 
of oneness and plurality in the divine realms and how they first came to be. Such a structure of 
theology and protology locates the text within Valentinian theological discourse.23 God, in 
1ApocJas “the One Who Is,” is originally perfectly one (10.8–9), before the plurality of the 
divine realms develops. 1ApocJas uses “femaleness” to refer to the negative aspect of this 
plurality, a world somehow separated from the realms of the One Who Is (10.21-27). This 
negative aspect of plurality is balanced by a more positive understanding of multiple figures in 
the divine realms including Jesus (10.12–19) and Sophia (22.5–6). The text’s discourses on 
“femaleness” build from themes developed in Valentinian theology, and I will discuss them in 
relation to relevant Valentinian comparands. These shared patterns of thought, however, do not 
imply total equivalence between Valentinian texts. When 1ApocJas brings this theology to bear 
on discussions of martyrdom and sexual difference, it enters into a complex series of disputes in 
the ancient Mediterranean world. The text’s engagements with martyrdom discourse, for 
                                                 
21
 Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 5. See also Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 2–10; Philip Tite, Valentinian Ethics 
and Paraenetic Discourse: Determining the Social Function of Moral Exhortation in Valentinian Christianity 
(NHMS 67; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 7–14. Karen King notes the relative coherence and consistency of the category of 
“Valentinianism,” in contrast to “Gnosticism.”  King, What is Gnosticism?, 154–162.  
 
22
 Michel R. Desjardins, Sin in Valentinianism (SBLDS 108; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 5–7; Thomassen, 
“Notes pour la delimitation d’un corpus valentinien à Nag Hammadi,” in Les Textes des Nag Hammadi et le 
problème de leur classification (ed. Louis Painchaud and Anne Pasquier; BCNH:E 3; Québec: Les Presses de 
l’Université Laval, 1995), 243–263; Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 7–10; Tite, Valentinian Ethics and Paraenetic 
Discourse, 14–17. 
 
23
 For the best summary of the unity and diversity of Valentinian thought, see Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed. 
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instance, can only be understood by comparison to a wide range of materials, both Valentinian 
and non-Valentinian.  
  
Martyrdom 
 At first read, 1ApocJas seems straightforwardly a text about martyrdom. It concludes 
with the death of James by stoning. James’ death is one of the paradigmatic early Christian 
martyrdom stories, which was told and re-told variously through the first centuries.24  Further, 
the text clearly narrates James’ progress in preparation for martyrdom. Jesus tells James, “You 
are ignorant concerning yourself” (ko dÄeÄ natsooune erok; 10.6), and he urges James not to 
fear (NHC V 25.13). By the conclusion of the dialogue, James is no longer fearful, and he 
proclaims proudly, “I have come to believe all these things, and they are properly within what is 
in my soul” (aei® [pi]steuïe enaû throu aïuw auHµ [p]etHN t/aïyuch kalws; 25.15–17).25 He 
learns true knowledge, he conquers his fear, and he can become a martyr.  
At the same time, no martyrdom is straightforward. No death, not even a violent death, 
constitutes martyrdom in itself. Martyrdom cannot occur as bare fact. It is an interpretation of 
                                                 
24
 Shelly Mathews, Perfect Martyr (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 79–97. Mathews argues 
convincingly that the martyrdom of Stephen in Acts 7–8 should be read as an appropriation of the narrative of 
James’ death. Christians most often mobilized the narratives of the death of James toward constructing a radical 
break between Jews and Christians, but a counter-narrative can be read in the Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions 
1.27–71. For comparison of the accounts of James’ death, with particular consideration given to the long excerpt of 
Hegesippus in Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History 2.23.4–18, see Wilhelm Pratscher, Der Herrenbruder 
Jakobus und die Jakobustradition (FRLANT 139; Göttingen:Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1987), 103–109; F. Stanley 
Jones, “The Martyrdom of James in Hegesippus, Clement of Alexandria, Christian Apocrypha, including Nag 
Hammadi: A Study of the Textual Relations,” in SBL Seminar Papers, 1990 (SBLSP 29; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1990), 322–335; Richard Bauckham, “For What Offense Was James Put to Death?” in James the Just and Christian 
Origins (eds. Bruce Chilton and Craig A. Evans; SNT 98; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 199–218; John Painter, Just James: 
The Brother of Jesus in History and Tradition (Columbia, S.C.: The University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 118–
131, 188–198. On the historical question of James’ death, scholars broadly agree that the narrative in Josephus, 
Jewish Antiquities 20.199–203 is more likely reliable, while Hegesippus builds a legendary narrative through the 
literalizing of early Christian metaphors about James’ piety. For a well-considered evaluation of what constitutes 
historical reliability in relation to Josephus, see Mathews, 96–97. 
   
25
 NHC V 38.12–15 is mostly lost, but what remains, auw sevoop k. … tayuch, agrees with the TC version.  
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events for which argument is required. To analyze martyrdom, one must place it among the 
various discussions and contestations from which the understanding of certain deaths as 
martyrdoms emerged. As Daniel Boyarin puts it:  
For the “Romans,” it didn’t matter much whether the lions were eating a robber or a 
bishop, and it probably didn’t make much of a difference to the lions, either, but the 
robber’s friends and the bishop’s friends told different stories about these leonine meals. 
It is in these stories that martyrdom, as opposed to execution or dinner, can be found, not 
in “what happened.”26 
 
Only from these stories can martyrdom emerge. A death becomes martyrdom, for some people at 
least, when it becomes an object of a certain kind of discourse. Arguments and the telling of 
stories produce the case for differentiating this particular violent death from others. I consider 
martyrdom as a “discourse” in the Foucauldian sense. “Discourse” in this sense does not simply 
refer to linguistic communication, but to “a field of strategic possibilities” with rules and values 
peculiar to it, enabled and constrained by cultural location.27 The discourse of martyrdom, then, 
itself enables all these various positions attested in debates as to which deaths should be treated 
as true martyrdoms.  
It is not surprising, then, that in the first centuries CE the discourse of martyrdom became 
closely bound up with another active set of disputes around orthodoxy and heresy. Martyrdom 
played a central role in contestations among Christians as to who embodied “true” or “false” 
Christianity. Tertullian in his Scorpiace identified Gnostics and Valentinians as “opponents of 
martyrdom.”28 Irenaeus and Tertullian claimed that being martyred was a sign of orthodox, true 
                                                 
26
 Daniel Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Early Christianity and Judaism (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 94–95. 
 
27
 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language (trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith; 
New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 37. 
 
28
 Tertullian, Scorpiace 1 (ANF 3.633). See also Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, 4.33.9. For the text of the 
Scorpiace, see August Reifferscheid and Georgi Wissowa, eds., Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani Opera (CCSL; 
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Christianity. There has been a tradition in scholarship, likewise, to follow the heresiologists in 
considering “Gnostics” and the Valentinians to have rejected martyrdom. W. H. C. Frend argues 
that among the Gnostics, “the idea that martyrdom would bring the individual a reward was 
utterly rejected” because “persecution and martyrdom were in imitation of Christ’s Passion and 
physical suffering.”29 Anyone who denied that Christ’s suffering occurred could not support 
martyrdom. According to Frend, martyrdom means a death suffused with particular theological 
meanings, and anyone who holds an opposing theological viewpoint cannot, by definition, 
support martyrdom.  
If martyrdom is constituted through discourse and contestation, then it is important not to 
limit the definition of martyrdom according to the theological considerations that at times 
organized this discourse. As Karen King argues, definitions of martyrdom should not “presume 
any particular predetermination of the meaning of Jesus’ death or the deaths of his followers—
for that is precisely what was at issue.”30 I want to work with a capacious understanding of what 
might count as a martyr’s death. It is indeed martyrdom as a discourse that enables all of these 
different contestations of what constitutes a martyr’s death.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Turnholt: Brepols, 1972), 2:1067-1097. For the text of Against the Heresies, see Adelin Rousseau and Louis 
Doutrelou, eds., Irénée de Lyon: Contre les hérésies (SC 100; Paris: Cerf, 1965). 
 
29
 W. H. C. Frend, “The Gnostic Sects and the Roman Empire,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 5.1 (1954), 31–33. 
Such assumptions about the nature of ancient martyrdom continue into the present. See, for example, Michael L. 
Budde’s claim that Christian martyrdom should be understood in terms of the “witness of the body,” wherein belief 
in the power and efficaciousness of Christ’ body is necessary for martyrdom. “The 'body' giving witness is the 
church, the new people formed by God as disciples of Christ, whose murdered and resurrected body is the 
paradigmatic witness of God's love of and hope for the world.”  Michael L. Budde, “Introduction,” in Witness of the 
Body: The Past, Present, and Future of Christian Martyrdom (eds. Michael L. Budde and Karen Scott; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2011), viii.  
 
30
 Karen King, “Martyrdom and its Discontents in the Tchacos Codex,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of 
the International Conference on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 
(ed. April DeConick; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 25. 
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 Although I argue that martyrdom must be understood in terms of its discursive 
contestation, recent scholarship has urged a complementary consideration of martyrdom as 
practice. In his Formations of the Secular, Talal Asad offers a response to Judith Perkins’ The 
Suffering Self, which I think can be taken as a response to much contemporary scholarly work on 
ancient Christian martyrdom. Asad notes that when Perkins talks about martyrdom, she turns 
quickly to discuss the symbolic and political implications of martyrdom texts, especially the way 
they challenge the dominant values of the ruling classes in the Roman Empire. Asad suggests 
that another mode of analysis is possible. He proposes that scholars might consider instead how 
Christians and others, faced with the risks of persecution and death, produced a “new economy 
of action” based on the endurance of suffering.31 This critique does not claim that martyrdom can 
be dissociated from disputation and argument. Rather, Asad argues that the purpose and effects 
of the discourse around martyrdom exceed symbolic and political contestation. Some recent 
scholarship has indeed considered how the discourse surrounding martyrdom both enabled and 
was structured by a set of practices which enabled people to submit to and endure suffering. 
Nicole Kelley proposes that early Christian martyr acts may be read as “instruments of 
discipline,” by which ancient readers trained themselves as potential martyrs.32 The study of 
“preparation for martyrdom” thus focuses on how texts shaped by martyrdom discourse could 
produce such a new practical economy. 
 As I have mentioned, 1ApocJas narrates James’ progression from fear and ignorance to 
confidence in anticipating martyrdom. The text’s structure, then, serves to exhort preparation for 
                                                 
31
 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 85–87. Asad engages here with the arguments in Judith Perkins, The Suffering Self: Pain and 
Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era (New York: Routledge, 1995), 104–123. 
 
32
 Nicole Kelley, “Philosophy as Training for Death: Reading the Ancient Christian Martyr Acts as Spiritual 
Exercises,” Church History 75:4 (2006), 731. See also King, “Martyrdom and its Discontents.” 
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martyrdom from readers and hearers who identify with James. I will ask how precisely 1ApocJas 
imagines that preparation for martyrdom works—what are the practices one is to undertake, and 
what mechanism makes these practices effective in producing ethical transformation? James 
prepares for martyrdom primarily by inculcating knowledge about the divine realms and about 
femaleness. I will consider how this knowledge serves purposes of producing a new economy of 
action. At the same time, by focusing so deeply on the revelation which James receives, 
1ApocJas narrates a martyrdom which focuses far more on the transmission of knowledge than 
on the testing and trial of the hero martyr. I will consider within the ancient discourse of 
martyrdom how this non-standard martyrdom account engages with the question of who counts 
as a true martyr.  
As such, I do not see a contradiction between reading texts about martyrdom for evidence 
of the practical economy they exhort as well as for evidence of discursive contestation. As a 
philosophical matter, “discourse” and “practice” should not be understood as opposed or strictly 
separate things. Rather, the strategic possibilities enabled and constrained by discourse include 
statements, practices, and actions that blur any definite line between “discourse” and “practice.” 
In Foucault’s later discussions of discourse, he makes clear that so-called non-discursive 
practices are typically embedded within fields of strategic possibility.33 I understand discourse 
not only as the set of things that one might say or do, but as a set of changing and changeable 
rules which allow certain practices and statements and which locate those practices and 
statements within structures of power, enabling and constraining possibilities for strategic action. 
                                                 
33
 Michel Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972–1977 (ed. and trans. Colin Gordon; New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 196–198. This is foreshadowed in the 
discussion in The Archaeology of Knowledge about the “materiality” of the statement—all the statements which 
make up discourse must be located in particular times and places, with particular bodies. Foucault, The Archaeology 
of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language (trans. A.M. Sheridan; New York: Pantheon, 1972), 100–102.  
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The discourse and practice of martyrdom, then, can be imagined as a relatively structured set of 
contestations about what sorts of suffering and death count as martyrdom and in what ways, and 
a relatively structured set of practices enabling new sorts of actions in light of the possibility of 
persecution and death. 
 Foucault’s conclusion, in this restatement of his theory of discourse, significantly 
resembles Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice. The key idea in Bourdieu’s theory is the notion 
of the habitus, an embodied capacity that structures practice based on the social structures by 
which it is formed.  
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material 
conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of 
durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as 
structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices 
and representations which can be objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way 
being the product of obedience to rules.34 
 
The field of strategic possibilities which Foucault sees as the structuring location of discourse is 
matched in Bourdieu with the principles of the generation of practices that lay out the possible 
set of practices in a given context. Because I am dealing with mostly textual, explicitly 
discursive evidence in this dissertation, I find it more useful to talk about “discourse and 
practice,” even though one could argue that Foucault’s “discourse” includes “practice” and 
Bourdieu’s “practice” is “discursive.” Further, although discourse and practice cannot be entirely 
disentangled historically, people have a general sense of their distinctiveness, and I think it is 
important to emphasize that martyrdom is both discourse and practice. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (trans. Richard Nice; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 72. 
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Sexual Difference 
Along with martyrdom, I will take sexual difference as the second major category of 
analysis for this dissertation. I use the term “sexual difference” to refer to differentiations along 
the lines of male and female, maleness and femaleness, and masculinity and femininity. This 
terminology allows me to bracket the question of the applicability of modern categories of sex, 
gender, and sexuality to antiquity. I bracket the categories of sex and gender not because ancients 
did not have various methods of differentiating people, but because all forms of sexual difference 
may not be treated equivalently. I talk about “sexual difference” because modern categories of 
sex, gender, and sexuality map quite poorly to ancient articulations of sexual difference.  
 Thomas Laqueur’s Making Sex argues that ancients did not understand male and female 
as a positional dualism, by which people and bodies are strictly classified as either male or 
female. Rather, according to Laqueur, a notion of a “one-sex body” as a model for sexual 
difference prevailed around the ancient Mediterranean. The one-sex body should be understood 
as a broad spectrum, with male and female, masculine and feminine on opposite ends. Many 
people would be categorized in between the two extremes, and even for those who were seen as 
standing at one or the other end of the spectrum, the possibility or risk of sliding up or down the 
scale always remained open. What to modern understanding are commonly taken as simply 
different structures arising from chromosomal differences were in antiquity allocated according 
to a hierarchy of warm and cool, perfected and lacking. Bodily difference, then, was imagined 
differently.35   
                                                 
35
 Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 25–29. Laqueur cites Galen, On the Usefulness of Parts 2.630. Laqueur’s model has been 
critiqued by historians of science, in particular for privileging the Galenic and Aristotelian models of sexual 
difference over the Hippocratic. See Katharine Park and Robert A. Nye, “"Destiny Is Anatomy, Review of Laqueur's 
Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud," New Republic (September 18, 1991), 53–57; Rebecca 
Fleming, Medicine and the Making of Roman Women: Gender, Nature, and Authority from Celsus to Galen (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000). As I will argue, Laqueur’s model risks oversimplifying the wide array of 
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 This understanding of sexual difference does not merely concern bodies but also social 
and political hierarchies. The subordinate qualities of women’s bodies—their lack of warmth, 
their weakness and dampness—are expressed in their anatomy and reflect the proper social 
order. Laqueur turns to Aristotle to explain more precisely how the one-sex body functioned in 
antiquity. He notes that for Aristotle, the overriding issue in discussion of sexual difference was 
a distinction at the level of causation, in which the male represented the formal cause and the 
female the material. This hierarchy was defended by reference to the social order. 
What we take to be ideologically charged social constructions of gender—that males are 
active and females passive, males contribute the form and females the matter to 
generation—were for Aristotle indubitable facts, “natural” truths. What we would take to 
be the basic facts of sexual difference, on the other hand—that males have a penis and 
females a vagina, males have testicles and females ovaries, females have a womb and 
males do not, males produce one kind of germinal product and females another, that 
women menstruate and men do not—were for Aristotle contingent and not very 
interesting observations about particular species under certain conditions. 36 
 
Under a common modern understanding of sex and gender, these terms refer, respectively, to 
unchangeable biological difference between binary positions of male and female, and changeable 
cultural difference on a spectrum of masculine and feminine. Laqueur’s “one-sex body” upsets 
the distinction. The sorts of biological differences that would constitute “sex,” in the modern 
understanding, were in antiquity not understood as discrete and binary, nor as fixed and 
unchangeable. The truly fixed, true facts of sexual difference were instead the location of men 
and women in the social order, and the ways in which their proper places in social organization 
reflect deeper truths about the causes of being. 
                                                                                                                                                             
articulations of sexual difference possible in antiquity. For summarizing the particular way in which male 
superiority was presumed in the dominant ancient schema of sexual difference, Laqueur’s model remains highly 
useful. On the distinct vision of female difference in the Hippocratic corpus, see Helen King, Hippocrates’ Woman: 
Reading the Female Body in Ancient Greece (New York: Routledge), 1998. 
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 Laqueur, Making Sex, 28–29, commenting primarily on Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2. 
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  Laqueur takes this apparent reversal of modern notions of the fixity of sex and the 
fluidity of gender to argue, in his introduction, that in antiquity, “sex, or the body, must be 
understood as the epiphenomenon, while gender, what we would take to be a cultural category, 
was primary or ‘real.’”37  Laqueur’s work usefully destabilizes any attempt to take modern 
notions of sex and gender uncritically into the study of antiquity, and I believe that his own study 
challenges the applicability of categories of sex and gender in this statement, even in reversed 
order. He means that, for these ancient writers, social differences are the unchangeable ground 
by which people may be differentiated, and from which bodily difference logically follows. The 
social differences to which he refers, though, were not understood as binary or discrete, but fell 
along a spectrum of relative differences. The body, which is epiphenomenal, is not sexually 
differentiated in a manner analogous to modern notions of sex. The categories of sex and gender, 
which Laqueur brings up here, risk obfuscating the insights he offers about the different 
articulations of sexual difference in antiquity. 
 What is needed, then, is a set of questions for reading ancient sources which neither 
presume the utility of categories of sex, gender, and sexuality, nor presume that unitary or 
univocal models of articulating sexual difference prevailed in antiquity. The category of “sexual 
difference” is perhaps best known from the work of Luce Irigaray. For Irigaray, “sexual 
difference” marks what is unrepresentable in philosophical and psychoanalytic discourse, the 
other of the phallogocentric subject which is necessary to the functioning of this discourse but 
cannot be represented within its structures. If discourse is “phallogocentric”—that is, the 
assumed subject position is the rational male, the one who is marked by both phallos and 
logos—then the other of this discourse is woman in her absolute difference. The sexual 
                                                 
37
 Ibid., 8. 
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difference which Irigaray identifies in philosophical and psychoanalytic discourse is not and can 
never be thought as complementary.  
In fact, of course, these two terms cannot be fittingly designated by the number ‘two’ and 
the adjective ‘different,’ if only because they are not subject to com-parison. To use such 
terms serves only to reiterate a movement begun long since, that is, the movement to 
speak of the ‘other’ in a language already systematized by/for the same.38   
 
Irigaray hesitates here even to call sexual difference a “difference” because this difference 
grounds the economy of sexual sameness. Sexual difference stands for the distinction between 
the sameness which discourse reproduces and the unrepresentable other which grounds 
discourse.  
 The risk which is run by Irigaray’s all-pervasive notion of sexual difference is that, as 
Amy Hollywood points out, a discussion of the complexity of human sexual difference which 
relies on “a slide between sex difference, subjective formation as sexed/gendered, and sexuality” 
may conflate these various aspects of difference into a monolith.39  Laqueur’s map of maleness 
and femaleness in antiquity runs a similar risk. By positing social hierarchies as eternally fixed in 
the ancient understanding, he suggests that a unitary, oppressive hierarchy of culturally 
determined sexual difference can be mapped on a single line and identified in a single way 
throughout ancient thought and practice.  
I want to take “sexual difference” not as a category which allows us to ignore the various, 
overlapping, and contradictory axes along which difference can be mapped. Laqueur and Irigaray 
both risk falling into this trap, but their work also opens up more fruitful possibilities. I consider 
sexual difference as a category which leaves open exactly what those different axes may be and 
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 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman (trans. Gillian C. Gill; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 
139. 
 
39
 Amy Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 284.  
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how they are related. Judith Butler’s essay, “The End of Sexual Difference?” responds to a 
variety of feminist philosophers who have taken up “sexual difference” and rejected the category 
of “gender.”40 Butler highlights, “a problem that sexual difference poses, namely, the permanent 
difficulty of determining where the biological, the psychic, the discursive, the social begin and 
end.”41 The category, then, can be taken not as a refusal to consider the question of the forms of 
sexual differentiation, but instead as a constant, pressing demand to find new and better 
articulations of the variety of sexual differentiation. As Butler puts it with regard just to 
questions of sex and gender, “sexual difference is the site where a question concerning the 
relation of the biological to the cultural is posed and reposed, where it must and can be posed, 
but where it cannot, strictly speaking, be answered.”42   
I will continue to pose this question, and the goal of the dissertation is to lay out with 
precision and care the complex possibilities raised in one important ancient consideration of 
sexual difference. 1ApocJas lays out its theology in sexually differentiated terms, with 
“femaleness” playing a central though unhappy role. At the same time, the text seeks a 
theological basis to honor female martyrs and exhorts readers and hearers to imitate their 
example in preparation for martyrdom. Each of these overlapping efforts maps sexual difference 
in its own way, according to distinct goals. I propose to use the question of sexual difference not 
to collapse these articulations together, but to seek to piece them apart.   
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 For these arguments, see Rosie Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington, 
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Manuscript and Dating 
Locating 1ApocJas within early Christian discourse on sexual difference first requires 
positioning 1ApocJas more precisely within its historical context. As discussed, two extant 
versions of the First Apocalypse of James have been published, one from the fifth of the Nag 
Hammadi codices and one from the Tchacos Codex.43  The NHC V version runs twenty 
manuscript pages, of which the final ten are missing many lines at the top and bottom of each 
page. The TC version is 21 pages with major lacunae only in the last two pages and the third 
through fifth pages.44 Although both versions of 1ApocJas are found in Coptic,45 scholars have 
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 Interestingly enough, neither of these versions of the text is actually titled “The First Apocalypse of James.”  The 
subscript in the Tchacos Codex is titled simply “James” (ûakkwbos; 30.28). NHC V has a subscript which reads, 
“The Apocalypse of James” (tapo/k/a/l/[uyis] Nûakw[bos]; 44.9–10). The name “The First Apocalypse of James” 
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1ApocJas from the text which follows it in Codex V, which has an identical superscript title (tap/o/kaluy[is] 
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James the Lord’s Brother,” (PhD diss., Brown University, 1972), 267–278; Charles Hedrick, “The (Second) 
Apocalypse of James,” in Nag Hammadi Codices V,2–5 and VI, 105–109; William R. Schoedel, “The (First) 
Apocalypse of James,” 65–67. The Second Apocalypse of James does include a revelation discourse between James 
and Jesus, but it spends much more time on the trial, judgment, and death of James. There has been no support for 
hypotheses of close textual relationship between the apocalypses. Brown further rejects of any kind of source 
relationship between these texts, based specifically their stories of the death of James.  
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 For codicological analysis of NHC V, see James Robinson, “Codicological Analysis of Nag Hammadi Codices V 
and VI and Papyrus Berolinensis 8502,” in Nag Hammadi Codices V,2–5 and VI, 9–45. For TC, see Gregor Wurst, 
“Preliminary Codicological Analysis of Codex Tchacos,” in The Gospel of Judas: Critical Edition, 27–33. A new 
cache of fragments of the Tchacos Codex were recently recovered, and it is hoped that many remaining lacunae will 
eventually be filled. The work is apparently facing delays, and I do not expect any major reconstructions to be 
published before my dissertation is complete.  
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 Wolf-Peter Funk, “The Linguistic Aspect of Classifying the Nag Hammadi Codices,” in Painchaud and Pasquier, 
Les Textes des Nag Hammadi, 140–141; Byung Woo Yoo, “Die Erste Apokalypse des Jakobus (Nag Hammadi-
Codex V,3), neu herausgegeben,übersetzt und erklärt,” (Diss. Theol., Humboldt-Universität, 1998), 6–21; Rodolphe 
Kasser, “Étude dialecticale,” in The Gospel of Judas: Critical Edition, 35–36. In both the Nag Hammadi and 
Tchacos Codex versions of 1ApocJas, the language resembles most closely the Sahidic dialect of Coptic. In both 
cases, the Coptic does not comport in all ways with the scholarly model of classical Sahidic but includes dialectical 
variations. For the Tchacos Codex, Rodolphe Kasser has argued that the Sahidic of the text is influenced by Middle 
Egyptian Coptic dialects. For Nag Hammadi Codex V, both Wolf-Peter Funk and Byung Woo Yoo classify the 
dialect as Sahidic with Northern or Lower Egyptian features. Yoo suggests that the original form of the text may 
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concluded that NHC V was probably a translation from Greek and that the same is likely true of 
the Tchacos Codex.46 The two Coptic versions show no signs of dependency, either from one to 
the other.47  Given that a source-critical history cannot be determined, I propose to treat the TC 
and NHC V versions of the text equally as evidence of the First Apocalypse of James, even at 
moments where variant readings emerge.  
My method here resembles Karen King’s proposal to treat the variants of the Apocryphon 
of John as historical evidence of the text’s tradition. She writes, “The variants are valuable in and 
of themselves as witnesses to the history of Sethian Gnosticism, and they should not be 
discounted or erased in the process of seeking a hypothetical original text.”48 I treat the First 
Apocalypse of James as a text whose manuscript tradition preserves a number of variant 
readings, and I consider all variants equally relevant to the interpretation. I will generally follow 
the text as presented in the Nag Hammadi Codex V,2–5 and Gospel of Judas editions of Schoedel 
and Kasser/Wurst, respectively. In practice I follow the Tchacos Codex more often than Nag 
Hammadi Codex V simply because it is the better preserved of the two by a significant margin. 
                                                                                                                                                             
have been in a Lower Egyptian Bohairic dialect, but the transmission of the text in Upper Egypt gradually produced 
more and more Sahidic features. 
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“variants”, see also Eldon Epp and Gordon Fee, Studies in the Theory and Method of New Testament Textual 
Criticism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993), 47–79. 
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In a few cases where I offer different readings, I will specify the difference and my reasons for 
offering a different reading. 
The two physical copies of 1ApocJas provide the most direct evidence of the dating of 
the text. Based on analysis of the construction of the codex, scholars have dated NHC V most 
likely to the fourth or fifth century CE, possibly as late as the sixth.49 The Tchacos Codex offers 
more useful data. The codex was subjected to close analysis by radiocarbon dating, electron 
microscopy and Raman spectrometry. These methods came to strikingly similar results. The first 
two suggested a date in the third or fourth century CE, the last suggested the third century was 
more likely than the fourth.50 The dating of the codices provides a terminus ad quem. The First 
Apocalypse of James cannot be younger than its copies. 
The results of this analysis of the Tchacos Codex help to confirm previous scholarly 
analysis, based only on evidence from NHC V, which dated the original composition in Greek of 
1ApocJas to the late second or early third century CE. These analyses generally depended on 
identifying likely connections between 1ApocJas and contemporary texts.51 The two texts with 
the closest links to 1ApocJas both date from the latter half of the second century CE. First, a 
                                                 
49
 James D. Robinson, ed., The Facsimile Edition of the Nag Hammadi Codices: Introduction (vol. 1 of The 
Facsimile Edition of the Nag Hammadi Codices; Leiden: Brill, 1972), 71–86; John W.B. Barnes, Gerald M. Browne, 
and John C. Shelton, eds., Nag Hammadi Codices: Greek and Coptic Papyri from the Cartonnage of the Covers 
(Nag Hammadi Studies 16; Leiden: Brill, 1981); Stephen Emmel, “Religious Tradition, Textual Transmission, and 
the Nag Hammadi Codices,” in McGuire and Turner, The Nag Hammadi Library after Fifty Years, 34–43. 
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 Krosney, The Lost Gospel, 326–328. Radiocarbon testing of pieces of papyrus suggested they date from 220–340 
CE. Transmission electron microscopy revealed the use of carbon black in the ink and gum in the binding, materials 
consistent with construction in the third or fourth century CE. Spectrometry identified the mix of pigments in the ink 
as more consistent with the third century CE than the fourth. For a fuller discussion of the methods used, as well as 
the evidence for the authentication of the Tchacos Codex, see Florence Darbre, “The Papyrus Codex Tchacos: Its 
Authentication, Conservation, and Future,” PapierRestaurierung: Mitteilungen der IADA 9.4 (2008), 19-25. 
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 For scholarly arguments supporting this consensus dating, see F.T. Fallon, “The Gnostic Apocalypses,” Semeia 14 
(1979), 133; Antti Marjanen, The Woman Jesus Loved: Mary Magdalene in the Nag Hammadi Library and Related 
Documents (NHMS 40; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 126; Yoo, “Die Erste Apokalypse des Jakobus,” 21–22; Wolf-Peter 
Funk, “The First Apocalypse of James,” in The Nag Hammadi Scriptures (ed. Marvin Meyer; New York: 
HarperCollins, 2007), 322–323.  
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version of a passage from 1ApocJas (TC 20.10–21.18, NHC V 33.20–34.18) appears almost 
verbatim in Irenaeus’ Against the Heresies 1.21.5. In 1ApocJas, this passage comes in the midst 
of what I call the long revelation speech, a discourse by Jesus on the nature of the divine realms 
and human salvation which spans six manuscript pages.52 In this section, Jesus narrates an 
embedded dialogue. He tells James that he will be interrogated by heavenly powers, and he 
provides for James the words he can say to escape these captors.  
[When] you fall because of (the) many, one of them will ask you, because he is a guard, 
“Who are you and where are you from?” You will say to him, “I am the son and I am 
from the father.” And he will say to you, “Which son and which father?” You will say to 
him, “The Father Who Is from the beginning and the son who is in the One Who Is from 
the beginning.” And he will say to you, “Where have you come from?” You will say to 
him, “From the One Who Is from the beginning.” And he will ask <you>, “Why have 
you come?” You will say, “I have come to all the ones who are mine and the ones who 
are not mine.” (20.7–21.18)  
 
Irenaeus preserves an extremely similar passage which he attributes to an unspecified group of 
heretics.53 He explains that they provide ritual instruction to dying members of their community, 
and this instruction is nearly identical to the answers which Jesus provides for James.  
They instruct them that, after they have died, when they come to the powers, they are to 
speak as follows: “I am a son of Father, of Father who is preexisting. I am a son in the 
Preexisting one. I have come to see all things that belong to me and to others.”54  
 
                                                 
52
 For a brief outline of 1ApocJas, see the Appendix on page 153. 
 
53
 This passage could be taken to refer specifically to Marcosians, but I do not believe that is the case. Against the 
Heresies 1.13–20 cover Marcus and the Marcosians, but in 1.22 Irenaeus has returned to more general statements 
about the “rule of faith” and the “refutation of all the heretical sects.”  Irenaeus begins the last section of 1.20 by 
writing of the Marcosians’ scriptural interpretation, “Finally, as the highest proof, the crown of their system as it 
were, they introduce this text...”  This seems to suggest that Irenaeus is completing his discussion of the Marcosians. 
In 1.21, he introduces the ritual of redemption and narrates a variety of quite different ideas and practices related to 
ritual practice. It seems much more likely to me that 1.21 treats a variety of rituals performed by folks whom 
Irenaeus considers to be heretics rather than the rituals specifically of the Marcosians. This textual parallel between 
1ApocJas and a ritual attributed to unspecified heretics has often been cited as evidence that 1ApocJas is a 
“Gnostic” text. 
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Both the passage and its parallel continue for several more verses, but this quotation should be 
sufficient to demonstrate the nearly identical textual content.55 The shared content, which is not 
attested by any other independent ancient texts, suggests historical proximity.  
A second, less extensive parallel provides support for this dating hypothesis. Following 
the long revelation speech, and nearing the end of the dialogue, James asks a new question about 
Jesus’ female disciples. “Who are the seven women who have become your disciples?” (nim ne 
TsΩFe nsHime ntar maqhteue nek; 25.18–20).56 Antti Marjanen points out that the Sophia of 
Jesus Christ is the only other text which preserves a tradition of Jesus having seven female 
disciples.57  SJC begins with the scene-setting, “After he rose from the dead, when his twelve 
disciples and the seven women who were his disciples went up to Galilee…” (mnNsa 
ntreFtwoU ebol HN netmoout Nterouei NCi peFmNtsnoous µmaqhths mN savFe 
NsHûme ete neumaqhteue naF eHraû etgalilaia; BG 77.9–77.16).58 The Coptic is not 
exactly the same, but it is very close. Again, the exclusively shared tradition of seven women 
disciples suggests proximity between the texts.  
 These two textual parallels are not determinative arguments on their own, but they are 
useful when paired with the physical analysis of the Tchacos Codex. Scholars had previously 
                                                 
55
 For my analysis of this passage, see pages 44–49, 67–81, 101–107. For a setting of the two full passages in 
parallel, see Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 406–408.  
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 Besides some minor differences in word order which do not change the basic sense, NHC V follows almost 
identically here. “Who are the [seven] women who have [become] your disciples?” (V 38.16–18; T[sav]Fäe NsHime 
nim ne Ntau[® ma]qhths nak). 
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 Marjanen, The Woman Jesus Loved, 126. 
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 There is another version of The Sophia of Jesus Christ in Nag Hammadi Codex III, which has essentially the same 
description of women disciples. It refers to “seven women being [his] disciples” (savFe NsHime maqhteue; III 
90.16–17). Once again, the text identifies the women as disciples by using the Greco-Coptic verb maqhteue. 
Douglas M. Parrott, ed., Nag Hammadi Codices III,3–4 and V,1 with Papyrus Berolinensis 8502,3 and Oxyrhynchus 
Papyrus 1081 (Leiden: Brill, 1991).   
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dated 1ApocJas to the late second or early third century CE before the Tchacos Codex was 
discovered, based on these connections. The evidence from the analysis of the Tchacos Codex 
places the most likely date of the composition in Greek of 1ApocJas in the third century or 
earlier, confirming the earlier hypotheses of the work’s dating. In my analysis, I will seek to 
locate 1ApocJas historically among ancient discourses and practices of martyrdom and sexual 
difference roughly in period of the late second and early third century CE.  
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
 My discussion of sexual difference and martyrdom in the First Apocalypse of James 
begins by engaging the topic of martyrdom. The second chapter will read the First Apocalypse of 
James in terms of preparation for martyrdom. Jesus exhorts James, and by implication the 
readers and hearers of the text, to prepare for martyrdom through specific practices of inculcation 
of knowledge and ritual repetition. The rhetoric of the text works by presenting James at first 
uncertain in knowledge and fearful about his fate. Over the course of the narrative, he receives 
consolation and revelation until he is ready to face his fate without fear. I locate the text’s 
exhortation of preparation for martyrdom within ancient moral philosophy, and in particular 
around the “practices of the self” identified by Michel Foucault.59  Practices of the control of the 
passions, particularly fear, were commonly exhorted in ancient philosophical literature, and 
1ApocJas fits among these ancient discussions and practices. The specific practices discussed in 
1ApocJas involve training in the inculcation of knowledge through ritual repetition and dialogue. 
The knowledge which is inculcated is a specifically theological knowledge. One comes to 
understand that one’s body is not the seat of the true self, and so harm done to the body in 
                                                 
59
 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981–1982 (ed. Frédéric 
Gros; trans. Graham Burchell; New York: Picador, 2001), 320–324. 
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martyrdom does not harm the soul or spirit of a person. The body, the text says, is a “type of the 
rulers,” and the rulers are secondary and inferior deities who were created by the secondary and 
inferior divine power “femaleness.” This training in knowledge enables the person to inculcate 
proper dispositions such that in a situation of persecution, she may act properly and without fear.  
 In the third chapter, I take up the question of scriptural interpretation in 1ApocJas. The 
“embedded dialogue” passage which exhorts readers and hearers to practices of ritual repetition, 
I argue, was drawn from a reading of the Gospel of John. The reading of John presented here 
builds from gaps in the presentation of ethics and Christology in John. By this method, it finds in 
John a program for preparation for martyrdom. This reading helps to explain the passages on the 
seven women, which are highly complex and confusing. The text presents the seven women first 
as honored women, then as divine spirits who preceded Jesus, then as disciples of Jesus whom 
James is called to imitate, then as women for whom “the work of the female has attained to the 
male,” and finally as female martyrs. I argue that these passages are organized according to 
certain methods of reading scripture. Readings of Isaiah and Leviticus underlie the passages on 
the seven women, and once again the reading focuses on questions of ethics and Christology. 
Where with regard to John this reading method produced a relatively coherent interpretation, 
here the application of this method to new scriptural texts produces new difficulties. 1ApocJas 
lays out moral exemplars and Christological knowledge found in Isaiah and Leviticus which can 
be useful for preparation for martyrdom, but it also effects a significant shift in the text’s logic of 
imitation. Where before Jesus was the primary moral exemplar, from this point forward the 
primary exemplars will be the seven women disciples. 
 The fourth chapter returns to the theological revelations and the question of sexual 
difference. I compare the structure of this theology to the Excerpts from Theodotus in order to 
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identify the particular play of oneness and plurality that organizes the theology. Both 1ApocJas 
and the Excerpts envision the difference between the positive and negative aspects of plurality by 
reference to the figure of Sophia. In both texts there are two Sophia figures, one higher and one 
lower. In 1ApocJas, “femaleness” produces a break in the unity of the divine realms, and human 
salvation can be achieved through reunification with the divine. This reunification is figured as 
triumph over femaleness and reabsorption into primal oneness, now apparently figured as male. 
At the same time, this theology honors the higher Sophia as a protective power in the divine 
realms. I consider here scholarship on sexual difference in the ancient Mediterranean world, in 
which theological, social and sexual hierarchies often paralleled. I note that while the narrative of 
“femaleness” seems to envision a reinstatement of a masculine ideal, the discussion of the higher 
Sophia challenges such a simple reading of sexual difference. 
 Building from this analysis of sexual difference in 1ApocJas’ theology, I consider in the 
fifth chapter the passage on Jesus’ seven women disciples. James asks Jesus about these women 
after he has received theological revelation. As Jesus seeks to explain how these women are 
blessed, he introduces new challenges for the text’s articulation of sexual difference. 1ApocJas 
seeks to authorize these female disciples and martyrs by way of a dual strategy drawn from the 
theology of the text. The seven women are associated with divine female figures such as Sophia 
and the spirits of prophecy, while at the same time, they are dissociated from “femaleness.” I 
argue that while these strategies could be considered “masculinizing” and “feminizing,” they are 
not in any way complementary strategies. Further, the association of the women with the higher 
Sophia does not serve any domesticating purpose. Whereas the move to authorize the women in 
terms of their triumph over femaleness suggests a perfected state of humanity characterized by a 
transformation to maleness, here the link drawn between the women martyrs and the higher 
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Sophia suggests in turn an imagined perfected female state toward which these women may 
aspire, without any particular denigration of maleness. In the case of both strategies, Jesus 
exhorts James to imitate this group of female disciples and martyrs, which introduces a further 
element of femininity into the practices of the self.     
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Chapter 2: Preparation for Martyrdom 
 
 The First Apocalypse of James ends with the execution of James. As the stones strike his 
body, James calls out in imitation of Christ on the cross, “Forgive them, for they do [not know] 
what they are doing” (kw nau ebol n/sä[esoou]ne gar [an] je eur ou; 30.25–26).1 The self-
controlled martyr who dies at the conclusion of the text resembles little the James whom one first 
encounters in 1ApocJas. James tells Jesus that he is afraid, and he requests revelation, seeking 
knowledge he does not possess. When informed that he must die, James weeps and has to steady 
himself by sitting down on a rock. But over the course of the text, as Jesus provides teaching and 
revelation, James wipes away his tears and grows progressively less terrified of his fate. Once 
James understands why he must die and what his death means, he ceases to be afraid. James’ 
progress culminates in his martyrdom.2   
                                                 
1
 Kasser and Wurst propose an emendation to place an enclitic negator an in the sentence, to correct a hypothesized 
scribal error, and I follow this proposal. This line ought to be emended with an because otherwise the contruction 
nse... gar does not work grammatically or contextually. The only other grammatically feasible option would be to 
take nse as the third-person plural form of the conjunctive conjugation base, but then this clause would have to be 
taken as continuing a jussive, following “forgive them.”  The other option, that is, would be to translate as “Forgive 
them, for, let them not know what they are doing.”  Given that this option both makes little sense contextually and 
contains an inexplicable gar, I find the emendation justified. Further, the otherwise lacuna-ridden conclusion to the 
NHC V version does include gar an precisely where it should appear in a parallel text (V 44.7–8). As Wolf-Peter 
Funk points out, a similar pattern of a dropped an for negation appears in NHC V 28.10. Wolf-Peter Funk, “The 
Significance of the Tchacos Codex,” in DeConick, The Codex Judas Papers, 515–516. 
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 1ApocJas has commonly, but not universally been read as a martyrdom text. The passage which narrates the death 
of James by stoning was missing from the Nag Hammadi Codex V version, and so it was possible to imagine that 
the text might have ended otherwise. Among readers who took 1ApocJas as a martyrdom narrative, see Brown, 
“James”; Elaine Pagels, “Gnostic and Orthodox Views of Christ’s Passion: Paradigms for the Christian’s Response 
to Persecution?” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism, Vol. 1. (ed. Bentley Layton; Leiden: Brill, 1980), 262–288; 
Clemens Scholten, Martyrium und Sophiamythos im Gnostizismus nach den Texten von Nag Hammadi (Münster: 
Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchh., 1987), 68–80; Painter, 168–173; Wolf-Peter Funk, “The First Apocalypse of 
James,” in The Nag Hammadi Scriptures (Marvin Meyer, ed.; New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 322–323. Two 
major commentaries on 1ApocJas written before the Tchacos Codex version was available question the importance 
of martyrdom in the text. Armand Vielleux states, “the concern of the author is not the martyrdom of James, but his 
authorization as a recipient of post-resurrection revelation.” Byung Woo Yoo hypothesized, from the very 
fragmentary conclusion to the NHC V version, that 1ApocJas ended not with James’ death, but with his continuing 
preaching of the revelation of the savior. Armand Vielleux, Le deux apocalypses de Jacques (BCNH:T 17 ; Québec: 
Presses de l’Université Laval, 1986), 97; Yoo, “Die Erste Apokalypse des Jakobus,” 220–221. Since the publication 
of the Tchacos Codex with its preserved narrative of the death of James, the central importance of martyrdom for the 
text has been the near-consensus position. See Brankaer and Bethge, Codex Tchacos; King, “Martyrdom and its 
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 1ApocJas thus narrates James’ martyrdom and the instruction he receives in preparation 
for it. James asks questions and describes his mental and emotional state, and Jesus responds 
with instruction and encouragement. These dialogues between James and Jesus dominate the 
text, and only two narrative interludes break up the discussions. The structure of the text runs 
dialogue, narrative, dialogue, narrative.3 The first dialogue takes place before Jesus’ crucifixion 
and the second during a post-resurrection appearance to James. In between these two dialogues 
there is a short narrative break during which Jesus is killed. Jesus returns afterward and imparts 
further instruction and encouragement in a second dialogue. After Jesus departs again, there is a 
fragmentary narrative of James’ arrest, and the text concludes with his martyrdom by stoning. 
Rodolphe Kasser argues that the basic form of the text builds first to Jesus’ death then in turn to 
James’ martyrdom as its climax.4  Martyrdom is the dramatic event around which the literary 
structure of 1ApocJas is organized.  
 I read the literary structure of the text rhetorically. Its narrative depicts James’ gradual 
transformation toward preparation for martyrdom in order to exhort readers and hearers to 
practices of preparation. In this interpretation, I follow a recent turn in martyrdom studies which 
considers the didactic function of martyrdom texts. Karen King explains that many martyrdom 
texts “took as [their] particular challenge to tell believers how to maintain their confession to be 
Christian even under torture and threat of death.”5 These texts seek to form their readers and 
hearers as potential martyrs by advocating practices and beliefs which enable them to respond 
                                                                                                                                                             
Discontents in the Tchacos Codex,” 23–42; Antti Marjanen, “The Seven Women Disciples: In the Two Versions of 
the First Apocalypse of James,” in DeConick, The Codex Judas Papers, 535–546. 
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 See Appendix on page 153 for an outline of the text of 1ApocJas. 
 
4
 Rodolphe Kasser, “Textes gnostiques. Nouvelle remarques à propos des apocalypses de Paul, Jacques et Adam,” 
Le Muséon 78 (1965), 79. 
 
5
 King, “Martyrdom and its Discontents,” 39.  
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properly to persecution. This shared goal and concern unites martyrdom texts of diverse generic 
forms, from explicit exhortations to martyrdom to narratives and dialogues.6 I will draw 
comparisons between 1ApocJas and texts of different generic forms, based on an understanding 
of shared engagement in these discussions.  
  The notion of preparation for martyrdom is not new in itself. Some ancient Christian 
texts quite explicitly exhort the reader to prepare for martyrdom. Origen, in his Exhortation to 
Martyrdom, writes to a fellow Christian under arrest, “O that our soul might not be troubled, but 
that even before the judgment seats, before the swords ready to behead us, our soul be preserved 
by the peace of God which surpasses all understanding, and be tranquil in the thought that they 
that leave the body live with the Lord of all things.”7 The intended effect is to enable the reader 
to persevere under arrest and endure a martyr’s death. Recent scholarship on the preparation for 
martyrdom argues that it is not only these explicit exhortations to martyrdom that seek to shape 
potential martyrs. Martyrdom texts of various generic forms also may implicitly exhort such 
disciplined training.  
 Recent studies have drawn on Michel Foucault’s and Pierre Hadot’s work on “practices 
of the self” and “spiritual exercises,” respectively, to explain the disciplined training exhorted by 
martyrdom texts.8 Hadot argues that ancient philosophy should be understood in terms of 
                                                 
6
 On the genres of martyrdom, see Hans R. Seeliger, “Martyrs, Acts of the,” in the Dictionary of Early Christian 
Literature (ed. Siegmar Döpp and Wilhelm Geerlings; trans. Matthew O’Connell; New York: Crossroad, 2000), 
405–407. As Seeliger notes, many of these differences of genre were not elaborated until the late Medieval period, 
which I believe further supports this practice of reading various martyrdom texts together. 
 
7
 Origen, Exhortation to Martyrdom 4. Translation from  Rowan A. Greer, trans., Origen: An Exhortation to 
Martyrdom; On Prayer; First Principles: Book IV; Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs; Homily 
XXVII on Numbers. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). For the Greek text of the Exhortation, see Maria-Barbara von 
Stritzky, ed. and trans., Origenes: Aufforderung zum Martyrium (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010). 
 
8
 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 86; Kelley, “Philosophy as Training for Death;” King, “Martyrdom and its 
Discontents.” Elizabeth Castelli made use of Foucault’s notion of “practices of the self” to consider how a 
martyrdom text might reflect practices of preparation for martyrdom. Castelli argues that Martyrdom of Perpetua 
and Felicitas is “a record of ascetic engagement, where disciplined practice and repetition generate a new identity 
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practices by which the self may be transformed.9  Foucault builds off Hadot’s method of reading 
ancient philosophy and articulates a general program of historical research to investigate the 
“practices of the self.”10  While I agree that these notions are useful for understanding martyrdom 
literature, their applicability requires some further elaboration. Foucault and Hadot often do not 
explain the imagined ends of these “practices of the self” and “spiritual exercises” in specific or 
practical terms. For a potential martyr, preparation for martyrdom involves preparing for a 
particular action in a particular setting—maintaining one’s confession under arrest and threat of 
execution. I argued above that preparation for martyrdom involves the inculcation of bodily and 
intellectual dispositions. These dispositions structure future practice and enable potential martyrs 
to endure persecution and torture, even up to death.11 It requires some discussion of how 
practices of the self may produce durable dispositions. I argue this understanding of preparation 
for martyrdom fits with the articulation of the “practices of the self” which Foucault offers in The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject. 
 In these lectures, Foucault questions the importance of renunciation to ancient practices 
of the self. Practices of the self in antiquity aimed “to acquire something we do not have, rather 
                                                                                                                                                             
and integrate a new symbolic reality.”  Perpetua’s practices of prayer, visionary experience, and interpretation 
enable her transformation into the confident martyr who responds “Christiana sum” even under penalty of death 
(6.4). This transformation is wide-ranging—bodily, religious, and social—and it is achieved through ascetic 
practice. While Castelli considers the text in terms of its “leaving a record” of this practice, I will consider how the 
narrative of discipline serves to exhort a similar disciplinary training among readers and hearers.  
 
9
 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (trans. Michael Chase; 
New York: Blackwell, 1995), 83. Hadot argues regarding the various ancient philosophical schools, “[A]ll of them 
linked their therapeutics to a profound transformation of the individual’s mode of seeing and being. The object of 
spiritual exercises is precisely to bring about this transformation.”   
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 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (ed. Paul Rabinow; trans. Robert 
Hurley et al.; New York: New Press, 1994), 223–253. For the language of “practices of the self,” I draw on the more 
in-depth treatment of ancient philosophy from his lecture series at the Collège de France in Michel Foucault, The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981–1982 (ed. Frédéric Gros; trans. Graham 
Burchell; New York: Picador, 2001). 
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 See pages 14–15, citing Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 72. 
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than renounce this or that element of ourselves that we are or have.”12  What is it that is 
acquired?  Foucault draws on a discussion of training by the Cynic philosopher Demetrius, 
which is cited approvingly in Seneca’s On Benefits. As Foucault reads this passage, the 
philosophers argue that one trains in order to “prepar[e] the individual for the future, for a future 
of unforeseen events whose general nature may be familiar to us, but which we cannot know 
whether and when they will occur.”13  Practices of the self, then, ready a person for proper action 
in specific situations. To be able to act properly requires the learning and embodiment of 
“inductive schemas of action which, in their inductive value and effectiveness, are such that 
when present in the head, thoughts, heart, and even body of someone who possesses them, that 
person will then act as if spontaneously.”14 The training one has received, the philosophical 
discourses that have been studied and practiced, “are effectively inscribed in the subject as 
matrices of action.”15 These matrices of action structure future practice just as dispositions in 
Bourdieu’s sense. One acquires dispositions to react properly to situations which may be 
foreseen in part but never in whole.  
 This elaboration of the practices of the self in terms of their ends informs my 
understanding of the preparation for martyrdom. A person who has fully prepared for martyrdom 
has so well learned true teaching that it has been inscribed into his or her mind and body and will 
drive the potential martyr’s actions in the event of persecution. The entire person has been 
transformed, such that he or she will react to the threat of torture and death properly. In 
1ApocJas, this means one must act with certainty of knowledge and without fear. The text 
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exhorts readers and hearers to train in order to control the passions, in particular the fear of 
death. Making use of a common set of connections in ancient moral philosophy, the text argues 
for practices of attainment of knowledge that enable the control of passions such as fear.16 These 
practices of attainment of knowledge include memorization and ritual recitation of theological 
truth to aid in its incorporation. Such practices are imagined to be effective because James learns 
that the aspect of his person which will suffer is only his flesh, which does not derive from the 
highest God and is not worthy of moral concern.17 If he truly accepts this knowledge, he will no 
longer fear. Through practices of discernment and training in knowledge, James inculcates 
dispositions that ready him to endure punishment in this world without fear and thus prepares for 
martyrdom. The text implicitly exhorts its readers and hearers to learn along with James, and in 
turn prepare for martyrdom. 
  
James’ Preparation for Martyrdom 
 I will first sketch the narrative arc of the text in order to show how the preparation for 
martyrdom provides a literary structure to the text. This sketch demonstrates also that 1ApocJas 
describes the preparation for martyrdom primarily in terms of acquisition of understanding and 
the control of feelings of fear and distress. These two themes are clearly linked, as James’ 
                                                 
16
 See Martha Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” Apeiron 20 (1987), 122–177; Julia Annas, 
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progress in understanding correlates almost perfectly with his ability to control his fear. In this 
section I will lay out in detail how these themes move through the text and connect this reading 
to the ancient understanding of ethics under which the themes would be inseparable. James 
displays his successful training at the moment of his death. While the people stone him, James 
intones, “forgive them, for they do [not know] what they are doing” (30.25–26). He shows 
neither fear nor distress, even as he is struck bodily by the stones and soon to die. James invokes 
his greater knowledge and states that his executioners do not understand the true meaning and 
effect of their actions. In 1ApocJas, the acquisition of knowledge is a disciplined practice which 
enables a student to manage passions of fear or distress.  
 The practical acquisition of understanding takes place over the course of the narrative. 
James regularly notes that he lacks knowledge and that he is afraid. 1ApocJas consistently 
associates fear with ignorance and courage with knowledge. The acquisition of knowledge drives 
away fear. In both cases, the relevant problem is martyrdom. James more specifically fears his 
potential death, his execution before the authorities. To conquer this fear, he requires a full 
understanding of the circumstances, meaning, and effects of martyrdom. James seeks to attain 
understanding in order that he may become unafraid that thus prepared for martyrdom.  
 The twin problems of ignorance and fear shape the first conversation between James and 
Jesus in the text. Jesus diagnoses James’ problem. “You are ignorant concerning yourself,” he 
says (ko dÄeÄ natsooune erok; 10.6).18 Thus he lays out the direction of this teaching—Jesus 
must bring James along in understanding until James sees who he truly is. Next, James voices his 
fear. Jesus has predicted his own death, and James asks, “if they arrest you, then what will I do?” 
                                                 
18
 The NHC V differs here, reading instead, “I am not ignorant about you” (oute NTe Nnateime erok an; 24.16–
17). Both readings express central themes–Jesus’ knowledge and James’ lack of knowledge at the beginning of the 
dialogue. If this were the only mention in either the NHC or TC of James’ lack of knowledge, I might hesitate to cite 
a variant reading in just one version, but the theme of James’ ignorance and later his growing knowledge repeats 
through both versions of the text. 
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(evwpe senamaHte µmok Hû[e a]nok ou peTnaaaF; 11.18–19). The connection between 
ignorance and fear can be seen here—James is afraid precisely because he does not know what to 
do. If he knew what he ought to do in the eventuality of Jesus’ arrest and execution, he would not 
be afraid and he would not be driven to ask this question. Jesus responds by consoling James. In 
the Tchacos Codex text, his consolation is, somewhat confusingly, prefaced with a prediction of 
James’ death. “When they arrest you and stone you, you will be saved” (Hotan euvanamaHte 
µmok auw NseHi wne erok eknaswte; 11.20–23). Jesus seems to be suggesting that James 
ought not be afraid because these deaths are not negative events, but instead they are somehow 
salvific. The Nag Hammadi version more explicitly acknowledges James’ fear. Jesus exhorts, 
“don’t fear, James, you too will be arrested” (µp®® Hote ûakwbos Ntak Hwwk senamaHte; 
NHC V 25.13–14). Following this exchange, Jesus provides a revelation speech to give James at 
least some of the knowledge he needs to be prepared to act properly after Jesus’ death. The 
didactic style and strategies of the dialogue can be seen here in outline. Jesus uses a double 
therapy to treat fear and ignorance. He first offers consolation to moderate fear, and then he 
provides revelation to enable understanding, which serves in turn to eliminate fear. 
 After this first revelation speech, James and Jesus again discuss James’ state of 
preparation in a short exchange. Regarding his fear, he says, “I am not concerned about the 
tortures that are in this place, [but] because of their rule” (au[w] nßmele[i] nïaïûü an [G]aï 
Nbasan[o]s et/HN peeima [alla] et/beï [p]eïuamäaïH/[te]; 15.13–15).19  Jesus responds, “I praise 
your understanding, and fear is making you a sufferer” (T® epainou mäpïekHht auw qote eire 
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(allïaï aei® Hote [...]u euam[aH]te; NHC V 28.29–30). 
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µmok µmaûHise; 15.18–20).20  James, through that first revelation speech, has gained some level 
of understanding. However, Jesus acknowledges compassionately that the thought of the ruling 
powers still provokes fear in James. It seems that James has not yet fully incorporated the 
knowledge which he has received. 
 At this point, with James having achieved only a part of the preparation he needs, Jesus 
tells James that he is leaving. Even though he will die, Jesus explains, he will then return. Jesus 
departs and is arrested and killed. James’ response, in a short narrative interlude before Jesus re-
appears, reflects his in-between state. “James heard about [Jesus’] sufferings, and he was deeply 
distressed and waited for his coming. It was this alone that he had to console himself” (ûakkwbos 
de aFswtµ eneFHise auw aFlupei mpva auw aFswmn´ ebol oube peFei monon de pai 
m[a]ouaaF peteountaFß µma[u e]sols¬ NHhtÏ; 16.27–17.4). The fear and distress, 
reflecting ignorance, are still present. But he knows Jesus will return, and that provides some 
kind of consolation. 
 Upon returning, Jesus foretells James’ death again. This shock reveals James’ remaining 
fear and ignorance. “Being afraid, James wept and was deeply distressed” (iakkwbos de 
euCabiHht pe [aFri]me auw aFlupi µpva; 19.7–8). Fear and suffering take him so fully that 
for the first time in the text, James is unable to respond verbally. He has to sit down. Once again, 
when confronted by his student’s fear and ignorance, Jesus’ teaching strategy is a combination of 
consolation and imparting knowledge. First, Jesus exhorts James, “As for you, do not be afraid, 
and fear nothing” (Ntok de mprvwpïeï NCabiHht auw µp®® Hote lïaou; 19.15–16). Next, he 
embarks on the longest revelation speech in 1ApocJas, which takes up six manuscript pages of 
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 The NHC V version is somewhat confusing at this point, as Jesus states, “I praise your understanding and your 
fear” (Ttmaeio Ntekdianoia mN tekHote; NHC V 29.4–5). The praise of fear is incongruous given the typical 
use of the term in the text. I think the TC may help explain this strange verse. James’ fear has led him to be 
concerned about the power of the rulers, and as I will argue, this is the proper perspective to take on events in the 
world. 
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the twenty in the Tchacos Codex text. Both of these efforts have their intended effects. Receiving 
Jesus’ consolation, James’ fear is assuaged. “When he heard this,” 1ApocJas reports, “he wiped 
his tears away and was greatly relieved from the pain within him” (aFbwte ebol 
nneFrµeiooue auw aFese µpva ebol HN tluph etNHhtÏ; 19.18–21). This new state of 
courage is maintained as James takes on this revealed knowledge. After Jesus’ long revelation 
speech, James responds confidently, “I have come to believe these things, and they are properly 
within what is in my soul” (aei® [pi]steuïe enaû throu aïuw auHµ [p]etHN t/aïyuch kalws; 
25.15–17). James continues to ask questions and seek further instruction, but he never again 
displays the sort of fear and ignorance which he confessed regularly during the first three-
quarters of the text. James does not merely say that he has received this knowledge, but further 
that it is “properly” (kalws) within him. James has inscribed in himself this understanding, and 
it will organize his actions and thoughts over the remainder of his life. 
 
Fear and Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy 
 The connection between ignorance and passions of fear or distress, which is repeatedly 
established in 1ApocJas, was likewise commonplace in much ancient moral philosophy. I have 
used the term “passions” for fear and distress because these were commonly located as 
paradigmatic forms of the emotions, called “passions” in philosophical works.21 The passions, in 
this broadly accepted understanding, had a primarily cognitive genesis. As Martha Nussbaum 
argues, this notion of the passions motivated Hellenistic philosophy to understand itself as a 
medical art.  
                                                 
21
 See, eg, Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.10–15; Epictetus, Discourses 4.1.84 (Oldfather, LCL). For translation of 
Cicero, see Graver, Cicero on the Emotions. For the Latin text of the Disputations, see Max Pohlenz, ed., De 
Ciceronis Tusculanis disputationibus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1909). For the Greek text of 
Epictetus, see Henricus Schenkl, ed., Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano Digestae (Leipzig: Teubner, 1916). 
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One reason [Hellenistic thinkers] believe that philosophy is the art best equipped to deal 
with human diseases is that they believe that philosophy—reasoning and argument—is 
what is required to diagnose and to modify the passions. This is so, they argue, precisely 
because passions such as fear, anger, grief, and love are not blind surges of affect that 
push and pull us without regard to reasoning and belief. They are, in fact, intelligent and 
discriminating elements of the personality that are very closely linked to belief, and are 
modified by the modification of belief.22 
 
The diseases of the soul, commonly through ancient thought, were passions of fear and desire, 
distress and love, which consistently lead people to act in ways contrary to reason. Acts contrary 
to reason in turn consistently cause harm to the actor so affected by passions.  
 If the fundamental problems of human existence derive from incorrect belief, then 
philosophical practice should be applied to correct false beliefs in order to break the grip of the 
passions over our actions and our lives. One of the clearest articulations of the origin of the 
passions appears in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations.  
Now, the cause of distress, as of all the emotions, is to be found entirely in belief … For 
while every emotion is a movement of the mind which is apart from reason or heedless of 
reason or disobedient to reason, the stimulus for such a movement may be of two kinds: it 
may be a belief either about what is good or about what is bad.23 
   
Good teaching takes as its fundamental task the modification of false beliefs. These philosophers 
understand that modifying false beliefs is not simply a matter of hearing new statements. It 
requires assiduous practice, deep engagement, and careful management of the self. Nussbaum 
discusses Epicurean thinkers as paradigmatic of a broader trend in Hellenistic and Roman 
thought. They understood “that the false beliefs that cause disturbance in life do not all lie on the 
surface of the self, ready for critical and dialectical scrutiny.”24 The story of the First Apocalypse 
of James, read through the ancient understandings of the passions and belief, appears to be a 
                                                 
22
 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 38. 
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 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.24 (Graver). 
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 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 133. 
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story of ideal instruction. Jesus does not only present instruction in true doctrine, but offers 
encouragement and critique aimed at engaging James’ whole psyche and enabling him to shake 
off these false beliefs. When James finally does correct his false beliefs, he comes to be no 
longer troubled by irrational passions. 
 1ApocJas’ focus on correcting James’ fear of death clearly fits within this ancient 
philosophical and educational discourse. The importance of the fear of death as an irrational 
belief impeding the good life appears most clearly in Epicurean writings of the first centuries CE. 
The first-century CE Roman poet Lucretius composed On the Nature of Things as a didactic text, 
and he devoted the third book to the problem of the fear of death.25 He argues, in one of the 
clearest statements of the text’s arguments, “this terror [of death], therefore, and the darkness of 
the mind must be dispersed, not by rays of the sun or by bright shafts of daylight, but by the 
aspect and law of nature.”26 The bulk of the third book works systematically to exhort and train 
the reader to understand the truth of a fully materialist view of existence, in order that they might 
no longer live in fear of death. If people accept this materialist teaching, then they will recognize 
that death is mere non-existence. Since non-existence cannot be considered an evil, according to 
Lucretius, then people who have inculcated this knowledge will no longer fear death. Instead, 
they will be able to live well and in accordance with nature. Lucretius calls on his reader to 
develop true beliefs about the nature of the human person with the expectation that this 
knowledge will be effective in treating the passions. The third-century CE inscription of 
Diogenes of Oeneanda, which he commissioned in order to publicly advertise the Epicurean 
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 For the reading of On the Nature of Things in terms of its didactic and therapeutic intent, see Nussbaum, The 
Therapy of Desire, ch. 4–6. 
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 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 3.91–93 (Rouse and Smith, LCL).  
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philosophy to which he held, articulates a similar notion in one fragment directly addressing 
Epicurus. 
(Gladly have I followed your) sayings on death, and you have persuaded me to laugh it to 
scorn. I am not in the least afraid because of the Tityuses and Tantaluses that some 
people depict in the underworld, nor does the decay of the body make me shudder, 
bearing in mind that destruction of the body causes no displeasure when the soul has 
perished.27  
  
Diogenes argues that death is neither good nor bad because the soul and thus the person will not 
be there to experience or judge. Fears of punishment after death are likewise irrational. Once 
understanding is achieved and false belief dismissed, the student will be able to live without fear 
of death.  
 Arguments of this form are hardly unique to Epicurean philosophy, though Epicureans do 
typically make the fear of death a special concern. Catharine Edwards argues that the control of 
the fear of death was a central theme in Roman thought in this period.28 The first-century CE 
Stoic philosopher Seneca, for example, explains that the fear of death is irrational, and anyone 
struggling to live well and rationally must no longer fear. He writes, “Most men ebb and flow in 
wretchedness between the fear of death and the hardships of life; they are unwilling to live, and 
yet they do not know how to die. For this reason, make life as a whole agreeable to yourself by 
banishing all worry about it.29 To triumph over the fear of death means to live in accordance with 
right reason, and this way of life may be achieved through assiduous practice of ferreting out 
false beliefs and slowly, carefully, replacing them with true beliefs. The structure of the 
argument in 1ApocJas follows analogous lines, as James receives instruction in true doctrine 
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from Jesus in order that he might no longer fear death. Jesus does not only give instruction, but 
also exhortation and consolation. This method draws James away from his fear and allows James 
to accept and embody the true instruction he receives.  
 One might object that 1ApocJas presents a theory of the good life and the human which is 
far removed from the philosophies of Lucretius, Diogenes, and Seneca. I would respond that we 
find arguments of this structure among Stoic and Epicurean thinkers who differ from each other 
significantly. The notion of attaining knowledge in order to control the passions was in fact 
widespread among various groups which held quite different notions of which precise beliefs 
were true. The discourse and practice of the inculcation of knowledge and conquering of fear is 
shared among writers and texts whose versions of true knowledge were profoundly different. 
1ApocJas provides further evidence of the broad ancient acceptance of this discursive link 
between fear and knowledge. 
 
Practices of Understanding and Effective Theology  
1ApocJas depicts James acquiring knowledge and gradually gaining control of his 
emotions until finally he embodies perfect equanimity at the moment of his execution. This 
interpretation raises further questions. How exactly is the acquisition of knowledge imagined to 
be effective? How does this particular knowledge enable James to control his passions and 
prepare for martyrdom? These questions demand a closer reading of the content of the 
knowledge which James acquires and the means by which Jesus relays it. This knowledge is 
contained in the text’s theology and anthropology.  
 1ApocJas describes a cosmos which is controlled by malevolent powers (“rulers”) and 
separated from the true God. Jesus begins by explaining that God is “unnameable and ineffable” 
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(ouatT ran eroF mNn ouatvaje µmoF pe; NHC V 24.20–21).30 The name most commonly 
given to God in this text is “the One Who Is” (petvoop), a locution that again emphasizes the 
impossibility of attributing characteristics to God.31 The only other figure who is mentioned as 
an inhabitant of the divine realm is Jesus, who came forth from the One Who Is as an image of 
the One Who Is (11.1–3). He came forth as the “second from the One Who Is,” apparently the 
first differentiation, creation, or hypostasis from the One Who Is (eank oumeHsnau eb/ol [H]m 
petvoop; 10.18). This initial section also describes a figure, “femaleness,” who appears to 
originate from the One Who Is, but who also creates a separate and weaker base of power for 
herself. “Femaleness existed, but she did not exist from the beginning. She created [powers] and 
gods for herself” (tmNtsHime nesvoop [pe] alla nesvoop an pe jN Nvorpi astamio nas 
NHÄNÄCÄ[om] mN HNnoute; 10.21–24).32 This initial discussion, while allusive, sets up the basic 
structure of the text’s theology. There is a transcendent, ineffable God from whom Jesus has 
come forth. There is a subordinate power of femaleness, who has created separate powers but 
who does not have the same transcendent character as the ineffable God.  
This theology reaches its fullest elaboration in the second dialogue’s long revelation 
speech (19.21–25.14). This speech takes the form of an embedded dialogue. Jesus tells James the 
questions he will be asked and then provides the answers James should give. Jesus explains that 
James will be taken before a group of malevolent powers. They will ask him questions about his 
identity, and Jesus, speaking both sides of this dialogue, provides for James the words with 
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which he can respond. Jesus tells James to explain to these power who he is, whence he comes 
and where he goes.  
[When] you fall because of (the) many, one of them will ask you, because he is a guard, 
“Who are you and where are you from?” You will say to him, “I am the son and I am 
from the father.” And he will say to you, “Which son and which father?” You will say to 
him, “The Father Who Is from the beginning and the son who is in the One Who Is from 
the beginning.” And he will say to you, “Where have you come from?” You will say to 
him, “From the One Who Is from the beginning.” And he will ask <you>, “Why have 
you come?” You will say, “I have come to all the ones who are mine and the ones who 
are not mine.”  
 
 [Hota]n ekvanHe HitN HaH [ou]n ouû navine mmok e[bo]l/ NHh/t/ou : j/e/u/f[ulax pe]  
j/e/ [N]t/k/ ouou h/ ntk ouebo[l] t/wne : Nkjoos naF je/ [a]n/ok pe pvhre auw  
ebo[l Hi]tN piwt : auw Fnajo[os] nak je av Nvhre h av n/iwt ˘ ekn/ajoos n[aF] 
je piwt etvoop jN Nv/[orpi] pvhre de etvoop HN pe/tvoop jN Nvorp auw  
Fnajoos nek je Ntakei twne : Nkjoos naF : je ebol Hm petvoop jN Nvorpi/ 
auw Fnav/N/t je etbe ou ake/iü Ngjoos je Ntaei va netenouû throu auw  
netenouû an (20.7–21.18)33 
 
James has come from the Father Who Is, which I take as another name for the One Who Is. 
James has his origin, in some unspecified way, within the same realm as the ineffable God. 
James’ mission in this world is more confusing. He will say that he has come for “those who are 
mine and those who are not mine.” It appears that his work is directed at once to people in the 
world who do not have their origin or nature within the One Who Is as well as to people who 
share with James this particular connection to the One Who Is. To explain the nature of these 
other people, the text gives a fuller explanation of its creation story. The embedded dialogue 
continues, and Jesus says that the guards will ask about “those who are not mine.” He gives 
James the response he must provide. 
They are not entirely foreign to me, but Achamoth, that is, the female, and she 
created these ones for herself. And she brought down the race which exists from 
the beginning. Thus, they are [not] foreign to [me], but they are mine. They are 
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[mine] according to [the fact that the one (f.) who is] lord over them is from the 
one who exists from the beginning. But they became [foreign] because the One 
Who Is from the beginning did not join with her when she created them. 
 
HNvµmoû an eroëû ëepthrÏ nüe: alla åçåµ‰œö e[te] taei te tesHime : auw  
astamio Nnaû nas : aseine de eHrhû µpgenos etvoop jN Nvorü[pi] ara Ce
HNvµmoû ero[û an n]eë [a]lëlëaë netenouû ne në[eteno]uëûü [me]n ne kata [q]eë  
[ete teto] N∆ß eroou ta petvaa[t te] jN Nëvarpi : Ntauë® vµ[mo] dëeë je  
mpetetvaapë jNë Nvorpi koinwni nµmas Nteërüeësëtamioo[u] (21.2–15)34 
 
Those who are not James’, the people to whom he has come, derive their origin from Achamoth, 
the female. Their differentiation from the divine comes about because “the One Who Is from the 
beginning did not unite with her when she created them.” So, this other creator, the female, is 
responsible for the differentiation of the world from the divine. She created without the 
preexistent One Who Is, and by this act she produced a people who are alienated from the divine. 
The naming of Achamoth as “the female” also explains the earlier passage about femaleness. 
The powers and gods that rule over this world are subordinate to Achamoth, who is a divine 
figure lesser than Jesus and the One Who Is. The powers who will question James, then, are 
themselves agents of femaleness.  
 Learning this theology prepares James for martyrdom. The literary form which this 
revelation takes has a further rhetorical function. It exhorts James to enact specific practices of 
ritual repetition in order to incorporate right knowledge. In the long revelation speech, Jesus 
provides both sides of an embedded dialogue, first offering the questions various rulers will ask 
of James, then providing the responses James will give. It repeats, “he will say … and you shall 
say.” The content of this dialogue constitutes the fullest exposition of the text’s theology and 
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cosmology. Jesus provides James with a clear and affirmative summary of true knowledge. This 
true knowledge enables James to triumph over his fear. 1ApocJas places this knowledge in 
memorizable form. Jesus tells James that he must remember particular statements so that he can 
repeat them in response to questioning. This embedded dialogue structure, then, exhorts 
particular practices of memorization and recitation of this summary of true knowledge. 
 This interpretation accords well with the textual history of the passage. As discussed 
briefly earlier, large sections of 1ApocJas 20.10–23.10 were also preserved, almost word-for-
word, in Irenaeus’ Against the Heresies 1.21.5 and Epiphanius’ Panarion 36.3.1–6. Scholars 
have concluded that Epiphanius has Irenaeus as his source, and so I will here compare only 
Irenaeus and 1ApocJas.35 Irenaeus states that he is transmitting a ritual text used by some 
unspecified group of heretics. Member of this group, when they are dying, receive instruction so 
that they might escape the world rulers after death. Speaking of ritual practice among this group, 
he writes that “at the very moment of their departure” the dying are anointed and then receive 
instruction: 
They instruct them that, after they have died, when they come to the powers, they are to 
speak as follows: “I am a son of Father, of Father who is preexisting. I am a son in the 
Preexisting one. I have come to see all things that belong to me and to others (which, 
however, do not belong to others entirely, but to Achamoth, who is a female). She made 
these things for herself. So they got their origin from the Pre-existing one, and I am 
returning to my own, whence I came.”36   
  
There is one key difference between Irenaeus’ text and this passage from 1ApocJas. Irenaeus 
does not cite these lines in a dialogue form, and there are no injunctions to say certain words in 
response to certain questions. Instead, Irenaeus’ version of this teaching includes only the 
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various statements which Jesus instructs James to memorize and repeat to the rulers. The 
responses are presented one after another, as a single speech, not interrupted by questions. The 
content of the answers, preserved in both texts, is nearly identical. 
In Irenaeus, just as in 1ApocJas, these are powerful words to be memorized. Further, in 
both cases, the repetition of statements is a form of training for death. In 1ApocJas, James may 
not be on his deathbed, but he is just as surely about to die. He must learn these statements to 
prepare himself for martyrdom. Irenaeus suggests that the passage was used for ritual instruction 
to prepare people for death, and that is exactly how this passage functions in 1ApocJas. It is 
possible that Irenaeus may have misinterpreted a ritual of preparation for death as a ritual 
performed over people who were actually dying. In that case, both Irenaeus and 1ApocJas 
preserve a record of an early Christian ritual of preparation for death. 
 The notion that the memorization and recitation of formulae constituted a key practice in 
the preparation for martyrdom has been argued with reference to other sources by Nicole Kelley. 
Looking at multiple attestations of Psalm 146 in acts of the martyrs, Kelley argues that the 
memorization and recitation of these passages played a part in preparation for martyrdom. 
Memorizing these passages could instill a belief that God’s eternal rule transcends and obviates 
the worldly authority of persecutors.37   
For three reasons, then, I take the embedded dialogue as an exhortation to particular 
practices of memorization and recitation. First, Jesus’ instructions to James call on him to be 
ready to repeat these words, implying a repeated practice of memorization and preparation for 
recitation. Second, an almost exactly parallel passage is described by Irenaeus as a teaching 
which is imparted to people about to die, for them to learn and repeat. Third, other Christians 
practiced the recitation and memorization of key formulae in preparation for martyrdom. The 
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precise manner of the presentation of theological doctrine in 1ApocJas, then, implicitly exhorts 
readers and hearers to undertake practices to aid in the incorporation of knowledge.  
 Thus, 1ApocJas works to inculcate dispositions and exhort practices of preparation for 
martyrdom. Recent studies of genre that consider 1ApocJas help to shed light on how the text 
engenders these two effects. Studies by Judith Hartenstein and Silke Petersen have attempted to 
move beyond the fuzzy category of the “revelation dialogue” or “Gnostic dialogue” to consider 
particular structural similarities among texts. Hartenstein identifies a set of dialogue texts which 
have what she calls a “story-within-a-story” format. These texts depict dialogues in which a story 
of the death and resurrection of Jesus is narrated, and revelation is given following the 
resurrection.38 She argues that these texts share not only structural similarities, but also a 
rhetorical and theological strategy. “The choice of an appearance of the resurrected as a 
framework for the revelation does not happen because of the lack of room in the earthly life of 
Jesus, but because of a theological idea: the content of the text constitutes a second and definitive 
teaching.”39 These are texts, Hartenstein argues, which work in similar ways, toward similar 
ends. 
 Silke Petersen builds on Hartenstein’s work in identifying these texts as “appearance 
dialogues,” given the central necessity of an appearance of the resurrected Jesus to the group. 
She identifies the Sophia of Jesus Christ, the First Apocalypse of James, the Gospel of Mary, the 
Epistle of the Apostles, and Pistis Sophia as sharing in this structure.40 The dialogues take place 
between Jesus and his disciples, with female disciples playing prominent roles in SJC, GMary, 
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and PS. 1ApocJas, while it does not have any spoken parts for female disciples, identifies a 
group of women as honored disciples of Jesus, and treats them as an important topic of 
discussion. Petersen hypothesizes that this structure of dialogue concerning ultimate revelation 
serves a rhetorical purpose—to spur dialogue among readers and hearers, and to bring them to 
accept and believe the revelation contained in the text. “The dialogues are texts in which 
elements of orality also play a role in textual composition. Dialogues were, like other ancient 
texts, not mostly read privately, but read aloud, listened to, and surely also debated, by which 
process the dialogue-situation was duplicated.”41 These are texts that we can imagine were read 
in groups, and in such a group setting, the dialogue structure serves to spur discussion among 
people. Petersen further argues that appearance dialogues often have a final summary of their 
revelation, which is meant to be taken up by readers and hearers as their own knowledge, to be 
repeated and learned.42  
 I argue that 1ApocJas exhorts a practice of inculcation of knowledge through ritual 
repetition, a practice which requires at least two participants (one for each side of the dialogue). 
In my reading of 1ApocJas, then, the text does basically what Petersen says that appearance 
dialogues should do. It exhorts its audience toward further dialogue, in which the content of the 
further dialogue mirrors the content of the text.43 
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Preparation for martyrdom here involves ritual practice aimed at the incorporation of 
knowledge. How is this memorized knowledge useful for inculcating dispositions proper to a 
potential martyr? I argue that 1ApocJas makes effective its theological doctrine for the 
preparation for martyrdom by linking that theology to its anthropology. Before Jesus’ long post-
resurrection speech, James admits he has been distressed because of what was done to Jesus. 
Jesus’ first attempt to console James challenges the cause of James’ distress.  
I did not suffer at all and I did not die, and this people has done nothing wrong. Rather, 
this was laid down for the type of the rulers for whom <it was fitting> to be prepared. It 
is the rulers who prepared it, then it came to its end. 
 
µpiHise gï[ar] H/[N] lïaïouï[e] oïuïde mpimou auw peeilaos eteï paei pe µpeF® laoue 
µpeqoou paû de eFkh eHr/hû µptupos nïnïarcwn e<v>v<e> eroF esb[t]wätÏ 
narcwn Nnetasbt/wtF tot/eï aFjwk ebol (18.12–16)44   
 
This passage affirms, I note, that torture and execution occurred. The rulers prepared the body, 
and it came to its end. However, the part or aspect of Jesus which was tortured and killed is not 
the essential being of Jesus. As he explains, “I am the one who exists from the beginning in 
myself” (anok gar [pe] pïetvoop jN Nvorp [N]Hht ouaat; 18,6–8).45 This discussion claims 
that the aspect of Jesus which has been killed is not from the pre-existent God, but it is a type of 
the rulers which ought to be destroyed. Earlier in the text, Jesus had exhorted James that to “cast 
off … this bond which is the flesh” (Nknouje ebol … Tm®re ete taei te etHN tsarax; 
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13.20–23). The notion seems to be that one’s flesh, which suffers and dies, is not worthy of great 
moral concern. Rather, the flesh and the body should be understood in terms of a cosmic drama 
of lower and higher divinities. The flesh which suffers and dies does not derive from the highest 
God and should not be counted among the essential aspects of Jesus. Instead, it is a type of the 
rulers, the lower divinities, and its nature is to cease to exist. 
Jesus in this way reassures James that James should not worry about him. But when Jesus 
reveals to James that he too must be arrested and killed, James, “being afraid … wept and was 
deeply distressed” (19.7–8). Jesus exhorts him again by applying to James’ situation the notion 
of the human used to discount Jesus’ suffering. “These things must happen to you, but do not be 
distressed. The weak flesh will receive what is laid down for it. But as for you, do not be afraid 
and fear nothing” (vve erok evwpe HN naû alla µp®lupei tsarax et/Coob snaji µpetkh 
nes eHraû Ntok de mprvwpÖe NCabiHht; 19.11–16).46  Just as the true essence of Jesus was not  
killed, likewise for James only “the weak flesh” will suffer. In Coptic, the last sentence quoted 
begins Ntok de, a topicalization of the pronoun. I have given this a strong translation, “but as 
for you.” The topicalization of Ntok makes clear that the subject of this clause is to be 
distinguished from the subject of the previous clause, the “weak flesh.” “You,” James, should 
recognize that your “weak flesh” does not contain your true identity. James, then, ought not fear. 
Just as the real essence of Jesus was not harmed in martyrdom, likewise only the weak flesh of 
James will suffer and his essential self will survive. The rulers, not the true God, created the 
flesh, and it is their type. When James comes to understand theological truth, he will understand 
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that what the rulers created is worthy of no concern when compared to that which derives from 
the highest God.  
This is the simplest structure of 1ApocJas’ exhortation to the preparation for martyrdom. 
One must not fear persecution, pain and death. The inculcation of fearlessness enables one to act 
bravely under arrest. To control fear, the reader or hearer is exhorted to practice memorization 
and recitation of true knowledge. Jesus reveals the nature of the universe, the distinction between 
lower rulers and highest God. The death and attendant suffering which a person might fear, Jesus 
explains, is inflicted not upon an aspect of the person which derives from the highest God, but on 
“the type of the rulers.” The knowledge which Jesus imparts is effective in this way. James 
thinks of his suffering and death as  
negative events to come, but Jesus exhorts him to understand them as indifferent because 
they are inflicted upon an inessential aspect of himself created by the rulers. If he can truly 
incorporate this understanding, James will cease to fear suffering and death. 
 
Martyrdom, Christology, and “Docetism” 
I have used language of “aspects” and “essences” to describe what Jesus means when he 
says “I did not suffer at all and I did not die.” Some essential aspect of Jesus survives when his 
body dies. As I have argued, there is no denial that Jesus’ death occurred. Rather, the text’s claim 
is that the essential aspect of Jesus was not harmed in the process of his bodily death. Armand 
Vielleux and other interpreters take 1ApocJas 18.6–16 (NHC V 31.15–26) as a clear statement of 
docetic Christology.47 But what exactly is “docetism”? Generally, the term refers to a 
Christology which holds that in some way the bodily reality of Jesus has not been affirmed. But 
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any more precision than this is often hard to come by. As Michael Slusser notes, scholars often 
seem to “classify as ‘docetistic’ only those Christologies in which Jesus does not meet a 
minimum standard of humanity—a standard which varies from scholar to scholar.”48   
Karl Tröger offers a useful categorization of different Christologies which have been 
variously grouped together as “docetic.” Tröger distinguishes between four general types of 
Christologies. First, there are notions which deny that Jesus had a material body and claim 
instead that his was a spiritual or heavenly body. Second, he lists Christologies which hold that 
Jesus had a real and material body, but his divine nature must be radically distinguished from his 
bodily aspect. Less relevant for this study, third and fourth are notions which held that the 
crucified was an entirely different person from Jesus and notions which do not separate Jesus’ 
bodily aspect from the rest of his existence.49 Tröger reads 1ApocJas as a Christology of the 
second type.50 There is in 1ApocJas no denial of Jesus’ bodily existence, nor of his execution. 
However, in describing the true self of Jesus, any essential connection between Jesus and his 
flesh is denied. Whether or not this theology is “docetic” is then a definitional question. Tröger 
retains the category of “docetic” only for Christologies of the first kind, in which Jesus only 
“seemed” to have a material body. I think this is a sensible suggestion for the more literal use of 
a complex term. As such, following Tröger, I prefer not to claim that 1ApocJas holds a “docetic” 
Christology.  
The foregoing analysis brings into focus how deeply the text’s Christology is intertwined 
with its anthropology. Jesus moves logically from articulating his own freedom from suffering to 
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arguing that James and other martyrs likewise do not have anything to fear from torture and 
execution. So, when Jesus says, “I did not suffer at all, and I did not die,” he is not articulating 
something that is peculiar to himself as the son of God. Rather, all people share this 
characteristic structure of the self. The flesh and the body may suffer and die, but the essential 
aspect of the human survives. This applies whether the body in question is that of Jesus, James, 
or anyone else. The ability of James to imitate Jesus at the moment of his death helps confirm 
this interpretation. The martyr who has fully incorporated the text’s teachings can thus become 
like Jesus.  
 1ApocJas exhorts preparation for martyrdom by means of this connection of Christology 
to anthropology. The text explains that the martyr’s flesh may suffer, but the martyr in his or her 
essential aspect will not. It is precisely this training in knowledge which enables James to control 
his fear and act according to proper dispositions during his arrest and execution. The intersection 
of Christology and anthropology provides the basis and structure of preparation for martyrdom.  
I highlight this intersection between Christology and martyrdom because it can offer a 
corrective to some theoretical work on martyrdom. W.H.C. Frend has argued that “martyrdom 
[was] in imitation of Christ’s Passion and physical suffering,” and as such that Christians who 
denied that suffering occurred could not support martyrdom.51 A similar formulation appears in a 
recent essay by Laurence Cunningham. Cunningham argues that Christians who did not 
recognize the value of the material body, especially Christ’s material body, could not appreciate 
or value martyrdom. “Gnostic Christians had neither a penchant for martyrdom nor an 
appreciation of it, since, almost to a person, the Gnostics were docetists with little evidence that 
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they valued the material in general and the body in particular.”52  1ApocJas demonstrates that 
support for martyrdom does not necessarily correlate with a Christology that emphasizes the 
bodily suffering of Jesus. The text makes an extended argument for martyrdom based on a 
Christology under which Jesus’ suffering body should be radically distinguished from his 
essential, eternal aspect which survives. Considering 1ApocJas as a martyrdom text demonstrates 
the variety of Christological and theological positions which might allow support for martyrdom.  
 Such a relationship between Christology and martyrdom in 1ApocJas was noted in earlier 
work by Elaine Pagels. She identifies a set of Nag Hammadi texts, including 1ApocJas, which 
either denied entirely the suffering of Christ, or which recognized that suffering occurred but  
denied that this suffering touched Christ’ divine nature.53  Pagels demonstrates that among these 
texts, support for martyrdom was found only among the latter group. She argues for a strict 
relationship of correlation; “in every case, the interpretation of Christ’s passion corresponds to 
the attitude toward martyrdom.”54  1ApocJas fits Pagels’ argument. It disputes in no way the 
embodied death of Christ, but it draws a strict distinction between Christ’s essential nature and 
his suffering body. Pagels argues that texts of this sort should take a pro-martyrdom position 
because of their acceptance of the real, bodily death of Christ, and indeed 1ApocJas does so.  
 I suggest, however, that some further nuance is necessary. The strict correlation suggests 
that it is the belief in the flesh of Jesus which enables a belief in martyrdom. In 1ApocJas, it is 
the belief that the flesh of Jesus is not the essential Jesus which undergirds the text’s exhortation 
to martyrdom. Pagels rightly sees a correlation between the honoring of martyrdom and the 
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belief in the reality of the body and the death of Christ. However, this does not mean that support 
for martyrdom must be based on the reality of Christ’s bodily death. 1ApocJas argues that the 
preparation for martyrdom works not by activating its belief in the reality of the body which dies, 
but by recalling that the body which dies is only the inessential aspect of the human. The 
argument for martyrdom in 1ApocJas depends on that aspect of its theology and anthropology 
which most differs from a radically non-docetic position on the bodily death of Christ. The 
relationship between Christology, visions of the human, and valuation of martyrdom does not 
have the form of a strict correlation, but rather various, differing forms of Christologies and 
visions of the human could equally instrumentalized toward the exhortation to martyrdom. 
  
Practices of Discernment and the Discourse of Martyrdom 
 1ApocJas, then, makes use of its theology and Christology for preparation for martyrdom 
by emphasizing that the fleshly suffering of the martyr does not ultimately affect the essential 
aspects of the person. This understanding is to be inculcated through practices of memorization 
and recitation. The third way in which 1ApocJas instrumentalizes its theology for the preparation 
for martyrdom is by exhorting a constant practice of discernment. This practice resembles in 
some ways practices endorsed by Stoic thinkers such as Epictetus, who argued that one must at 
all times engage the world by asking questions of what things are really worth moral concern.55 
In 1ApocJas, this practice takes the form of working to discern, within everyday events, an 
underlying meaning related to the cosmic drama of the rulers and the One Who Is. If James can 
understand the events of his persecution in terms of their significance and effects within the 
heavenly drama, he will be prepared to respond properly under arrest and at the moment of 
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execution. 1ApocJas exhorts this practice through a literary blurring of referents, where events in 
the heavens and on earth are described in equivalent, overlapping language.  
 The text draws an analogy between this-worldly authorities who will arrest James and 
heavenly powers who will detain his soul after death. The same words are used to describe both 
the this-worldly arrests of James and Jesus and the heavenly arrest of James’ soul. Jesus predicts 
his own arrest and death early in the text, saying, “they will arrest me the day after tomorrow” 
(senaamaHte µmoei Nsa raste; V 25.7–8).56 At the conclusion of the text, the same terms 
are used during the narrative of James’ arrest and execution. “It happened after … [that] James 
was arrested” (asvwpe mNNsa [. ]v auamaHte Nûakkw[bos]; 28.25–27). Strikingly, this same 
construction also appears at the beginning of the long post-resurrection revelation speech. The 
language of James’ seizure during his ascent in the divine realms mimics the language of his 
actual arrest later in the text. It is the same verb amaHte. In this speech, quoted extensively 
above, Jesus describes the heavenly drama in which James will be interrogated by malevolent 
rulers. James, concerned about his fate, asks, “What word can I say before I can escape them?” 
(av Nvaje peTnavä jooF vanT® bol eroou; V 29.2–3).57  Jesus finally provides a response 
that leaves open the question of whether these are words he must say to heavenly rulers or 
worldly authorities. “Look, I am going to reveal to you your salvation. When you are arrested, 
you will be among the following ones.” (eis Hhte Tnou Tna Cwlp nak ebol mpekswte 
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Hotan euvanamaÓte µmok knavwpe HN naei; 19.22–25).58  Once again, the verb is amaHte. 
The prophesied arrest of James by this-worldly authorities is described in the same language as 
his detainment by malevolent heavenly rulers. 
 The implicit argument in 1ApocJas runs that the underlying meaning of arrest and 
persecution must be understood in terms of a heavenly drama. The persecutors, here, are aligned 
with the rulers. The text calls on James to interpret them as such. Scholars have noted that 
various early Christian texts that talk about evil “rulers” in control of the world commonly draw 
implicit equivalences between these heavenly rulers and the existing authorities of the texts’ 
contemporary worlds.59 The blurring of the difference between these two kinds of arrests and 
two kinds of rulers works to drive James to interpret this-worldly events in terms of their higher 
meaning or significance. When one is arrested and interrogated, the text suggests, one is doing 
battle with the world rulers and one must not surrender. The responses which Jesus provides, 
which James ought to memorize and recite, are rebukes that assert that these authorities lack true 
power. Despite being under arrest, James will be able to resist and triumph because of his 
relationship with the One Who Is. The practice of discernment of the true meaning of arrest and 
persecution, then, is intended to instill dispositions which enable the potential martyr to resist 
questioning, to refuse to give in. If James understands that the people who have arrested him, 
who wish his death, are world rulers over whom he can win a greater victory by refusing to 
cooperate, then he will be able to accept martyrdom and not recant or attempt to flee. This is 
precisely the attitude that can be seen in James in his final moments, as he never attempts to 
escape his captors or avoid his fate. The text exhorts this practice of discernment, based on the 
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knowledge of the true theology and the nature of the world rulers, to inculcate schemas of action 
in the face of persecution that will enable the potential martyr to accept his fate and understand it 
as victory. 
 I believe that this exhortation to discernment can help explain one of the major textual 
problems in 1ApocJas. For a martyrdom text, the actual narrative of the martyrdom appears 
entirely non-standard. I will argue that the peculiarity of the narrative is the point. It demands 
from the reader careful interpretation. To explain how this works, I need to contextualize the 
narrative of James’ death within the ancient discourse of martyrdom. 
 As discourses and practices of martyrdom developed in the second and third centuries CE, 
particular elements came to proliferate in related texts. In his discussion of shifts in the discourse 
of martyrdom in the second and third centuries CE, Daniel Boyarin notes that “a ritualized and 
performative speech act associated with a statement of pure essence becomes the central action 
of the martyrology.”60 Likewise, in his typology of Jewish and Christian martyrdom, Jan Willem 
van Henten argues that one key element of these texts is the “examination, often accompanied by 
torture, by the ruler or other officials” in which the Jewish or Christian martyr “choose[s] to die 
rather than to obey the authorities.”61 The interrogation of the potential martyr became the 
climax of the text, and in turn the climax of the interrogation occurred with this performative 
speech act. 
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Paradigmatic is the interrogation of Polycarp in the third-century CE Martyrdom of 
Polycarp.62 Arrested and taken to the arena, Polycarp is questioned by a government official 
before a hostile crowd. The proconsul demands that he “swear by the genius of Caesar” and say 
“away with the atheists.” Polycarp groans and, gesturing at crowd in the stadium, calls out “away 
with the atheists.”63 He not only refuses to recant, he indicts the official and the crowd under the 
same terms they sought to indict him. Pressing on, the proconsul again tells Polycarp, “swear by 
the genius of Caesar.” Polycarp remains steadfast, and climactically announces, “I am a 
Christian.”64  With this statement, Polycarp effectively condemns himself and the proconsul 
sentences him to death. In the scene of interrogation, a power-laden dialogue climaxes in a 
performative statement of identity. 
In 1ApocJas, the scene of interrogation plays more as a comedy of errors than as the 
climax of a drama. James is not arrested for the crime of being a Christian, but apparently by 
mistake. The text reads, “James was arrested instead of another man” (auamaHte Nûakkw[bos 
nt]vFbiw epma nkerwme; 29.26–27). A lacuna and uncertain antecedents make parsing the 
following passage difficult, but it may not even be James who is then brought before the 
authorities. “It was another person named James who came out from the prison, and they arrested 
this one [for] him, and they brought him to the judges” (ka[i]o/ua peNtaFe/[i] ebol HN 
pev[t]eko eûakkwb/[os] pe peFran aua/maHte µp[a]ûü [Ha]roF a/ueine µmoF Nnekrith[s]; 
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30.4–7). This man is then released.65  “The majority of the judges saw that he had no sin, and 
they [released him]” (peHü[o]uüo de NNkriths auneuü eä[ro]Fä emNä näobe eä[ro]Fä auk[aaF] ebol; 
30.8–10). Debates between the judges and the people follow, but no interrogation scene takes 
place. After another lacuna James is stoned to death. It is possible that one of the lacunae either 
preceding or following this confusing passage contains a traditional interrogation, but it would 
have to be very short. Even a short interrogation seems unlikely. The scene does not suggest that 
either the authorities or the people have a clear legal case against James that would require his 
interrogation. Instead, James is executed as a result of a case of mistaken identity. He does not 
indict himself with a performative statement of identity under questioning. 
Given the importance of the interrogation scene and the performative “I am a Christian” 
to much martyrdom literature, their absence at the conclusion of 1ApocJas requires some 
explanation. I argue that it constitutes the text’s particular engagement with discourses 
surrounding martyrdom. I want to highlight this engagement both to explain 1ApocJas and to 
offer a small corrective to recent studies of the discourses of martyrdom. There was much more 
to ancient disputations over martyrdom than simply claims to support or oppose the practice. 
While I believe the debate between what Jesper Hyldahl calls the “martyrdom of death” and the 
“martyrdom of knowledge” was real and significant, it does not cover the entirety of the disputes 
among ancient Christians.66 In 1ApocJas, we have evidence of a text articulating support for 
martyrdom while carefully policing the bounds of proper and improper martyrdom.  
                                                 
65
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1ApocJas in fact does not lack an interrogation scene, but the scene has been displaced in 
order to more clearly articulate the essence of proper martyrdom. This displaced interrogation 
scene occurs in the heavens. As I have noted, Jesus tells James that before he is interrogated by 
the “guard” and the “toll collectors,” he will be “arrested.” The embedded dialogue itself bears 
the characteristics of a martyr’s interrogation. James is first arrested. Then he is put to the 
question by hostile forces, and he responds with statements of identity. By means of clever 
responses to their questions, James demonstrates his superiority to his interrogators and 
condemns them as lacking in virtue, knowledge, and power. While this scene of interrogation 
resembles Polycarp’s interrogation in the arena, it differs in two important respects. First, most 
obviously, it takes place not in the arena before a government official, but in the heavens before 
malevolent divine powers. Second, the performative statement of identity is no simple “I am a 
Christian” but an extended discourse on the nature of humanity, the highest God, and the lower 
rulers. 
 The embedded dialogue, then, contains not only the words which James must say under 
interrogation from heavenly powers. It outlines also the basis of an exhortation to martyrdom. 
James is truly the son who comes from the One Who Is, which means that his essential self 
derives from the highest God. His flesh is not his true self, and so he need not worry about what 
will happen to his body, even up to torture and execution. Further, the true meaning of 
interrogation in this world can only be understood by reference to the malevolent powers in the 
heavens. The resistance under “arrest” in this world mirrors the resistance under “arrest” which 
one will perform in the heavenly realms. The statements of identity James proffers contain in 
themselves justification for martyrdom and the reasoning under which one should remain 
                                                                                                                                                             
Apocalypse of Peter as texts which rejected bodily martyrdom, but he suggests little diversity beyond this duality of 
total support for or opposition to martyrdom.  
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unafraid in the face of interrogation. James’ demeanor at the moment of execution demonstrates 
that he has truly inculcated this knowledge and become unafraid, as he intones “forgive them.” 
James’ confessions contain the necessary instruction for preparation for martyrdom, and his 
actions at his death demonstrate that he has truly understood this instruction. 1ApocJas, then, 
displaces its interrogation scene to the heavens and expands its performative statement of 
identity to encompass a complete theological justification for martyrdom.  
By doing so, the text engages in a debate over the nature of true martyrdom. 1ApocJas’ 
intervention in martyrdom discourse resembles a set of claims made by Heracleon about 
martyrdom, cited approvingly by Clement of Alexandria in the fourth book of his Stromateis. 
Heracleon makes a distinction between two kinds of confession, and relates them to martyrdom. 
“There is a confession by faith and conduct, and one with the voice. The confession that is made 
with the voice, and before the authorities, is what the most reckon the only confession. Not 
soundly; and hypocrites can also confess with this confession.” Heracleon does not argue that 
confession before the authorities is a false confession. In fact he argues, “All the saved have 
confessed with the confession made by the voice.” Rather, what is necessary for right confession, 
and thus for the right kind of martyrdom, is a transformation of the self so that faith and conduct 
confess Christ before the voice does. “For he will rightly confess with his voice who has first 
confessed with his disposition.” Clement explicitly agrees with all these claims, saying, “he 
seems to be of the same sentiments as us in this section.”67 Heracleon and Clement argue that the 
Christian is called to more than simply an act of confession under interrogation. What is required 
is a full transformation of the person such that one’s understanding and conduct are in accord 
with truth. Confessing under interrogation should be simply a byproduct of this transformation. 
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 Clement’s position is somewhat slippery in this section. He states his agreement with 
Heracleon, but then later he appears to suggest that those who confess with the voice, but not 
with conduct, nonetheless confess truly. “Their witness, then, appears to be the cleansing away 
of sins with glory.”68 However, in the following section, Clement rejects those who make 
themselves available to be arrested. The key issue for Clement here is not that this person 
“volunteers” for martyrdom, but that he does not have the confession of faith and conduct.69   His 
actions mark him an unfit martyr. As Clement puts it in an earlier discussion, “they do not 
preserve the characteristic mark of believing martyrdom, inasmuch as they have not known the 
true God.”70 These martyrs whom Clement rejects, then, lack precisely the characteristic that 
Heracleon also demands—the confession of faith that comes from knowing the true God. As 
Paul Middleton aptly summarizes the point, “"Put simply, they do not know God, and therefore, 
despite any action they take, they could never be martyrs. Clement's discourse ‘unmakes’ these 
martyrs."71  So although Clement and Heracleon may disagree as to which martyrs should be 
rejected because they lack the confession of faith and conduct, they agree on the conceptual 
apparatus for distinguishing martyrdoms.  
 1ApocJas dramatizes the understanding of martyrdom articulated by Clement and 
Heracleon. By displacing James’ confession into the divine realms, the text makes clear that the 
confession of the voice before the authorities is not the ultimate goal. The actual arrest of James 
reads as anti-climactic because the demonstration of James’ true fitness as a martyr has already 
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been established in the dialogue. At the moment of execution, James’ demeanor shows that he 
has understood the teaching of Jesus. Thus he demonstrates his “confession of faith and conduct” 
in his imitation of Christ. The expansion of the confession serves a similar purpose. The 
cascading statements of identity bridge the gap between the confession of the voice and the 
confession of faith and conduct. Far more than a single statement of identity, the “I” statements 
of 1ApocJas articulate the text’s theology and anthropology. They contain within themselves the 
justification for martyrdom. When James “confesses” in the First Apocalypse of James, he 
performs in full his inculcation of Jesus’ teaching. When James dies, demonstrating his 
development of dispositions enabling martyrdom, the reader can conclude that James was a 
virtuous Christian by his words and by his conduct. His words and his conduct are one and the 
same. 
 Ancient discourses of martyrdom enabled multiple different positions and produced 
various disputes. While some of these disputes concerned whether or not any martyrs should be 
honored, many involved other issues. The topic which motivates 1ApocJas, within this discourse, 
is the nature of the virtuous martyr and the nature of true confession. The text implicitly 
challenges other martyr narratives in which the climax of both the action and the thematic 
content occurs in an interrogation scene in the arena. The statement christiana sum, for 
1ApocJas, does not suffice for confession. The true martyr is the one whose confession 
articulates the full scope of theological truth, demonstrating by belief and disposition that the 
martyr has inculcated true knowledge.  
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Chapter 3: Interpretation of Scripture 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the First Apocalypse of James narrates James’ 
preparation for martyrdom. He begins fearful of his death and ignorant of the nature of himself, 
of Christ, and of the highest God. Jesus provides him with revelation, and through the acquisition 
of true knowledge, James is transformed. The core content of this revelation appears in a long 
speech which Jesus presents to James in a post-resurrection appearance. In this chapter, I 
undertake an analysis of scriptural interpretation in 1ApocJas beginning with the same revelation 
speech. This analysis will then allow a reading of a set of difficult passages which follow after 
the long revelation speech.  
The embedded dialogue in the revelation speech bears several remarkable similarities to 
the Gospel of John, particularly John 7–8. This speech reflects a complex and creative reading of 
John. In this reading, John 7–8 provides an ethical program of preparation for martyrdom 
through its Christological revelations. The identity statements of Jesus are taken to constitute a 
description of the perfected state of the martyr. One learns to imitate Jesus, based on the 
statements of identity in John 7–8, in preparation for martyrdom. This reading underlies the 
revelation speech in 1ApocJas.  
 In this revelation speech (19.21–25.14), Jesus provides revelation about the malevolent 
“rulers” who will capture and interrogate James after his death. 1ApocJas draws a radical 
distinction between the highest God called “the One Who Is” and subordinate powers of a figure 
“femaleness” who created a separate power base of rulers (10.8–27 and 22.4–20). The “guard” 
and “toll collectors” who interrogate James are the underlings of the power called “femaleness.” 
The revelation is structured as an embedded dialogue, in which Jesus speaks both the questions 
that James will be asked and the answers that James ought to give. This organization implies that 
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these words should be memorized and repeated. Readers and hearers are thus implicitly exhorted 
to engage in practices of ritual repetition in order to prepare for martyrdom. 
[When] you fall because of (the) many, one of them will ask you, because he is a guard, 
“Who are you and where are you from?” You will say to him, “I am the son and I am 
from the father.” And he will say to you, “Which son and which father?” You will say to 
him, “The pre-existent father and the son who is in the pre-existent one.” And he will say 
to you, “Where have you come from?” You will say to him, “From the pre-existent one.” 
And he will ask <you>, “Why have you come?” You will say, “I have come to all the 
ones who are mine and the ones who are not mine.” … And he will say, “Where will you 
go?” You will say, “I will go to the ones who are mine, to the place where I came from.” 
If you say these things, you will be saved from all of these. 
 
[Hota]n ekvanHe HitN HaH [ou]n ouû navine mmok e[bo]l/ NHh/t/ou j/e/u/f[ulax pe] 
j/e [N]t/k ouou h/ ntk ouebo[l] t/wne Nkjoos naF je/ [a]n/ok pe pvhre auw ebo[l 
Hi]tN piwt auw Fnajo[os] nak je av Nvhre h av n/iwt ekn/ajoos n[aF] je piwt 
etvoop jN Nv/[orpi] pvhre de etvoop HN pe/tvoop jN Nvorp auw Fnajoos nek 
je Ntakei twne Nkjoos naF je ebol Hm petvoop jN Nvorpi/ auw Fnav/N/t je 
etbe ou ake/iü Ngjoos je Ntaei va netenouû throu auw netenouû an … auw 
Fnajo[o]s je Hie knab/w/k etwne nk/joos je eei[n]abwk va netenouû ne epma 
Ntaeiei µmoF (20.7–21.18) 
 
This passage contains a number of thematic and verbal similarities to passages in the Gospel of 
John, in particular chapters 7–8. While Jesus teaches in the temple in John 7.10–24, a debate 
breaks out as to whether Jesus is the Messiah. Some people argue that Jesus cannot be the 
Messiah because “we know where this man is from, but when the Messiah comes, no one will 
know where he is from” (John 7.27).1  Jesus responds, “You know me and you know where I am 
from. I have not come on my own. But the one sent me is true, and you do not know him. I know 
him, because I am from him, and he sent me” (John 7.29). The discussion then moves from the 
questions of who Jesus is, whence Jesus has come, and to where he is going. “I will be with you 
a little longer,” he says, “and then I am going to him who sent me” (John 7.33). This teaching 
causes consternation, and the Gospel reports “the Jews” saying, “Where does this man intend to 
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go that we will not find him?” (John 7.35). John 7 makes the case that the central questions 
about Jesus are these most basic ones—his identity, whence he comes, and where he goes.2   
The discussion continues in John 8, where, as Wayne Meeks has observed, the topic of 
Jesus’ origin and destination “becomes the cipher for Jesus' unique self-knowledge.”3  Jesus 
proclaims, “My testimony is valid because I know where I have come from and where I am 
going, but you know not know where I come from or where I am going” (John 8.14). The themes 
of self-knowledge and identity, origin and destination, all come together here. They serve to 
authorize Jesus. He is the one who knows that he comes from the Father, and his peculiar self-
knowledge authorizes his witness and his judgment.  
 The dialogue in 1ApocJas builds from the themes and topics of John 7–8. The questions 
which are asked of Jesus in John, and which the “guard” and “toll collectors” pose in 1ApocJas, 
concern the same issues of origin and destination. The answers are the same: just as Jesus came 
from God the Father, so James has come from the Father. Just as Jesus is returning to the Father, 
so James is going to the place from which he came. Further, Jesus’ authority in John 8 is 
explained by his self-knowledge. James’ self-knowledge, expressed in his answers, will 
authorize him to escape from these toll-collectors, and defeated, these rulers will “be troubled, 
and they will blame their own root” (senavtart® throu auw senaCN arike eteunoune; 
22.17–19).  James’ soul will then escape the guards. Jesus’ unique authorizing self-knowledge in 
John becomes in 1ApocJas knowledge which James must come to recognize about himself. It is 
now James’ origin and destination, James’ self-knowledge, which are contained in these words. 
These, I think, are the central interpretive tendencies evidenced by 1ApocJas. First, the reading 
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of John reveals Christological knowledge. Second, this knowledge forms the foundation of a 
practical, ethical program by which a person may inculcate this knowledge as knowledge about 
the self. The Christology of John comes to be knowledge about the self in 1ApocJas. 
1ApocJas uses distinctively Johannine terminology also when Jesus says that James has 
come to “the ones who are mine and the ones who are not mine.” This language echoes the 
mission of the logos in John’s prologue. John 1.11–12 reads, “He came to what was his own, and 
his own people did not receive him. But to all who received him, who believed in his name, he 
gave power to become children of God.” The Coptic construction used to articulate “the ones 
who are mine,” netenouû, is the same that is used to translate the Greek “one’s own,” τὰ ἴδια.4 
The language of coming to one’s own and recognizing one’s own also appears earlier in 
1ApocJas. This earlier passage even more clearly has developed from a reading of John 1. As 
Jesus is explaining his mission to James, he explains he has come “so that the children of the 
One Who Is may know what is theirs and what is not theirs” (j/ekaas ere Nvhre mpetvoo/p 
eunaµme enouou auw netenouou an n[e]; 11.5–7).5  John 1.11–12 connects a set of themes 
regarding the children of God, the reception of Christ, and the recognition of the people who are 
one’s own. This concatenation of themes is reconstituted in 1ApocJas 11.5–7.  
In the embedded dialogue, 1ApocJas presents a reading of the Christological sayings in 
John 7–8. This reading applies the Christological sayings to all Christians who acquire true 
knowledge of God. It is James, and by extension all readers and hearers of the text, who are 
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called to train in the inculcation of knowledge through the repetition of this dialogue. The 
knowledge they inculcate is the self-knowledge which Jesus presented as his own in John 7–8. A 
similar pattern appears in the reading of John 1.11–12. In John it was Jesus (or the Logos) who 
came to “his own” and the ones who recognized Jesus became “children of God.” In 1ApocJas 
this distinctive action of the Logos becomes the model for the action of these “children of the 
One Who Is” who come to learn what is and what is not their own.  
 
The Intertextual Gap: Ethics and Christology 
This analysis offers evidence for a textual relationship between the Gospel of John and 
the First Apocalypse of James. Such a relationship has previously been postulated by other 
scholars including M.R. Hillmer and Titus Nagel. Their studies, however, have not considered 
extensively how and to what purposes the John is interpreted. Instead, Hillmer and Nagel were 
concerned mostly with the possible “Gnostic” character of the passage in John.6 These studies 
have noted some sort of textual connection, but they have not worked out a theory or method for 
understanding this intertextual relationship. 
My use of the term “intertextuality” refers to a set of theories which flow from the 
recognition that texts are dialogical. Texts are engaged with their worlds, interested, and in 
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dialogue with various other texts.7 If there is not one pure text with unity of content and purpose, 
but instead texts constantly “weave in and out of complex interrelationships,”8 then we should 
approach texts with the assumption that they are gapped and in tension with themselves, as well 
as in tension with their various textual interlocutors. Julia Kristeva drew out these conclusions in 
her theory of intertextuality. 
If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various 
signifying systems (an intertextuality), one then understands that its ‘place’ of 
enunciation and its denoted ‘object’ are never single, complete, and identical to 
themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of being tabulated.9   
 
Kristeva’s does not theorize that texts “use” “sources,”10 but rather she argues that texts are 
characterized by a multiplicity which is never fully internally coherent. One can always 
“tabulate” the different ways in which different texts are in dialogue within a text, and these 
dialogues never fully cohere. They are, in Kristeva’s terminology, “plural, shattered.”  
Daniel Boyarin, in his Intertextuality and the Reading of Midrash, draws two important 
conclusions from this theory of intertextuality. Boyarin argues, “Every text is constrained by the 
literary system of which it is a part and every text is ultimately dialogical in that it cannot but 
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record the traces of its contentions and doubling of earlier discourses.”11 Boyarin picks up on the 
key idea that these dialogical, never fully coherent texts are necessarily products of complex 
cultural and literary situations, which enable and constrain their interests and directions. What I 
find particularly useful in Boyarin is his articulation, in relation to midrash, of the intertextual 
doubling that is endemic to the reading of scripture. “The very fractured and unsystematic 
surface of the biblical text is an encoding of its own intertextuality, and it is precisely this which 
the midrash interprets.”12 The methods of reading which I find in 1ApocJas are not midrashic in 
a technical sense, but the basic insight that biblical interpreters pick up on the “fractured and 
unsystematic” nature of biblical texts as their spur to interpretation applies also to 1ApocJas. It is 
the gaps, tensions, and multiplicities in the biblical text, in particular in the Gospel of John, 
which drive the interpretation found in 1ApocJas 
 The reading of the Gospel of John found in 1ApocJas builds from a gap in the 
presentation of ethics and Christology which is unresolved in John. We should expect 
intertextual work to be done in such gaps. Where John 7–8 is unclear about the relationship 
between ethics and Christology, the reading of John in 1ApocJas produces a full ethical program 
based on the inculcation of Christological knowledge.    
This gap in John’s presentation of ethics and Christology has been widely discussed in 
scholarship on the Gospel. Frank Matera has argued that in John, ethics and Christology 
intersect. For John, the believer who has true understanding of the nature of Christ is formed as 
an ethical subject by means of that understanding. Matera draws this conclusion from a reading 
of the stories in John, particularly in John 7–8, in which various people interact with Jesus and 
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either come to believe in him or do not. In coming to know who Jesus is, Matera argues, these 
people are transformed. “Faith is an ethical action, then, because it requires those who believe to 
alter the fundamental way they know and understand themselves.”13 The formation of the ethical 
subject, then, occurs in the moment of “faith in Jesus”—that is, the moment in which one 
recognizes the identity and nature of Jesus. Matera makes this statement most clearly in his 
conclusion. 
The moral teaching of the Johannine Jesus manifests a tremendous confidence in the 
outcome of faith ... If the world believes in him, all moral decisions will follow. This may 
explain why Jesus does not make more specific moral demands upon his followers. The 
one work that God requires is to believe in the one he sent into the world. From this 
comes the power to love, and all else besides. Ethics has become Christology.14 
 
Matera argues that the Gospel of John’s sketch of moral philosophy appears most clearly in its 
depiction of various possible responses to Jesus. The various disputants who do not recognize 
Jesus as a son from God the father in chapters 7–8 also fail also to constitute themselves as 
ethical subjects based on this recognition. The reader or hearer of John who understands their 
failure is supposed to achieve the recognition and subsequent self-transformation which the 
characters in John could not achieve.  
 In my analysis, Matera’s interpretation of John bears a clear resemblance to the reading 
put forward in Heracleon’s Commentary on John. This second-century CE text, which is 
preserved only in fragments in Origen’s Commentary on John,15 appears to have focused on the 
responses to Jesus of various characters in the Gospel, and looked for an organizing principle to 
                                                 
13
 Frank Matera, New Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1996), 101. 
 
14
 Ibid., 113. 
 
15
 For the Greek text of Origen’s Commentary, see Erwin Preuschen, ed., Origenes: Der Johanneskommentar (Vol. 
4 of Origenes Werke; Leipzig: J. C. Heinrichs, 1903). For translation, see Robert Heine, trans., Origen: Commentary 
on the Gospel according to John Books 13–32 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993). 
 75 
 
distinguish these responses.16  Origen preserves a significant passage from Heracleon’s 
commentary which treats John 8.44, in which Jesus tells a group of Jews, “You are from your 
father the devil, and you choose to do your father’s desires.” Heracleon argues that these Jews 
have become children of the devil through their lack of understanding.17 They failed to 
understand who Jesus truly is, where he has come from and where he is going. People who fail to 
recognize Christ become “children of the devil” through that failure of recognition, and not 
because of some underlying devilish nature.18 The moment of recognition or misrecognition of 
Christological truth determines one’s ethical nature. 19  For Heracleon, just as for Matera, the 
relationship of ethics and Christology in the Gospel of John is worked out in chapter 7–8. And it 
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passages as Heracleon did. On anti-Judaism in John, see Tina Pippin, “‘For Fear of the Jews’: Lying and Truth-
Telling in Translating the Gospel of John,” Semeia 76 (1996), 81–97; Reimund Bieringer et al., eds., Anti-Judaism 
and the Fourth Gospel (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001); Adele Reinhartz, Befriending the 
Beloved Disciple: A Jewish Reading of the Gospel of John (New York: Continuum Press, 2001). 
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 Origen, Commentary on John 20.215 (Heine). The fact that Heracleon does not claim that people are condemned 
by nature seems to be broadly recognized now in scholarship. Heracleon makes a distinction that people may 
become children in three ways, “first by nature, second by choice, third by merit.”  In the case of the Jews whom 
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 Heracleon’s reading of John, here bears similarity to Rudolf Bultmann’s. Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel of John: 
A Commentary, (trans. G.R. Beasley-Murray; Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), 157–160. 
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is these passages which 1ApocJas reads for its articulation of how knowledge of Christ may be 
made useful for moral formation. 
 I am using the language of “moral formation” to describe the ethics of John, even though 
it is not precisely Matera’s language. Matera articulates an ethics which focuses on the formation 
of an ethical subject rather than the precise regulations by which moral actions may be judged. I 
draw the language of formation from Michel Foucault, who outlined three possible models of the 
study of ethics. In the study of “moral behaviors,” the scholar would focus on “the extent to 
which actions of certain individuals or groups are consistent with the rules and values that are 
prescribed for them by various agencies.” In the study of “codes,” the topic would be “the 
different systems of rules or values that are operative in a given society of group.” Matera does 
not appear to be describing an ethics of behaviors or codes. In fact, he emphasizes that John pays 
little attention to precise codes or behaviors. Rather, what is being described fits with Foucault’s 
third category: 
And finally, a history of the way in which individuals are urged to constitute themselves 
as subjects of moral conduct would be concerned with the models proposed for setting up 
and developing relationships with the self, for self-reflection, self-knowledge, and self-
examination, for the decipherment of the self by oneself, for the transformations that one 
seeks to accomplish with oneself as an object.20 
 
Matera argues that in the Gospel of John, the transformation of the self occurs in the recognition 
of Christological truth. Knowledge of Christ is transformative, and one’s entire way of life 
becomes ethically grounded through the acquisition of this knowledge. In my reading, John 
treats questions of moral formation in Foucault’s sense. 
 Now, Foucault’s definition of this field of ethics involves more than just transformation. 
He talks about the models for setting up and developing relationships with the self by which this 
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 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure (trans. Robert Hurley; New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990), 29.  
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transformation may occur. Scholars debate whether John’s Christological ethics lays out in 
sufficient detail the means by which the ethical subject is transformed.   On one side of the 
debate, Wayne Meeks argues that the character of Jesus is too otherworldly to serve as a model 
for formation, and the disciples who make the choice to follow Jesus are not presented as 
following any rational basis for this decision that could in turn be emulated.21   Scholars who 
disagree with Meeks as to whether John “has an ethics” find that precise mechanisms of moral 
formation are nonetheless difficult to identify in the Gospel. Paradigmatic is Andreas 
Köstenberger, who describes the ethics of John as a “sanctified reductionism.”22 In contrast, 
what I think is evident in this sketch of the debate is that (1) the ethics of John are related 
directly to its Christology, as it is by coming to know the nature of Christ that one is formed as 
an ethical subject; and (2) John 7–8 is a key passage in which this relationship is articulated; but 
(3) the precise means by which this formation occurs and the precise mechanisms by which this 
formation depends on one’s recognition of Christ are not fulsomely specified in the Gospel.    
 This important but imprecise relationship between ethics and Christology in John creates 
exactly the sort of gap where we would expect intertextual work to be done. Heracleon’s 
Commentary on John provides evidence of another second-century CE text which built a program 
of ethics and Christology from the gaps in John 7–8. Likewise, the First Apocalypse of James’ 
reading of John responds to the rich but not fully coherent set of connections drawn in John 
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 Wayne Meeks, “The Ethics of the Fourth Evangelist,” in Exploring the Gospel of John (ed. R. Alan Culpepper 
and C. Clifton Black; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 318–322. He writes, “The Gospel does 
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between ethics and Christology, between the moral formation to which the believer is exhorted 
and the knowledge about the nature and origin of Christ which drives this formation. In the 
reading found in 1ApocJas, the Johannine Jesus becomes a moral exemplar for readers and 
hearers to imitate.23  Jesus’ statement, “I know where I have come from and where I am going,” 
becomes in this reading an articulation of the nature of all people. Reader and hearers must come 
to understand this statement and then transform themselves in relation to it. The text exhorts 
readers and hearers to practice inculcation of knowledge toward this ethical transformation. 
1ApocJas picks up on a moment of fracture in John, where the text is unsystematic in its 
presentation of ethics and Christology, and it draws from the text a broader, more complete 
ethical program.  
 
Response to an Anticipated Source-Critical Objection 
 In the above reading, my primary evidence for an intertextual relationship between John 
and 1ApocJas comes from a section of the long revelation speech on pages 19–23 of the Tchacos 
Codex text. I need to address the possible objection that 1ApocJas 19–23 may not be original to 
the text. If 1ApocJas simply contains a passage taken from an unknown source, then it may not 
be precisely correct to say that 1ApocJas is presenting a reading of John. One could say that 
1ApocJas merely contains a source which happens to reflect a reading of John. I want to address 
this objection from two perspectives. First, from a source-critical perspective, the majority of 
interpreters of 1ApocJas consider these passages to have been significantly re-worked in the 
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production of the text.24  From a source-critical perspective, then, the reading of John found on 
pages 19–23 would have to be taken as original to 1ApocJas. Second, an intertextual reading 
rejects the notion that a “source” might appear in a text without crucially shaping its meaning. 
Even if the entirety of 1ApocJas 19–23 reflects the quotation of a source, an intertextual reading 
of 1ApocJas takes the interpretation of John found in these pages as fundamental to the meaning 
and effects of the text. 
Much of this embedded dialogue appears, in a somewhat different form, in Irenaeus’ 
Against the Heresies. Because of the clear verbal equivalences between the text preserved in 
Irenaeus and this dialogue in 1ApocJas, various source relationships have been hypothesized. 
The majority scholarly opinion holds that this passage reflects the significantly re-worked use of 
a source. In Irenaeus’ Valentinian ritual, only the answers to the questions are preserved, while 
1ApocJas has a full dialogue structure. That is, 1ApocJas reads “one of them … will say to you, 
‘who are you and where are you from?’ You will say to him, ‘I am a son and I am from the 
father” (20.8–13). In the parallel text, Irenaeus has only, “I am a son from the father” (AH 
1.21.5). The context and the questions appear only in 1ApocJas. Most interpreters have 
concluded that most likely the passage in Irenaeus is original, a good record of an actual ritual 
text, and 1ApocJas has surrounded the ritual text with a larger narrative and drawn from the text 
questions which are at most implicit in the original. This is important because these questions, 
not the answers, most directly parallel the language of John 7–8. The statement of self-
knowledge from John 8.14 (“I know where I have come from and where I am going”) is repeated 
in the form of direct questions of 1ApocJas 20.19–20 and 21.18: “where have you come from?” 
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and “where will you go?” If the questions are original to 1ApocJas, then the clearest evidence of 
intertextual relationship is also original to 1ApocJas.  
Some interpreters have argued that an original question and answer text was abridged by 
either Irenaeus or the Valentinians, but preserved in full by 1ApocJas.25 If one follows the 
source-critical methodology sketched above, then because the reading of John comes from some 
other chunk of text inserted into 1ApocJas, one would conclude that this passage does not reflect 
a reading of John internal to the logic of 1ApocJas. An intertextual method of reading, however, 
rejects these source-critical assumptions. A text is always a “field of transpositions” in which 
various bits and pieces of existing discourse are being arranged and rearranged, and every 
transposition crucially shapes the text so re-arranged. This process of arrangement or 
transposition of discourse shapes the text in fundamental ways. If a text is a “field of 
transpositions,” then everything is in some sense “sourced,” and a text is composed of many 
sources which serve various purposes.  
These intertextual effects can be seen, in 1ApocJas, by consideration of Jesus’ discussion 
in 11.5–7 of “the children of the One Who Is” who come to recognize “what is theirs and what is 
not theirs.” This passage occurs early in the text of 1ApocJas and its immediate context does not 
provide any explanation of what it means to recognize “one’s own.” This passage’s meanings 
and effects are altered in relation to the revelation speech. Without the revelation speech, we 
would never learn what it means for the children of the One Who Is to know “what is theirs.” 
Only the revelation speech explains that “what is theirs” are those people whose origin may be 
found in the highest God and “what is not theirs” are those people who originate from the 
secondary power of femaleness. The passage in the long revelation speech, even if it is “sourced” 
from another document, crucially shapes the meaning and effects of earlier discussions in the 
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text. Further, we learn from the speech on pages 19–23 that this revelation crucially shapes 
James’ preparation for martyrdom. The statement by Jesus that he has come “so that the children 
of the One Who Is may know what is theirs and what is not theirs,” we learn in the revelation 
speech, refers to the preparation for martyrdom which is exhorted for all Christians. The 
intertextual relations within the First Apocalypse of James significantly determine the meanings 
and effects of the text, and the use of this embedded dialogue cannot be dismissed as the 
indifferent placement of a source.  
  
Readings of Scripture in the Passage on the “Seven Women” 
 This long revelation speech with its embedded dialogue does not conclude the revelations 
given in 1ApocJas. Rather, James asks a new question about a new set of characters. “Who are 
the seven women who have become your disciples,” he asks, “and whom all the generations 
bless?” (nim ne TsΩFe nsHime ntar maqhteue nek auw naû se®makarize µmau NCi 
Ngenea throu; 25.18–21).26 The discussion which follows contains the final revelation that 
James receives, before his martyrdom. Its placement at the end of the dialogue indicates the 
central importance of this passage to 1ApocJas. I will argue that once again a reading of scripture 
underlies these discussions. Further, the methods of interpreting scripture which organized the 
reading of John—the focus on integrating ethics and Christology—continue to structure the 
readings of Isaiah and Leviticus in the following passages. 
                                                 
26
 For most of the passages I will discuss in this chapter, the NHC V text is highly fragmentary. As to the general 
structure of the discussion, it appears just as difficult to parse in the NHC V version. In this passage, the NHC V text 
differs here in a way that seems to lessen the praise given the women. For my purposes in this chapter, the NHC V 
text confirms that the introduction of the seven women arises unexpectedly. “Who are the [seven] women who have 
become your disciples, and look, all women bless you.” (T[sav]Fäe NsHime nim ne Ntau[® ma]qhths nak auw eis 
H[hhte] se®makarize µmok/ [N]Ci sHime nim; V 38.16–20).  
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This final dialogue is confusing, digressive and not entirely internally coherent. This 
section begins with James’ question, seemingly unprompted, about blessed female disciples. 
Jesus offers in response a reading of Isaiah 11.2–3—cited explicitly in the text—in which he first 
interprets the “seven spirits” in Isaiah as divine powers who inspire prophecy, and then interprets 
them as honored female disciples. How can these two readings be reconciled? I suggest that 
these passages reflect the two different modes of scriptural interpretation which were seen 
previously in the reading of John in the embedded dialogue. Once again, the reading of scripture 
seeks both Christological knowledge and an ethical program based on the imitation of an 
exemplar. These methods produced a mostly coherent reading of John, but they produce readings 
of Isaiah which do not entirely cohere.  
 In the span of four manuscript pages, Jesus lays out a set of connected readings of 
scripture. James asks about “seven women who have become your disciples and whom all the 
generations bless.” Jesus first responds that these seven women were described in scripture.  
The seven women, they are the seven spirits who are introduced in this scripture: a spirit 
of wisdom [and] intelligence, a spirit of counsel [and] strength, [a] spirit of reason and 
knowledge, a spirit of fear. 
  
TsavFe NsHime ete/ neei ne savF µpna ne naiü evauNtou eHoun HN te/[i]g[ra]fh 
oupna nsofia H[i] m[Nt]sabe oupna nsojn/[e Hi] C/[o]m [ou]p/n/a/ [n]nou Hi soo[une] 
oup/na nHote (26.4-10)27  
 
This is a citation of a version of Isaiah 11.2–3 which closely resembles the text of the 
Septuagint: 
                                                 
27
 The NHC V is fragmentary here, but it was recognized as a citation of Isaiah 11.2–3 from the fragments. The 
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The spirit of God will rest upon him, a spirit of wisdom and understanding, a spirit of 
counsel and strength, a spirit of knowledge and piety, and a spirit of the fear of God will 
fill him. 
 
καὶ ἀναpiαύσεται ἐpi᾽ αὐτὸν piνεῦµα τοῦ θεοῦ piνεῦµα σοφίας καὶ συνέσεως piνεῦµα 
βουλῆς καὶ ἰσχύος piνεῦµα γνώσεως καὶ εὐσεβείας ἐµpiλήσει αὐτὸν piνεῦµα φόβου θεοῦ 
 
1ApocJas’ presentation of these verses is slightly different, as the spirit of piety (piνεῦµα … 
εὐσεβείας) is replaced by a spirit of reason ([ou]pna [n]nous), and the “spirit of fear” is 
included in the list instead of appearing in another line. However, these differences are minor 
compared to the differences between the Masoretic Hebrew text and both 1ApocJas and the 
Septuagint. In the Masoretic text, there are only six spirits. The Septuagint and 1ApocJas 
distinguish between the last two spirits, piety and fear, while the Masoretic text talks about a 
spirit of fear twice. It reads, “The spirit of the Lord will rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and 
understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of the knowledge and fear of the Lord, 
and he will delight in the fear of the Lord.” Only in the Septuagint can seven spirits or aspects of 
the spirit be distinguished, if one takes the “spirit of the fear of the God” from 11.3 as a seventh 
spirit along with the six listed in 11.2. Such a reading is unavailable from the Masoretic text, and 
so I conclude that 1ApocJas is drawing from a tradition similar to the Septuagint.28   
These divine female spirits, Jesus will explain, have been the cause of prophecy and 
specifically of the prophetic texts of the Jewish Scriptures. The seven inspired prophecy and 
more specifically, prophecy about Jesus. To explain the workings of these seven spirits, Jesus 
contextualizes their work within a short, allusive theological narrative.  
When <I> passed by the land of the great ruler, the one who is called Addon, I went up to 
him, and he was ignorant. And when I left him, he thought of me that I was his son, and 
he favored me as his own son. And before I appeared in these places, these (spirits) were 
already among this people, in the place where no prophet spoke without the seven spirits. 
And these are the seven spirits who have preached about me through the mouths of the 
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people, just as they were able to speak, because I had not spoken with all strength. But I 
have come and I have fulfilled (it). 
 
Nter/e/<i>jwwbe npkaH µpnoC narc/wn petevaum[o]ute ero/F je addwn aeibwk 
eHoun varoF auw ntoF eFo nats/[o]oune N[t]erieiü de ebol µm/oF neFmeoue 
ero[ei] pe je an˚ p/eFvhre auw aFcarise naei Hws peFvhre µmin moF auw anok 
Ha teHh empaTouwnÓ ebol Nneei ma ara neuvoop NCi naei Hµ pilaos ete paei 
pe pma ete mpeprofhths vaje cwris pisavÏ µpna auw naei ne pisavÏ µpna 
Ntautave oeiv etbht HitN ttapro nNrwme kata qe/ n/tauC/m/Com ejoou ebol je 
µpijw NtCom thrß [a]n/ok de [ae]iei aeijwk ebol (26.11–27.2)29 
 
First, Jesus talks about his travels “in the land of the great ruler, who is called Addon.” The name 
of the ruler in NHC V text is Adonaios (V 39.12), confirming that this Addon is a version of 
Adonai, one of the names of God. Jesus then relates that the great ruler mistook Jesus for his son. 
I take this as a parody of the common early Christian claims that Jesus was the son of the God 
found in Jewish Scriptures. The text is making a little joke. For 1ApocJas, Jesus obviously 
cannot be the son of the God known as Addon (or Adonaios), because Addon is a power lower 
than Jesus. The “ruler” Addon should be counted among the “rulers” who are the underlings of 
the power of “femaleness” rather than of the highest God. So how did people get the idea that 
Jesus was the son of the ruler, Addon? What happened was that this ruler mistook Jesus for his 
son, and Jesus never disabused him of the notion. The whole idea that this lower divinity could 
be the father of Jesus came about through a comic misunderstanding.30   
 After establishing that the God referred to in the Jewish Scriptures is not necessarily the 
highest God, the text then needs to explain how it is that prophetic texts may nonetheless be 
divinely inspired. Jesus, after all, has just cited Isaiah as an authoritative text. Jesus explains that 
this ruler Addon controlled certain lands, and prophets appeared in “these places … with this 
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very people.” I take this as an allusive description of Jewish prophets in the land of Israel. These 
prophets spoke about Jesus and prepared for him. These prophets, Jesus explains, were able to 
preach truly because they were inspired by the seven spirits, who are agents of the highest God. 
Thus, 1ApocJas argues that many references to God in Jewish scripture actually refer to Addon, 
the ignorant ruler. Only a subset of the references to God refer to the highest God. Jesus is not 
the son of Addon, but rather he is the son of the highest God, “the One Who Is.” The Jewish 
Scriptures contain true prophecy because agents of the highest God, these seven spirits, worked 
through the prophets. 
   
The Dialogue with Trypho and the Christological Reading of Scripture 
This reading of Isaiah 11.2–3 parallels in several aspects a reading of the same passage 
presented in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho. The parallels reflect a shared hermeneutic, 
under which one reads Jewish Scripture in order to seek knowledge about the nature of Christ. 
One finds this knowledge by identifying multiple divine figures in the scriptures.31 The Dialogue 
is a second-century CE text which portrays a dialogue between Justin, who writes himself as the 
first-person narrator, and a group of Jews represented mostly by Trypho. In chapters 87–88 of 
the Dialogue, Justin is in the midst of laying out a reading of Jewish Scripture which finds Jesus 
Christ as a second power in heaven alongside God. Justin argues, “We have likewise proved that 
in many scriptural passages Christ is symbolically called a stone,” and “We have likewise shown 
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that every chrism, whether of oil, or myrrh, or any other balsam compound, was a figure of 
Christ.”32  For Justin, proper hermeneutical method requires identifying those words and figures 
which stand for Christ, by which his work and his words have been prophesied, and through 
which one can come to understand the nature and activity of Christ. Among the key markers that 
should alert the reader to Jesus’ presence are titles for God or other divine figures. He argues, 
“[Christ] received from the Father the titles of King and Christ and the first and Angel.”33 It is 
not only common objects and actions which figure Christ, but more importantly all these various 
divine titles. 
One can see this Christological hermeneutic at work in the passage that follows. Trypho 
quotes Isaiah 11.1–3, and then asks a question of Justin:  
Explain to me the following words of Isaiah: “A shoot shall sprout from the root of Jesse, 
and a flower shall blossom out of his root. And a spirit of God shall rest upon him, a 
spirit of wisdom and understanding, a spirit of counsel and fortitude, a spirit of 
knowledge and piety, and he shall be filled with a spirit of the fear of the Lord.” Now you 
have admitted that these words were spoken of Christ … How can you prove that Christ 
already existed, since he is endowed with these gifts of the Holy Spirit which the above-
quoted passages of Isaiah attribute to him as though he had lacked them?34  
 
Justin responds, first, that the gifts were not bestowed upon Christ to fill a lack. The key phrase 
in the passage, he explains, is “the spirit of the Lord will rest upon him.” Justin interprets “rest” 
to mean “come to rest” or “be completed.” Thus, Isaiah 11.2 tells how “the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit … came to an end with [Christ], so that the word has no more prophets among your people 
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as of old.”35  So, in Justin’s reading, the gifts were indeed not bestowed to fill a lack. Rather, the 
gifts are completed by Christ.  
Further, these gifts of the Holy Spirit represent the “powers” by which prophecy has 
occurred in the past. Justin continues, “Each of your prophets, by receiving one or two powers 
from God, did and said those things which we have learned from the scriptures.”36 Justin 
interprets Isaiah 11.2 to be speaking about Christ and about prophetic gifts which came to an end 
with Christ. Justin argues that the prophets were able to prophesy by means of these spirits 
described in Isaiah. The prophets, typically, received only one or two of the spirits. Because of 
this, these prophets who came before Jesus had inspiration from God, but they had not received 
the fullness of the gifts. Justin’s explansive list of prophets includes not only the figures counted 
as prophets in traditional categorization of books of the Bible (i.e. Ezekiel, Isaiah, Jeremiah, etc), 
but also Moses, Solomon, and David (87.4). Thus, as Bruce Chilton argues, Justin’s reading of 
Isaiah 11.1–3 serves to explain the inspiration of nearly all of scripture.37 Almost every book of 
scripture is attributed to a “prophet” by this method. These prophets were able to work because 
they were inspired by these spirits, but none of the prophets received the fullness of the spirits. 
Because Christ had upon him the full complement of the spirit, Christ’s coming brought 
prophecy to completion.  
In 1ApocJas, we find not only a reading of the same passage of Isaiah, but also nearly 
identical conclusions drawn about the nature of prophecy and scripture. Jesus states that prophets 
prophesied by means of these spirits. “These spirits were among this people, where no prophet 
spoke without these seven spirits” (26.20–24). Further, people who prophesied by means of these 
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spirits prophesied only “as far as they were able to speak, because I had not yet spoken with all 
strength. But I came and fulfilled (it)” (27.1–3). The prophets who are responsible for the Jewish 
Scriptures did not prophecy fully, but only “as far as they were able to speak.” So, just as in the 
Dialogue, the spirits of Isaiah 11.2 inspire the production of scripture. And further in parallel to 
Justin’s reading, this scripture is divinely inspired but does not have the fullness of God within it, 
and so the fulfillment of this scripture comes about with Jesus.  
The comparison to Justin, I think, helps to identify one of the methods of scriptural 
interpretation reflected in 1ApocJas. By this method, one seeks within scriptural texts knowledge 
about the nature of Christ. The implicit argument of both Justin and 1ApocJas is that one ought 
to read scripture for knowledge about Christ. In fact, both argue through readings of Isaiah that 
scripture tells us that its subject is Christ. As Jesus puts it in 1ApocJas, the prophets “preached 
about me” (26.26). The topic of the Jewish Scriptures, for both Justin and 1ApocJas, is Christ. 
Further, both Justin and 1ApocJas distinguish between multiple divine figures in the Jewish 
Scriptures. In neither case does this identification of multiple divine powers suggest a non-
monotheistic theology. Both Justin and 1ApocJas identify secondary, lower divine powers, while 
maintaining the transcendence of the highest God. In both texts, the different names of God serve 
as evidence of multiple divine figures in the heavens. The “him” in Isaiah 11.2–3 refers to Christ 
and to his role as the one who brings prophecy to completion. The spirits in this passage can then 
be distinguished from Jesus. These other divine powers have been active historically and have 
enabled the production of scriptural texts which contain knowledge about Jesus. 1ApocJas makes 
a similar distinction between Jesus and the spirits of prophecy, but 1ApocJas adds a third 
distinction by arguing that Addon was not the highest God but instead a secondary ruler. This 
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section thus exemplifies the Christological hermeneutic found in 1ApocJas, which it shares with 
Justin.  
 
 
 
Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora and the Ethical Reading of Scripture 
The identification of multiple divine figures in the heavens accords with a short passage 
earlier in 1ApocJas. James is praying alone after the crucifixion of Jesus, and Jesus appears to 
him. James ceases his prayer. Jesus praises James, saying, “already you have been released, so 
that you know me and you know yourself and you ceased the prayer that the Just God prays” 
(hdh je aukaak ebol eknaäsouwnt/ auw nksouwnk auw nkkw Hüwk Ntproseuch taei 
NtaFtwbÓ µmos NCi pnoute Ndikaios; 18.21–25). The passage claims, then, that there is a 
secondary God who is not evil, but who is subordinate to the highest God. To this divinity 
traditional pieties of prayer have been (mis)directed. Christians, the passage implicitly argues, 
should cease these traditional devotions to a lower God and direct their prayer instead to the 
highest God. The God who had been the object of traditional piety and prayer among devout 
Jews seems like the clear referent of this discussion as well. In both cases, the God named in 
Jewish Scriptures may not be the highest God but a secondary, imperfect, mistaken deity. 
 This naming of a secondary “just God” suggests a parallel to Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora. 
The Letter to Flora is preserved in Epiphanius of Salamis’ Against the Heresies book 33,38 and it 
takes up as its explicit subject the proper method of reading what it calls “the law,” referring to 
                                                 
38
 On the text of the Letter to Flora, see Gilles Quispel, ed., Lettre à Flora: Analyse, texte critique, traduction, 
commentaire et index grec (SC 24; Paris: Cerf, 1966). For translation see Bentley Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures 
(New York: Doubleday, 1987), 306–315. 
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the Pentateuch of Moses.39  Ptolemy presents himself as offering a fair and balanced middle 
position between two extremes. When Christians discuss how to interpret scripture, Ptolemy 
says, some incorrectly claim that the law comes from the perfect God, despite the obvious 
imperfections of the law.40  Some other Christians assert that the law has come from the 
adversary, the devil, even though obviously it contains just teaching. The devil could not be 
responsible for just teaching.41 Having rejected these positions as clearly flawed, Ptolemy 
proceeds to stake out a position between them. He presents two threefold divisions. First, the 
authorship of the law is divided between God, Moses, and the elders.42  Second, the law of God 
contains pure but imperfect legislation, legislation interwoven with injustice, and legislation 
meant to be interpreted symbolically.43 The God who established a law which is imperfect, even 
at times interwoven with injustice, Ptolemy argues, could not be the highest God or the devil. 
Instead, this must be an intermediate figure who is merely just. “A being that is in a state 
intermediate between these and is neither good, nor evil and unjust, might well be properly 
called just, being a judge of the justice that is his.”44 Thus Ptolemy explains the existence of a 
“just God” like the one Jesus mentioned in 1ApocJas. 
 This just God provides the most obvious point of comparison between the two texts. Both 
texts reflect readings of Jewish Scripture which strive to identify multiple, distinct divinities in 
                                                 
39
 On the reading of scripture in Ptolemy, see Francis T. Fallon, “The Law in Philo and Ptolemaeus: A Note on the 
Letter to Flora,” Vigilium Christianae 30 (1976), 45–51; Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 77–94; Tuomas Rasimus, 
“Ptolemaeus and the Valentinian Exegesis of John’s Prologue,” in The Legacy of John, 145–172.  
 
40
 Ptolemy, Letter to Flora 33.3.4. 
 
41
 Ibid. 33.3.5 
 
42
 Ibid. 33.4.1 
 
43
 Ibid. 33.5.1–2 
 
44
 Ibid. 33.7.6 (Layton). 
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the biblical text. In the Letter to Flora, this process of identification and distinction uses the 
words of Jesus, mostly from the Gospel of Matthew, to sort the legal codes according to their 
righteousness. Ptolemy explains, for instance, that in Matthew 5.39, “the commandment of ‘an 
eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,’ which is interwoven with injustice and itself involves an 
act of injustice, was abolished by the savior with injunctions to the contrary.”45  Jesus provides 
the key to this interpretation. Jesus’ statements that certain laws have been perfected and that 
certain laws should be understood based on meaning in the heart lead Ptolemy to create parallel 
distinctions in his typology. By using Jesus’ words as the key to the interpretation, Ptolemy finds 
in the authorship of the Jewish Scriptures an intermediate divine figure who can be responsible 
for the just but imperfect legislation that Jesus re-interprets.  
 The second thing I want to highlight, in this comparison, is how the modern category of 
“ethics” can be used to describe the interests of both 1ApocJas and the Letter to Flora, even 
while they do quite different work. This is why I have made use of Michel Foucault’s 
distinctions between different modes of the study of ethics. Ptolemy focuses on the content of 
law codes, legislation regarding what one ought to do or not to do. One must read the Jewish 
Scriptures in order to determine which acts are permitted and which are outlawed, and it is with 
this goal always in mind that the text sets out to determine which rulings are authoritative, to 
what degree, and for what reason. This discussion concerns the study of ethical codes, the 
production of rules for evaluating behavior.  
In 1ApocJas, the embedded dialogue provides ethical exhortation in a quite different way. 
There is no elaboration of a code by which behavior might be judged. Instead, Jesus exhorts 
James to inculcate knowledge about himself and the nature of God. By inculcating this 
knowledge, James will be transformed as a subject of ethics. This transformation will produce in 
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 Ibid. 33.6.5 (Layton). 
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James dispositions so that he may be prepared for martyrdom. The reading in 1ApocJas is 
ethical, then, but in a different way from the reading in the Letter to Flora. The former focuses 
on the formation of the self, the latter on the determination of codes of forbidden and acceptable 
behavior.  
 
The Three Women as Moral Exemplars and the Ethical Reading of Isaiah 11.2–3 
The ethical hermeneutic for the reading of scripture, which the long revelation speech 
reflected, may also be seen in the following discussion about the seven women. Jesus’ initial 
response to James’ question about these women adduces Isaiah 11.2–3 in order to argue that 
these women are spirits of prophecy described in scripture. In the very next passage, 1ApocJas 
presents a second, parallel reading of the same text focused on the presentation of moral 
exemplars. James says that he accepts the teaching Jesus has provided about the seven spirits, but 
he has a further question. “Since one has considered the seven all together as a group, do you 
have some being more honored than others?” (27.7–9). James states that the earlier interpretation 
considered who the seven spirits were collectively. They were divine agents who inspired 
prophecy. He explains that his question now concerns the seven as distinct figures, and he asks 
whether there are certain of them who are particularly honored. Jesus first praises James lavishly. 
Then he praises even more lavishly three of the women. This is an extension of the earlier 
interpretation, as Jesus continues speaking of the seven who were described in Isaiah 11.2. 
Be persuaded by this other example, which is that of Salome, Mary, and Arsinoe, whom I 
will introduce to you, since [they] are worthy of the One Who Is. For they have become 
sober, and they have [cast away] the blindness which was in their minds, and they have 
come to know who I am.  
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® piqesqai on mpeeikeoua ete salwme mn mariHammhn auw arsinoh nai eTna® 
sunHista µmau nek e/[u]µpva µpetvoop kai gar aäuä® nh/fe auw a/uä[n]o/uje/ [e]bol/ 
Nt/m/[n]tb¬le etHn [p]euHht au[w] au® noû mmoû je anok ouo[u] (27.25–28.5)46 
 
I take this passage as an exhortation to imitate the three women. Jesus says, “let yourself be 
convinced by this other (example).”47 He then explains that he introduces these women to James 
for four reasons. First, they have become “worthy of the One Who Is.” Second, they “have 
become sober.” Third, they “have cast away the blindness that was in their minds.” Finally, they 
have “come to know who I am.” Each of these descriptions of the women has a clear analogue in 
earlier statements by Jesus about what James ought to do. What these women have achieved, 
then, is precisely what Jesus has exhorted James to achieve. James has to become “worthy of 
[his] own root” ([k]µpva Nteknoune mmin mmok; 27.13–14). His “root,” under the text’s 
anthropology, refers to the source of the essential aspect of himself, the One Who Is. Jesus 
earlier exhorted James to “attain to the One Who Is” (knapwH va petvoot; 13.23–24),48 in a 
similar construction with a similar goal of exhorting development of the self. Jesus has praised 
James for having “cast away the cup of drunkenness” (aknouje ebol [m]mok mpipothrion 
                                                 
46
 At line 28.3, the Kasser/Wurst edition here reads [t]oujo/, which would have the meaning “they have been saved 
from the blindness which was in their minds.”  As best as I can tell, the space where they reconstruct a tau could 
also have fit a nu, and the reconstruction of the omicron at the end of the word is based on a small piece of an arc 
which could also be part of an epsilon, not an omicron. toujo and nouje are both possible readings, and since the 
text has used the phrase “cast away” in a nearly identical phrase before, I think mine is the more likely 
reconstruction. One other difference worth noting here is the verb in the sentence. While in the Tchacos Codex Jesus 
clearly exhorts James to “be convinced by” (® piqesqai) the example of the three women, the NHC V version has 
the more ambiguous twt NHht. Most translations previous to the publication of the Tchacos Codex took twt NHht 
as a transitive verb meaning something like “encourage,” but Antti Marjanen correctly noted that this form in the 
imperative is much more likely to be intransitive, meaning “be persuaded by.”  The Tchacos Codex confirms his 
interpretation. See Marjanen, The Woman Jesus Loved, 132–135. I will discuss the names of the three women and 
their parallels in chapter 5.  
 
47
 On the argument that the ambiguous “peeikeoua” refers to the presentation of an example, see Petersen, Zerstort 
Die Werke Der Weiblichkeit!, 250–251. 
 
48
 The NHC V version here has an identical translation. The Coptic is slightly different, but only in unimportant 
ways, such as using a Greco-Coptic verb in place of the Coptic and using a different but equivalent preposition 
(eknakatanta eHraû epetvoop; V 27.6–7).  
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mpT[H]e; 27.15–16),49 and these women have gone further and “become sober.” Third, in the 
same passage earlier in the text where Jesus told James that he must attain to the One Who Is, 
Jesus explained that James could not attain to the One Who Is unless he “cast away the blindness 
that is in [his] mind” (Nknouje ebol NtmNtb¬le etHN pekHht; 13.20–21).50 The wording is 
identical. Finally, these women have come to know who Jesus is. This has a parallel in the very 
first page of 1ApocJas, where Jesus explains to James how he will give him the knowledge he 
seeks. Jesus says, “[I] will tell you who I am” (e/e/[i]natamok je anok nim/; 10.7). If James 
receives the knowledge which Jesus reveals to him through their dialogue, then he, like these 
women, will come to know Jesus’ identity. These women embody precisely the state to which 
James ought to attain, which he has begun to realize. They are models for imitation. This passage 
exemplifies 1ApocJas’ ethical hermeneutic. The text reflects readings of scripture which uncover 
moral exemplars, figures to imitate in ethical practice. Through this hermeneutic, Isaiah 11.2–3 
provides practical knowledge to readers in the form of figures who are to be not only honored 
but imitated. The readers learn from the text how they ought to organize their lives and whom 
they ought to imitate in their practices of the self.  
 The two readings of Isaiah 11.2–3 which the text puts forward do not initially appear 
consistent with each other. In the Christological reading, the seven spirits were interpreted as 
divine powers who preceded Jesus. In the ethical reading, the spirits represent several women 
who are disciples of Jesus, following him. This divergence can be explained by the two quite 
different hermeneutics applied to the scriptural text. The Christological reading identifies Jesus 
                                                 
49
 The NHC V version here differs slightly, as it no long refers to the cup of “drunkenness”, but refers instead to 
“bitterness.”  “You cast away from yourself the cup, this is bitterness” ([ak]nouje gar ebol µmä[ok µpa pot paû 
pe psiv[e]; V 40.13–15). The parallelism does not work as well in the Nag Hammadi version.    
 
50
 NHC V here is nearly identical. “Until you cast away blind thought” (vantek'n'o'u'je e[b]oäl µmok NTdianoia 
Nbellh; V 27.3–4). 
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as the fulfillment of prophecy and identifies a secondary, mistaken ruler who was misunderstood 
in Jewish Scripture as the highest God. It locates within this heavenly drama divine female spirits 
whose work is completed with the coming of Jesus. The ethical reading identifies female 
disciples as proper objects of imitation in practices of moral formation. The seven women are 
first described as divine powers which preceded Jesus and then as disciples who followed him.  
The modes of reading which produce these two interpretations of Isaiah are the same 
modes of reading which extracted an exhortation to preparation for martyrdom from the Gospel 
of John. As argued above, the reading of scripture in 1ApocJas develops from a textual gap in 
John. The Gospel consistently weaves together ethics and Christology, but the text lacks an 
explanation as to how one should understand the relationship of ethics and Christology. This 
problem is solved in the reading presented in 1ApocJas. In this text, Jesus’ self-knowledge from 
John becomes knowledge which the Christian must come to know about himself or herself. The 
Christological and ethical modes of reading complemented each other in the interpretation of 
John. In the reading of Isaiah, the text reflects the same methods of reading which enabled this 
interpretation of John. 1ApocJas presents first a Christological reading and then an ethical 
reading of Isaiah. The underlying logic of the text, here, works by switching from one mode of 
scriptural interpretation to another. 1ApocJas does not suggest that these two readings contradict, 
but rather it seems that both readings serve the underlying goals of the text. They provide 
knowledge which can be useful for preparation for martyrdom. 
 
The Ethical and Christological Reading of Leviticus 
 Directly after presenting the three women to James as objects of imitation, Jesus begins 
another allusive reading of scripture in which he compares himself to a priest. The point of 
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connection here appears to be the notion of transformation. The women have been transformed 
to become ideal disciples for ethical imitation. Jesus invokes a reading of Leviticus to describe 
his crucial role in this transformation.  
This is according to the foreknowledge of the Father, because he sent me as a priest. And 
in every place are reckoned the firstfruits and the firstborn [in] the [great sacrifice]. One 
receives the firstfruits  and assigns sacrifices and offerings. But I do not act in this way. 
Rather, I receive the firstfruits of the defiled ones so that I may send them up [un]defiled, 
so that the true power is revealed. For the defiled has separated from the undefiled and 
the work <of the female> has attained to the male.  
 
paû kata tepronoia µpiüw/[t] je aFtnoou µmoû Nouhhb auw/ [H]µ ma nim sehp Nte 
naûü N/[n]a/parch auw Nvrp m/m/iüs/e/ H[µ pe]e/[inoC Nq]u/os51 ete paei p/[e] vaFji 
Nnaparch auw va[Fr]wve Nqusia Hi prosfor/[a] anok de NteeiHe an all[a] 
e/v/aûji Nnaparch Nnetj/[aH]m Ntatnoousou euo N/[at]jwHm j[e]kaas 
esnaouw/n/H ebol NCi tCom µme je apjwHµ pwrj ebol eumNtatjwHµ auw fwb 
<NtesHi>me aFkatanta efaut (28.6–20)52 
 
Jesus identifies here a distinction between the defiled and the undefiled. These women have 
achieved a transformation of the self which is characterized here as a movement from being 
defiled to becoming undefiled. Jesus’ priestly action produces that transformation. In the Nag 
Hammadi version, Jesus’ transformative action is directly contrasted with the action of “priests 
of this world” (pouh[hb µpikosmo]s; V 41.6).53 In the TC version as reconstructed by Brankaer 
and Bethge, there still appears to be a contrast to worldly priests, as Jesus says “I do not act in 
this way.” Jesus claims that typical priests receive firstfruits and offerings but do not transform 
them, while Jesus transforms offerings rather than sending them up as is. I think this contrast is 
best explained by reference to the sacrificial laws of Leviticus. It is regularly required in 
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 This is a more likely reconstruction than is suggested by Kasser and Wurst. See Brankaer and Bethge, Codex 
Tchacos, 124, 234–235. 
 
52
 Where I have emended the text to read “the work <of the female>, the Tchacos Codex reads “true work” 
(fwb µme). Nag Hammadi Codex V, which is luckily extant for a few lines at this point, reads “the work of 
femaleness” ([f]wb NTmNtsHime; NHC V 41.17). I think it is most likely that the Tchacos Codex has been altered 
by a scribal error. I will discuss this reading in chapter 5, pages 129–133, 141–142.  
 
53
 The reconstruction is not certain, and I don’t want to rest too much on this lacuna.  
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Leviticus that sacrificial offerings be “unblemished.”54 In this reading of the sacrificial codes, the 
sacrifice begins in a perfect state, without blemish or fault or defilement. Jesus’ action as a priest 
is different because he takes that which is not perfect, that which is instead blemished and 
defiled, and he transforms it to become unblemished and undefiled. 
Now, “unblemished” and “undefiled” are not precisely the same word or concept. In the 
Septuagint, “unblemished” is rendered ἄµωµος, while the Coptic atjwHµ usually translates the 
Greek ἀµιάντος.55 However, these terms do share the same broad semantic range in ancient 
Christian literature. This can be seen by comparison to a passage in the First Epistle of Peter. In 
the 1 Peter 1.18–19, there is a short sacrificial metaphor.56  Jesus is compared to an 
“unblemished” offering who is offered up for the world. “You know that you were ransomed 
from your futile ways inherited from your ancestors, no with perishable things like silver or gold, 
but with the precious blood of Christ, like that of a lamb without defect or blemish.” A reading of 
the above-referenced passages from Leviticus clearly underlies this passage. It uses the same 
word ἄµωµος as found in the Septuagint, and its draws a simple one-to-one reading in which the 
sacrificial offering in Leviticus represents the “sacrificed” Jesus whose death performs the same 
action once and for all.57 In the same passage of 1 Peter, the reader or hearer is exhorted to come 
to receive an “undefiled” (ἀµιάντον) inheritance, by becoming sober and by exchanging a 
“perishable” inheritance for one that comes from the “unblemished” sacrifice of Jesus (1.4, 
1.18). The logic works by connecting the “unblemished” sacrifice of Jesus to the “undefiled” 
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 Leviticus 1.3, 1.10, 3.1, 3.6, etc. 
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 Crum, A Coptic Dictionary, 797b–798a. 
 
56
 On this metaphor, see Paul J. Achtemeier, 1 Peter: A Commentary on First Peter (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1996), 92–93; 114–129; Paul W. Felix, "Penal Substitution in the New Testament: A Focused Look at 1 Peter," The 
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inheritance which can be achieved through that sacrifice. 1 Peter provides clear evidence, then, 
of another early Christian reading of Leviticus which connects the “unblemished” nature of the 
proper sacrifice with an “undefiled” quality which can be achieved by the Christian, through 
Jesus. 
At the same time as 1ApocJas lays out this Christological reading of Leviticus, the text 
also presents an ethical reading. Jesus effects, in his role as a new priest, a transformation of his 
disciples from defilement to undefilement. In the previous passage, Jesus explained how these 
women had been formed as ethical subjects, and he exhorted James to imitate them. The three 
women had “cast off the blindness which was in their minds,” and they had “become sober” and 
“come to know” Christ. This passage now gives a further explanation of this transformation. It 
was through the power of Christ as a new priest that these transformations were possible. The 
women who have been so transformed are the ones whom James, and by extension also the 
readers and hearers of the text, are called to imitate. I argue that this passage reflects a second 
combination of ethical and Christological readings of scripture. The women have become 
perfected moral exemplars through the priestly action of Christ. This reading links the 
Christological to the ethical. The Christological reading of Leviticus treats this text as an oblique 
reference to Christ’s work in the world, and this work has been produced exemplars for ethical 
imitation.  
 This reading produces an important transformation also in the text’s exhortation to 
martyrdom. The depiction of Christ has shifted. In the revelation speech, the Christological and 
ethical modes of interpretation fit together neatly. The I-statements of Jesus in John 7–8 were 
read to provide revelation about the nature of Christ, as well as knowledge about the nature of 
the human person. 1ApocJas implicitly exhorted readers and hearers to inculcate this 
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Christological knowledge as self-understanding. James will repeat to his interrogators the self-
knowledge which was presented as uniquely Christological in John. In the reading of Leviticus, 
Christ no longer appears as a moral exemplar. Here, it is the women who are objects of imitation, 
while Christ is an actor in the divine realms who works, in priestly fashion, to transform these 
women into “undefiled” moral exemplars. What James is meant to imitate, in the text’s ethical 
reading of scripture, is not the sacrificial action of Christ the new priest, but the undefiled state of 
the women transformed by the action of Jesus. In combining the ethical reading of scripture into 
harmony with the Christological, 1ApocJas shifts its ethical program from an imitation of Christ 
to an imitation of women. Boyarin had noted how the intertextuality of the biblical text is 
encoded by its compilation, and here we see the effects of readings of scripture that seek to 
harmonize John, Isaiah, and Leviticus. The complexity and heterogeneity of these texts, and the 
multiple methods of reading which are applied to them, produce not one perfectly unified 
reading, however, but a variety of possible readings. The integration of these readings shifts the 
text’s exhortation to martyrdom in a significant way.  
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 Chapter 4: Sexual Difference and Valentinian Theology 
 
Since you asked about femaleness, listen: Femaleness existed, but she did not 
exist from the beginning. She created [powers] and gods for herself. Thus, the 
One Who [Is] exists from the beginning, and femaleness exists but does not exist 
from the beginning. 
 
epeidh [a]kv[i]n/e/ etbe tmNtsHime swt[µ] nesvoop [pe] alla nesvoop 
an pe jN nÖvorpi astamio nas NHÖnÖCÖ[om] mN HNnoute petvo[op] Ce eFvoop 
jN Nvor[p] tmNtsHime Hwws svoop alla jN nvorpi an (10.19–27)1 
 
In the preceding chapters I have interpreted 1ApocJas with reference to James’ 
martyrdom which concludes the narrative. In this chapter, I will read 1ApocJas from the 
beginning, and I will focus my interpretation on the category of “femaleness” and its peculiar 
presentation on the first page. The questions raised there concerning the nature of the divine 
realms and the creation of the world continue to be addressed through the remainder of the text. 
Jesus continually identifies “femaleness” and the sexual differentiation of the divine realms as 
the topics of his revelation. 1ApocJas can be read as an extended discourse on the topic of 
femaleness and sexual difference. 
  The initial discussion of femaleness lays out in broad strokes the terms of the theology 
to follow. Before the coming into existence of femaleness, there was only the One Who Is. At 
this point, Jesus explains, “Nothing existed except the One Who Is. He is [un]nameable [and] 
[in]describable [among those who] are or will be” (nemn laoue voop [ei]mhti petvoop 
o/[uat T]r/an eroF/ pe/ [auw ouat]va/j[e e]roF pe/ [HN naei et]v/oo[p] h netnav/w[pe]; 
10.8–12). Because of the transcendence of the One Who Is, this highest God cannot be named or 
described. Femaleness holds a subordinate position to the One Who Is. The One Who Is has 
existed from the beginning, while femaleness once did not exist and only has later come into 
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 The NHC version is nearly complete here, and nearly identical to the Tchacos Codex in sense. The somewhat 
confusing construction “she prepared powers and gods for herself” ([as]sobte nas NH[e]nCom mN noute; V 
24.30) is better explained by the TC “she created” (astamio). 
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being. It seems that there was a time when femaleness was not.  Further, femaleness “created 
powers and gods for herself” (10.23–24) and this creation took place separately from the One 
Who Is. After this short discourse, the dialogue moves on to a discussion of James’ fear and 
ignorance. In order for James to overcome his fear, he must acquire knowledge about the divine 
realms and about humanity. Because the creation of humanity follows from the creation by 
femaleness, it turns out that the content of this knowledge also concerns the nature of 
femaleness. 
 The explicit reprise of the theme of sexual difference takes place during the theological 
revelation in the post-resurrection speech (19.21–23.10). This revelation speech consists 
primarily of an embedded dialogue. Jesus tells James that he will be interrogated by various 
malevolent forces and he provides for James the responses with which he can triumph over them. 
Jesus explains that certain “toll collectors” who “take the soul” (HNtelwnhs ... euFi nµyuch, 
20.3–6) will interrogate James, and they will ask who he is. James must answer, “I am the son, 
and I am from the father” ([a]nok pe pvhre auw ebol HitN piwt, 20.12–13). He will then 
explain what these names mean: “The Father Who Is from the beginning, and the son who is in 
the One Who Is from the beginning” (piwt etvoop jN Nv[orpi] pvhre je etvoop HN 
petvoop jN Nvorp, 20.16–18). Here Jesus uses the same terms to speak of the God who was 
introduced at the opening of the dialogue. The “One Who Is from the beginning” is reprised here 
as “the Father Who Is from the beginning.”  
With these words, James will locate himself within the drama of the divine realms. 
Because James must learn and come to understand these revelations, he becomes, in imitation of 
Jesus, the son who is in the One Who Is from the beginning. This re-statement of the text’s 
theology also effects a subtle difference in the gendering of the divine realms. In the first 
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passage, Jesus used non-gendered language to describe a God to whom qualities could not be 
predicated. In the second passage, God is the Father and his people are his sons.2 This gendering 
of the divine realms was perhaps suggested by the initial passage, in which the power 
“femaleness” separated itself from the One Who Is. Through this rearticulation of the nature of 
God, a key set of relationships in the text become marked by sexual differentiation. The highest 
God has aspects of maleness, while femaleness characterizes lower divinities. Jesus is a son of 
this highest God, and Christians like James can attain to his position and become sons 
themselves. Perfection seems to attend to the male rather than the female.  
 As the dialogue continues, it expands the set of relationships defined through sexual 
difference. The entire state of the cosmos and humanity has been structured by the sexual 
differentiation of the divine realms. We resume here the embedded dialogue between James and 
the toll collectors. They will ask James what his mission in the world has been. James is to 
explain, “I have come to those who are mine and those who are not mine” (Ntaei va netenouû 
throu auw netenouû an, 20.23–25). Then James will explain what he means by “those who 
are not mine.” 
                                                 
2
 A reading of the Gospel of John underlies both of these points. In James’ self-identification as a son from the 
father, he echoes Jesus’ statements of identity from John. James has taken on the qualities of the Johannine Jesus. 
His search for knowledge and his work of self-transformation conclude in his taking on the qualities of Jesus. 
Likewise, the description of God as “the father”, in this context, reads as Johannine theological language. The 
father-son relationship between God and Christ in John draws attention to the gendered character of these terms. 
Adele Reinhartz compares the articulation of the father-son relationship in John to Aristotelian understandings of 
human reproduction, and she suggests that the language of fathers and sons in John depends on a notion of maleness 
as perfect. She writes, “God's ability to transform the Word, his λόγος, into flesh is predicated on an understanding 
of God as male and as in some way being capable of generation through divine seed just as human males generate 
through human seed.”  The relationship of father and son depends on an idea of perfected reproduction from male to 
male. In 1ApocJas, the Johannine vocabulary allows the text to emphasize the maleness of God. Adele Reinhartz, 
“‘And the Word Was Begotten’: Divine Epigenesis in the Gospel of John,” Semeia 85 (1999), 99. On sexual 
difference and the father/son relationship in John, see also Allison Jasper, The Shining Garment of the Text: 
Gendered Readings of John’s Prologue (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998); Mary Rose D’Angelo, 
“Imitating Deity in the Gospel of John: Theological Language and ‘Father’ in ‘Prayers of Jesus,’” Semeia 85 (1999), 
59–82; Colleen Conway, “‘Behold the Man!’ Masculine Christology and the Fourth Gospel,” in New Testament 
Masculinities (eds. Janice D. Anderson and Stephen Moore; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 163–180. 
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They are not entirely other to me, but Achamoth, that is, the female, and she 
created these ones for herself. And she brought down the race which is from the 
beginning. Thus, they are [not] other to [me], but they are mine. They are [mine] 
according to [the fact that the one (f.) who is] lord over them is from the One Who 
Is from the beginning. But they became [other] because the One Who Is from the 
beginning did not join with her when she created them. 
 
HNvµmoû an eroëû ëepthrÏ nüe: alla åçåµ‰œö e[te] taei te tesHime : auw  
astamio Nnaû nas : aseine de eHrhû µpgenos etvoop jN Nvorü[pi] ara Ce
HNvµmoû ero[û an n]eë [a]lëlëaë netenouû ne në[eteno]uëûü [me]n ne kata [q]eë  
[ete teto] N∆ß eroou ta petvaa[t te] jN Nëvarpi : Ntauë® vµ[mo] dëeë je  
mpetetvaapë jNë Nvorpi koinwni nµmas Nteërüeësëtamioo[u] (21.2–15) 
 
At this point in the text, Achamoth is a new character, and so she is glossed as “the female,” 
which I take to be a technical term. The unmodified definite noun tesHime, meaning “the 
female,” only appears in the text in descriptions of Achamoth. It has the same meaning as 
“femaleness,” the abstract noun tmNtsHime, which was seen in the introductory passage (10.19-
27). While the terminology used in the two passages is somewhat different, the character 
Achamoth appears to be equivalent to femaleness, the cosmic power discussed on the text’s first 
page. It may be that the text uses the abstract noun “femaleness” to abstract a principle from the 
definite mythological character Achamoth.3 In any case, the parallels between the two figures are 
overwhelming. Just as femaleness “created powers and gods for herself” (10.22–23), likewise 
Achamoth “created these ones for herself.” Just as femaleness’ creation was separate from the 
One Who Is, here Achamoth did not unite with the pre-existent One before her act of creation. 
Just as femaleness is secondary to the One Who Is, Achamoth “is from the One Who Is from the 
beginning.”  
 These revelations establish that Achamoth plays a decisive role in the narrative of 
salvation. Before offering this revelation, Jesus introduced his speech by saying, “Look, now I 
will reveal to you your salvation” (eisHhte Tnou TnaCwlp nak ebol mpekswte, 19.22–24). 
                                                 
3
 Yoo, “Die erste Apokalypse des Jakobus,” 124. 
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And indeed, the revelation will save James. We see in the narrative frame of the embedded 
dialogue that James will give these answers to his interrogators, and his words will overpower 
them so that he can escape. He will be saved by speaking these words. It is not clear at first why 
this theological discourse should have such power, but the next section adds clarification. Jesus 
reveals that James will escape the “toll collectors” if he says in these words who he is and to 
whom he has come. But he will be detained and questioned again, now by “the three, these ones 
who take the soul” (tv©te naû etFi Nteyuch, 21.21–22).4 Again, Jesus provides the words 
that James will say. “I am a vessel more honored than Achamoth, the female, who created you” 
(ank ouskeuos eFtaûhu para acamwq tesHime Ntastamio µmwtN, 21.25–27). Both the 
toll collectors and the three who take the soul count among the rulers created by Achamoth. 
James, who can draw his lineage back to the One Who Is, is more powerful and more honored 
than the rulers that are merely creations of Achamoth. The rulers who claim to have the power to 
detain and to take away souls in fact were created by Achamoth, and as such they have no power 
over a person who knows that his or her lineage runs back to the One Who Is. 
This salvation appears as re-absorption into a primal unity which is either male or 
ungendered. Both perspectives on unity are offered in Jesus’ revelation. At one point, Jesus tells 
James that when “you cast off the blindness that is in your mind” (eimhti Nknouje ebol 
NtmNtb¬le etHN pekHht, 13.20–21),5 then, “you will attain to the One Who Is and you will no 
longer be James, but you will be in all ways in the One Who Is” (knapwH va petvoop auw 
                                                 
4
 The NHC version emphasizes further that these three are endowed with the power to arrest and detain. “[These] 
three captors [who] take souls” ([Nni]vomet NreFamaHte [nh e]tFi Nnµyuchyuch; V 34.22–23). 
 
5
 The NHC version has a similar sense, as Jesus tells James he cannot fully understand “unless you cast off blind 
thought from yourself” (vantek'n'o'u'je e[b]oäl µmok NTdianoia Nbellh; V 27.3–4). The use of the Greco-
Coptic Tdianoia where the TC describes blindness etHN pekHht helps confirm my choice to translate Hht as 
mind. This is a cognitive problem that James must transcend. 
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ouketi knavwpe Nûak/kwbos alla petHN petwoop kata Hwb nim, 13.23–14.2).6 This 
explanation of salvation emphasizes the transformation of the person into some new form in the 
divine realms. James no longer exists because he has been subsumed into the realms of the One 
Who Is, beyond all qualities and predications.  
This vision of James becoming part of a transcendent whole with the One Who Is stands 
in contrast to James’ statement of identity within the embedded dialogue. There he is to say that 
he is “the son, from the father.” This son “is in the One Who Is from the beginning.” In this 
passage, James’ salvation again coincides with James’ personal identity being dissolved and 
replaced by a new existence in the divine realms. However, here the primal maleness of both 
God and the perfected soul are emphasized. James has become the son, and he is the son who is 
in all ways within the father. The perfected state of the human, like the nature of God, can be 
described either as ungendered or perfectly male. 
I have thus far found in 1ApocJas a reasonably coherent story of male dominance, or at 
least of the denigration of the female. The perfect God may be male (“the Father”) or ungendered 
(“the One Who Is”), but in any case this divinity exists at a higher level of reality than 
femaleness or Achamoth. Salvation may be achieved by becoming “a son” or one who is 
“entirely in the One Who Is,” but regardless it requires defeating the agents of femaleness in 
order to return to the divine realms. However, this is not ultimately the story told by the First 
Apocalypse of James. Instead, Jesus’ continued revelations build a richer and more complex 
picture both of the divine realms and of human salvation.  
                                                 
6
 The NHC version articulates James’ transformation in even more radical terms. “Then you will attain to the One 
Who Is, and so you will no longer be James, but you are the One Who Is” (tote eknakatanta eHraû epetvoop 
auw knavwpe an Ce ent˚ ûakwbos an alla Ntok pe ph etvoop; V 27.6–10). I think this merely expresses in 
a logical fashion the same idea from the Tchacos Codex. If James will lose his personal identity, then when he is “in 
the One Who Is,” he cannot be himself separate from the One Who Is. James, becoming entirely “in the One Who Is, 
becomes indeed transformed into the perfection of the highest God.  
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Within the long revelation speech, the divine realms come to include, internal to their 
perfection, a certain gendered differentiation. While the character of Achamoth or “femaleness” 
still bears responsibility for the divergence of humanity from the divine realms, additional female 
characters come to populate the divine realms. It has already been established that Jesus exists in 
the divine realms, as the “second” from the One Who Is. He is not alone. After providing James 
the words he can say to escape his captors, Jesus explains why these words are effective. He tells 
James to explain to the rulers where they come from, and by what power in the heavens they will 
be defeated. 
I am a vessel more honored than Achamoth, the female, who created you. And if 
your mother is ignorant of her own root, then when will you become sober? But I 
have summoned undefiled Sophia, who is in the [Father], the mother of 
Achamoth, but her partner was [not] right [with the] female. Without a male, [she] 
alone created you, and she was ignorant of her mother—it is she alone who is 
ignorant of her mother—and she believed that she was alone, but I invoked her 
mother. 
 
ank ouskeuos eFtaûhu para åçåµ‰œ tesHime Ntas tamio µmwtN auw 
evje tetNämäaou aû natsaoun etesnoune µmin mos Hüie NtwtëNä 
etna®nhfe HN av [No]uaeiv alla aëiparakalei Ntsofia natjäwäHüµ taû 
etvoop Hµ pi[wt] tmaou Nåçåµ‰œ alla [µpe]pëessuzugos saoutN [mN 
tes]Hüime cwrüis Haou[t as]tamio µmwtN ouaasët [as]vëwpe esaû 
natsooune eë[te]sëmaou Ntos ouaë[a]tß etvoop eso natsooune 
etesëmëeëou auw nesmeoue je nëtëos ouaatß pëe anoëkë de aeû® epikalei 
Ntëesmëaëou (21.25–22.16) 
 
The multiple invocations here assert the superiority of James to the forces who have detained 
him. Jesus tells James that if he learns these words and recites them to his interrogators, they will 
let him pass, cursing their own weakness. The weakness of the creatures of Achamoth appears 
with greater specificity in this passage. Not only are they unworthy of concern due to the 
circumstances of their creation, but they are also characterized by ignorance. More importantly, 
James is told to invoke Sophia, a new character in the divine realms. Achamoth the female, 
Jesus, and the pre-existent One Who Is are not the only figures who populate these realms. 
 107 
 
Achamoth has a mother, the “undefiled Sophia.” This description significantly complicates the 
narrative and the underlying articulation of sexual difference. 
 Jesus instructs James to invoke Sophia. Upon that invocation, Jesus explains, the 
detainers will be troubled and thrown into uncertainty. Achamoth seemed to share the 
characteristics of femaleness, a secondary, inessential being who created the evil world rulers. 
Sophia does not. She is undefiled. She belongs so fully to the divine realms that her name may be 
invoked in defense against the world rulers. Just as James must attain to knowledge of the true 
God in order to be saved, it is Achamoth’s ignorance about Sophia which denotes her weakness 
and her secondary position. James, then, must attain knowledge of the female figures in the 
divine realms in order to be saved. Strikingly, the text does not suggest that Sophia lacks 
qualities of femaleness and femininity. Rather, she is repeatedly called “the mother” as an 
honorific. Her status as mother signifies her power, and Achamoth’s ignorance of her mother 
signifies her weakness. This passage suggests an articulation of sexual difference in which 
femaleness does not represent secondariness or weakness. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
explore why Sophia has been introduced here and what her introduction means for the text’s 
theology and its articulation of sexual difference. This explanation will require the 
contextualization of 1ApocJas within ancient discourses of sexual difference and theology.  
 
Sexual Difference in Theology 
Jesus’ revelation imagines the divine realms through the language of sexual difference. 
1ApocJas stands within ancient discourses of sexual difference when the text speaks of the 
divine in terms of maleness and femaleness. Stephen Moore’s reading of Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans offers one useful comparison, because he locates Romans within a precisely sketched 
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Greco-Roman system of sexual difference. I find that 1ApocJas’ articulation of sexual difference 
draws on a world of thought and practice broadly similar to that in which Moore locates Romans. 
First, Moore lays out a general Greco-Roman “sex/gender system,” which he compares to a 
pyramid with adult male citizens at the top, above variously arrayed “unmen” who lack the full 
complement of male traits. Moore offers as examples of unmen, “females, boys, slaves (of either 
sex), sexually passive or ‘effeminate’ males, eunuchs, ‘barbarians,’ and so on.”7 This hierarchy 
was understood by analogy to penetrative sexual acts. The person who held a higher position on 
the pyramid would be the penetrative partner, the lower-positioned person the receptive. The 
ideal man, then, would be impenetrable, always dominant in the eyes of this system.8  God is the 
perfect representative of controlled righteousness, and thus the ideal form of the dominant male 
at the top of the pyramid.  
The Impenetrable Penetrator (that condition being the quintessence of Roman manhood, 
as we have seen—it is not by accident that we speak of ‘the impenetrability of God’) 
remains fully in charge, and his superiority and their inferiority are being properly 
displayed on behalf of all males everywhere—which, for Paul and the hegemonic 
hypermasculinity for which he is here the mouthpiece, is all that matters ultimately.9   
 
                                                 
7
 Moore, God’s Beauty Parlor, 136. 
 
8
 On the interconnection of sexual and social hierarchies, see also Foucault, The Use of Pleasure; K. J. Dover, Greek 
Homosexuality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); David Halperin, One Hundred Years of 
Homosexuality and Other Essays on Greek Love. New York: Routledge, 1990); Laqueur, Making Sex Elizabeth 
Castelli, “I Will Make Mary Male: Pieties of the Body and Gender Transformation in Late Antiquity,” in Body 
Guards: The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity, eds. Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub (New York: Routledge, 
1991), 29–49; Giulia Sissa, “The Sexual Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle,” in From Ancient Goddesses to 
Christian Saints (vol. 1 of A History of Women in the West; ed. P.S. Pantel; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), 46–81; Maud W. Gleason, Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995); Bernadette Brooten, Love Between Women: Early Christian Responses to Female Homoeroticism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996); Matthew Kuefler, The Manly Eunuch: Masculinity, Gender Ambiguity, and 
Christian Ideology in Late Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Jennifer Wright Knust, 
Abandoned to Lust: Sexual Slander and Ancient Christianity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For 
partly dissenting views, see Simon Goldhill, Foucault’s Virginity: Ancient Erotic Fiction and the History of 
Sexuality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Kathy L. Gaca,  The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, 
and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 
2003). 
 
9
 Moore, God’s Beauty Parlor, 169. 
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Paul draws on notions of human perfection to explicate the nature of the divine. Because 
masculinity marks perfection, God’s perfection appears in his perfect maleness. Through 
comparison to ancient Mediterranean discourses and practices of sexual difference, Moore 
locates Paul’s theology also within this hegemonic ideology of “hypermasculinity.”  
The theology of 1ApocJas also makes sense within the system of sex and gender sketched 
by Moore. The centrality of sexual difference in the text’s theology becomes clear in the 
description of the One Who Is as “the Father” and his followers as his “sons.” The perfection of 
the One Who Is would necessarily mark God as male within Moore’s model, and this then 
becomes explicit in the discussion of the “Father Who Is.” Further, in 1ApocJas James must 
triumph over Achamoth and her powers in order to progress to unity with the One Who Is and 
the divine realms. The female here appears as that which is lacking, that which is other than the 
perfection of the divine. The articulation of sexual difference in 1ApocJas draws from dominant 
discourses and practices of sexual difference in the ancient Mediterranean. Like Paul, 1ApocJas 
understands the perfection of the divine in terms of the perfection of the ideal male. 
Of course, as I have argued, the imagination of divine perfection does not map to such a 
simple hierarchy. First, 1ApocJas imagines God at times as non-gendered because the One Who 
Is must be beyond description. Second, the divine realms come to be described according to a 
certain gendered plurality. While “femaleness” appears as the agent of harmful differentiation, 
“the undefiled Sophia” is invoked as a powerful actor within the divine realms. These aspects of 
1ApocJas locate it within ancient Christian Valentinian discourse. A strictly monistic view of 
God, which likewise characterizes Valentinian theology, underlies the text’s occasional 
suggestions that the One Who Is exists beyond gender.10 The identification of distinct and 
                                                 
10
 On monism and Valentinian theology, see Schoedel, “Gnostic Monism and the Gospel of Truth,” in Layton, The 
Rediscovery of Gnosticism, vol. 1, 379–390. 
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differently valenced female divine actors reflects the complex Valentinian understanding of 
divine plurality. The key issue for comparison is the gendering of theology and protology. While 
the corpus of texts and excerpts labeled “Valentinian” is wide-ranging, scholars have noted a 
shared theological myth with a tendency to articulate the difference between the one and the 
many in gendered terms. Einar Thomassen summarizes the issue clearly. 
The major concern of the Valentinian protologies is, as we have seen, to explain how 
plurality comes into being from oneness. The initial oneness of the Father becomes two 
with Father-and-Son, and this twoness in turn generates the plurality of the Pleroma of 
the aeons. The tension between unity and diversity inherent in the Pleroma as it unfolds 
eventually produces a rupture, represented by the myth of Sophia. Sophia personifies the 
negative and uncontrolled aspect of the plurality that was first introduced when the Father 
decided to become more than himself alone.11 
 
Thomassen describes here the multivalent articulation of divine plurality within ancient 
Valentinian thought. The divine realms are characterized by a productive tension between 
plurality and oneness, and this plurality often takes the form of male-female pairs. Plurality bears 
within itself the danger of disunity, and that disunity comes to be attributed to a female figure, 
usually Sophia or Wisdom. Sophia’s rupture produces a gap between the divine realms and the 
world of humanity—typically Sophia splits off from the divine realms by producing on her own, 
and this creation leads to the creation of the world.12  Sexual difference, then, can appear in two 
                                                 
11
 Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 269. Now, in 1ApocJas, the “rupture represented by the myth of Sophia” instead 
was the work of Achamoth. The “undefiled Sophia” remains an honored member of the divine realms. I will discuss 
this splitting of the role of Sophia below.  
 
12
 Raimund Köbert, “Achamoth,” Biblica 45 (1964), 254–255; G. Christopher Stead, “The Valentinian Myth of 
Sophia,” Journal of Theological Studies 20 (1969), 75–104; George MacRae, “The Jewish Background of the 
Gnostic Sophia Myth,” Novum Testamentum 12 (1970), 86–101; Deirdre Good, Reconstructing the Tradition of 
Sophia in Gnostic Literature (SBLMS 32; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987); Scholten, Martyrium und Sophiamythos; 
Guy Stroumsa, Another Seed: Studies in Gnostic Mythology (NHS 24; Leiden: Brill, 1988); King, The Secret 
Revelation of John, 225–234; Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 248–262; Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 95–118. A 
variety of early Christian thinkers, not just Valentinians, derived a myth of divine Wisdom acting in creation from a 
reading of Proverbs and other Jewish sapiential literature. George MacRae demonstrated this most convincingly 
through a reading of Sethian texts, and G. Christopher Stead made a similar determination in a reading of 
Valentinian materials. This has come to be called in scholarly literature the “Sophia myth” although there is clearly 
not one myth of Sophia but many. Karen King has argued, at least for the Apocryphon of John, that an intertextual 
engagement with Genesis, Wisdom literature, and Platonic philosophy lies behind the depiction of Sophia. In 
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distinct forms. In one form, sexual difference can represent an aspect of the stable, perfect divine 
plurality. In another form, sexual difference can represent the dangers of plurality and the break 
between the divine realms and the world of humanity. As a consequence of this second form, 
sexual difference can appear as the aspect of the human which must be triumphed over in a 
return to perfection. 
As I have argued, 1ApocJas imagines salvation as a return to primordial unity with the 
One Who Is. Salvation enacts a reversal of the protological myth. The human returns through the 
stages of devolution from primal unity until he or she has reached the divine realms. This story 
of salvation has multiple implications for the articulation of sexual difference  If salvation means 
reversing the devolution of the world from the divine realms, and if femaleness was responsible 
for that devolution, then salvation means surpassing that which is female. However, the 
“femaleness” responsible for the devolution of the world is not the only female figure in the 
divine realms. Achamoth, whom I will argue represents a particular kind of lower Sophia figure, 
is associated with the negative aspect of plurality. The more positive aspect of plurality also 
incorporates sexual difference. Divine female actors also populate the divine realms, and they 
appear to be fully within the One Who Is despite their gendered characteristics.  
This multivalent articulation of gender and plurality has its roots in Valentinian theology. 
In a number of Valentinian texts, the role of Sophia described by Thomassen is split between two 
figures, a higher and a lower Sophia. The higher Sophia remains safely ensconced in the positive 
plurality of the divine realms, while only the lower Sophia bears responsibility for rupture. This 
                                                                                                                                                             
1ApocJas, the components of a certain Sophia story seem to be in place in the background, as “settled science,” and 
they are brought forward as needed. For a discussion of discourses and practices of ancient goddess devotion as 
intertexts for Sophia in some early Christian texts, see Pheme Perkins, “Sophia as Goddess in the Nag Hammadi 
Codices,” in Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism (ed. Karen King; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 96–112. 
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lower Sophia often bears the name Achamoth.13 The name itself demonstrates that this is a 
Sophia figure, as it was derived from the plural of Hebrew name of Wisdom, hokmōt.14  
1ApocJas even mentions this linguistic derivation in a later passage where Jesus is summing up 
for James the content of his revelation. “I have revealed to you,” Jesus says, “Achamoth, the 
female, which is translated, ‘Sophia’” (aeiCwlpi nak ebol je … åçåµ‰äœ/ t/eäsäH/iöm/e taäiö eävau® 
Herm/hneäu/eä m/mas je tsofia; 22.24–23.4).15 The higher Sophia is “undefiled” and powerful, 
while the lower Achamoth is guilty of creating on her own and is characterized by ignorance. To 
better elucidate how this double Sophia system functions in 1ApocJas, I find it useful to consider 
the multiple depictions of Sophia/Wisdom in a different Valentinian source, the Excerpts from 
Theodotus.  
 
The Excerpts from Theodotus and Valentinian Theology 
Transmitted by Clement of Alexandria, the Excerpts from Theodotus lays out a narrative 
of creation, differentiation, and salvation in which sexual difference plays a similarly central 
role.16  Clement attributes these writings to a Theodotus who lived during the late second century 
CE and was a follower of Valentinus. This attribution cannot be certain, but scholars generally 
accept that these excerpts were collected by Clement or by a member of his school, and so the 
                                                 
13
 See Excerpts from Theodotus 43–45, Gospel of Philip I 60.10–15, and the Valentinian system in Irenaeus’ Against 
the Heresies 1.1–7. In GosPhil and AH, the name “Achamoth” or “Echamoth” appears for this lower Sophia. 
 
14
 Köbert, “Achamoth,” 254–255; Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 100–101. 
 
15
 The NHC V version lacks Jesus’ statement in which he explains that he is summing up his revelation, but the 
summary of Achamoth is nearly identical, missing only the gloss of Achamoth as “the female.” ( åçåµ/‰œ teä[tou]r/ 
Hermhäneu/e µm[os] jeä säofia, NHC V 36.4–5). 
 
16
 For the Greek text, see François Sagnard, ed. and trans., Clément d’Alexandrie: Extraits de Théodote (SC 23; 
Paris: Cerf), 1970. For translation, see Robert P. Casey, trans., The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria 
(ed. Kirsopp Lake; London: Christopher’s, 1934).       
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collection can be reasonably dated to the late second or early third century CE.17 The primary 
concern of these excerpts is human salvation, but they contain enough theological discussion to 
locate Excerpts within the discourse of Valentinian theology.   
The Excerpts describe the processes of human creation and salvation in relation to these 
differently valenced accounts of unity and plurality. The divine realms are defined by their unity, 
according to a positive accounting of plurality. “Therefore though there is unity in the Pleroma, 
each of the Aeons has its own complement, the syzygia.”18 These heavenly “marriages” between 
male and female elements constitute a single unity through their harmony.19 This unity devolves 
when “the Mother” produces separately an “inferior” being, the “ruler.” She creates because of 
her desire, and as such her creation “was made less, as if he was created from the passion of 
desire.” 20 Humanity’s need for salvation derives from this desirous and inferior creation.  
The text discusses the situation of humanity arising from this creation in terms of 
maleness and femaleness. When we are saved, Theodotus explains, we are “restored to unity 
                                                 
17
 Christoph Markschies, “Valentinian Gnosticism: Toward the Anatomy of a School,” in McGuire and Turner, The 
Nag Hammadi Library after Fifty Years, 434–435. For further discussion of the Excerpts, see Elaine Pagels, 
“Conflicting Versions of Valentinian Eschatology: Irenaeus’ Treatise vs. The Excerpts From Theodotus,” Harvard 
Theological Review 67 (1974) 35–53; J.F. McCue, “Conflicting Versions of Valentinianism? Irenaeus and the 
Excerpta ex Theodoto,” in Layton, The Rediscovery of Gnosticism, vol. 1, 404–416; Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, 
Female Fault and Fulfilment in Gnosticism (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 61–83; 
Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 28–39, 377–383; Benjamin Dunning, Specters of Paul: Sexual Difference in Early 
Christian Thought (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 43–50. 
 
18
 Excerpts 22 (Casey). 
 
19
 As Dale Martin has argued, such androgynous pairings are “actually the subsuming of the weaker female into the 
stronger male … [it] embodies the unequal hierarchy of male over female; it does not dispense with it or overcome 
it.”  Martin, Sex and the Single Savior, 84. On the notion of the “partners” in Valentinian texts, and the ways in 
which this notion served to reinforce a masculinist ideology, see Peter Brown, Body and Society: Men, Women, and 
Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 103–121; Dennis Ronald 
MacDonald, “Corinthian Veils and Gnostic Androgynes,” in King, Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism, 276–292; 
Dunning, Specters of Paul, 31–50. 
 
20
 Excerpts 33 (Casey). 
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with the males.”21 The gendered language refers to classes of people at different states of 
attainment, with female being the lower and male the higher. The male and female classes 
further correspond to the elements of spirit and soul, pneuma and psuche. As Jorunn Jacobsen 
Buckley puts it, “the element pneuma, equated… with the male, is superior to the psuche in such 
a way that the lower, female psuche element needs to acquire the nature of the male pneuma in 
order to be eligible for salvation.”22 The Excerpts maps progress toward salvation according to 
sexual difference. This surpassing of femaleness to acquire maleness would seem to fit with the 
story of the lesser creation by the “Mother.” However, when Theodotus considers the creation 
and salvation of humanity, it is not the “Mother” who appears as the creator, but Wisdom (or 
Sophia). This second Sophia figure creates on her own, but she creates both aspects of humanity, 
male and female, pneumatic and psychic.  
The finest emanation of Wisdom is spoken of in "He created them in the image of God, 
male and female created he them." Now the males from this emanation are the "election," 
but the females are the "calling" and they call the male beings angelic, and the females 
themselves, the separate seed. So also, in the case of Adam, the male remained in him but 
all the female seed was taken from him and became Eve, from whom the females are 
derived, as the males are from him. Therefore the males are drawn together with the 
Logos, but the females, becoming men, are united to the angels and pass into the 
Pleroma. Therefore the woman is said to be changed into a man, and the church here on 
earth into angels.23   
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This sketch of salvation makes use of the terms male and female in the expected ways. Males as 
the “election” have achieved a higher state of being than females, and females must become male 
in order to reach the Pleroma. Buckley explains, “everything has come full circle, the origin has 
been restored, the saved church has become angelic. For all of these the solution implies that 
femaleness must be overcome in order for maleness to be fully restored, to become itself.”24 
However, while Buckley’s summary covers well the topic of human salvation and sexual 
difference, this solution does not appear to apply to Wisdom herself. She creates on her own both 
the election and the calling, both the male and the female. This “finest emanation” derives from 
Wisdom without any partner. Theodotus appears to distinguish between the Mother, whose 
creation arose from desire and was immediately made less, and Wisdom, whose “finest 
emanation” includes both the election and the calling. 
 In the Excerpts, these two distinguishable Sophia figures both play a role in creation, but 
the deeply flawed, passionate creation is attributed to the Mother, not to Wisdom. Within the 
plurality of the divine realms, the text leaves open the possibility of honored female figures. The 
distinction between the Sophia figures according to the passions is important for the reading of 
Paul that follows later in the text. This section builds its narrative of the cosmos and human 
salvation from the interpretation of Paul—Romans 7.5–6 in particular.25  Romans 7.5 reads, 
“When we were living in the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our 
members to bear fruit for death.”26 Theodotus explains, “‘When we were living in the flesh,’ the 
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apostle says, speaking as if he were already outside the body. By ‘flesh’ he refers, he says, to that 
weakness which is the emission of the female above.”27 This creation of weakness refers to the 
Mother, and this weakness matches Paul’s argument in Romans because for both it is the 
passions which represent and demonstrate human lack. Salvation occurs when we are 
transformed from “children of the female” to “children of the male.” 
 In a recent, groundbreaking study of sexual difference in early Christianity, Benjamin 
Dunning highlights the importance of the interpretation of Paul. In particular, Dunning argues 
that certain moments of incoherence in Paul’s articulation of anthropology, theology and sexual 
difference repeat themselves in the writings of Paul’s interpreters. Paul understood the 
fundamental axis of salvation history to run from Adam to Christ and that typology leaves no 
obvious place to fit sexual difference.  
Here a real dilemma emerged for early Christians as they sought to theologize the sexed 
body in a conceptual field already overdetermined by the Pauline text: sexual difference 
simply does not fit in any obvious or uncomplicated way into a theology of creation and 
resurrection grounded in an Adam-Christ typology. And this dilemma, I will argue, 
continued to exercise an indirect influence that long outlived Paul, haunting Christian 
discourse on the question of sexual difference into the second and third centuries and 
beyond.28 
 
As readers of Paul attempt to articulate full and coherent visions of sexual difference, the 
moments of incoherence in Paul’s thought re-emerge in various forms and prevent any ultimate 
or complete coherence. Because the fundamental vision of human salvation imagined by Paul 
left no clear space open for sexual difference, theologians who inherited Paul’s vision worked 
themselves into new and stranger moments of incoherence in pursuit of a complete narrative of 
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sexual difference within human salvation.  Dunning writes, “the specter [of Paul] persists, visible 
in the disavowed and unacknowledged fault lines and failures that each position necessarily 
generates.”29 The specter of Paul refers to the fundamental incoherence of Paul’s own 
articulation of sexual difference with regard to human salvation, and this specter is reproduced in 
the thought of writers who take up Paul’s categories and his anthropology. The gaps and 
contradictions in Paul’s thought undo any attempts at wholeness or completeness in the 
theologies of his readers. 
 The structure of Dunning’s argument can perhaps best be understood by briefly 
summarizing his reading of Irenaeus.30 For Irenaeus, human salvation occurs through Christ’s 
“recapitulation” of human history, by which all things are redeemed and a positive future 
swallows up a negative past. This vision inherits from Paul the centrality of the Adam-Christ 
framework. If recapitulation requires “a consummation of all things in which every element in 
the end is linked to its corresponding component at the beginning,” then it depends on forging 
these links between Adam and Christ.31 At the same time, Irenaeus did not imagine that sexual 
difference would be entirely eliminated in the eschaton, but rather that the Edenic state of 
differentiated but virginal sexual difference would be recapitulated through Christ. This creates 
an obvious problem because now Eve has been inserted into the schema of human salvation as 
the representative of differentiated female bodies in the story of the origin. Likewise, Irenaeus 
turns to discuss the virgin Mary as Eve’s eschatological counterpart. Dunning argues that 
Irenaeus uses his readings of Mary and Eve to establish the connection between Adam and 
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Christ, but in this attempt to shore up the Adam-Christ relationship, Irenaeus introduces a 
destabilizing element of sexual difference which cannot fit into his Pauline framework. 
 The key to Irenaeus’ reading lies in associating the “virgin earth” from which Adam was 
created with the “virgin birth” from Mary by which Christ was created. Because the earth from 
which Adam was created in Genesis 2.7 was described as untilled in 2.5, Irenaeus argues that it 
was unpenetrated and thus virginal.32 This secures for Irenaeus the analogy between Mary’s 
virginal body and the earth from Adam was formed, thus linking Christ to Adam by their 
creations. The flesh Christ received from Mary is derived from the same virgin earth that 
produced Adam. However, Dunning argues, “the analogy is preserved at a price: the introduction 
of the sexually unpenetrated female body as an image/concept on which the logic of 
recapitulation hangs.”33 Pure virginity, which Irenaeus imagined as the state of humankind in the 
eschaton, now appears feminized and associated with a logic of penetration and sexual desire. 
The flesh of Christ, which, according to Irenaeus’ theory of recapitulation, assures the salvation 
of embodied humanity, “is itself already implicated in the conceptual specifics of the female 
body, insofar as its origin in virgin soil depends on the logic of penetration.”34 Irenaeus’ vision of 
human salvation, then, can only run from Adam to Christ by means of an imagination of 
specifically female bodily difference, connected to procreation and desire. The pure virginity of 
perfected humanity, in Irenaeus, can only come to be through an association with penetration and 
procreation which is then in turn disavowed. In Dunning’s reading, this is where the specter of 
Paul can be seen. Irenaeus seeks a coherent and self-sufficient vision of human salvation and 
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sexual difference. Because of his inheritance of the Adam-Christ framework from Paul, Irenaeus 
bases his story of human salvation on the virginal creations of these two figures, but in doing so 
he introduces female bodily difference and the logic of penetration into the core of his theology. 
They remain there, disavowed but necessary, in Dunning’s words a “remainder” of Irenaeus’ 
theology which prevents its ultimate coherence.35 
 This compelling argument challenges the notion that early Christian engagements with 
sexual difference inscribe a strict and relentless gendered hierarchy of male over female, what 
Daniel Boyarin calls a “reinstatement of masculinism.”36 Rather, Dunning explains that these 
writings are only “masquerading as solid and self-sufficient,” and they are rendered ultimately 
incoherent by the inheritance from Paul of a schema of human salvation which leaves no evident 
space for human sexual difference.37 There is no uniformity to ancient Christian articulations of 
sexual difference. Instead they are multiple, complex and plagued by incoherence. I draw on 
Dunning’s revision of the study of ancient imaginations of sexual difference for this focus on 
complexity, multiplicity and lack of coherence. I will argue, however, that the specific structure 
of his reading does not apply perfectly to the Excerpts from Theodotus and will not be as fruitful 
when applied to the First Apocalypse of James. 
Dunning considers Theodotus as one of these readers of Paul, but he suggests that the 
Excerpts are comparatively free of Paul’s haunting. He locates the text’s understanding of 
salvation under the rubric of Paul’s Adam-Christ typology. By interpreting the passions in 
Romans 7 as the mark of femaleness, Theodotus creates a space for sexual difference which does 
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not, at first glance, undermine the Adam-Christ story. “The female is nothing but a figure of 
formlessness and division—a cosmological aberration having no legitimate standing of its own. 
As such, it can be situated between the earthly Adam and the heavenly Christ as a site of 
problematic (but temporary) rupture.”38 The Excerpts seems to solve the problem in Paul by 
casting sexual difference as entirely inessential, a mere “aberration” which is transcended in the 
return to undifferentiated maleness. The fall of Adam partakes in femaleness and produces 
sexual difference, and humanity can attain re-admittance to the divine realms through Christ 
when femaleness is sloughed off. The inessential female in the theology of the Excerpts fits into 
Paul’s Adam-Christ typology because she does not challenge the position of either Adam or 
Christ.   
Dunning does not argue that the Excerpts thus solves the intractable problem inherited 
from Paul. Rather, he suggests that the specter of Paul still lurks under the surface of the text, but 
the Excerpts never engages deeply enough with sexual difference to bring it forth. In the 
Excerpts, the “strategies used to achieve this reinstatement of masculinism are presented in 
brief—and their larger theological and anthropological implications are not worked out in any 
thoroughgoing way.”39 The other subjects of Dunning’s analysis, including Irenaeus, Clement of 
Alexandria, and On the Origin of the World, do attempt such a “thoroughgoing” consideration of 
sexual difference. In each case, the specter of Paul undermines their pretensions to wholeness 
and self-sufficiency.  
I agree with Dunning that it is reductive to see in early Christian texts only a simple 
“reinstatement of masculinism.” Early Christian discourse allows a wide array of possible 
articulations of sexual difference. Dunning’s study locates a structural, organizing principle that 
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can both explain and document complexity and ultimate incoherence of ancient Christian 
articulations of sexual difference. I disagree with Dunning on two points, however. First, 
Dunning’s reading of the Excerpts does not account for the multiple Sophia figures and in 
particular the evaluation of Wisdom. I will argue that the space opened up in Valentinian 
theology by the distinctions between divine female powers enables a variety of new articulations 
of sexual difference within 1ApocJas. The Excerpts argues both that salvation entails some form 
of becoming male and that Wisdom was responsible for the creation of the saved, spiritual aspect 
of humanity. This incongruity does not receive a full elaboration within the Excerpts, but in 
1ApocJas an analogous understanding of the divine realms underlies many of the discussions of 
female martyrs and disciples. 
Second, I do not think that Dunning’s method will have as much explanatory power for a 
text like 1ApocJas. If the Excerpts are not extensive enough for the specter of Paul to emerge, 
then it is unlikely that the comparatively cursory discussions in 1ApocJas will suffice, either. 
Dunning’s study critically punctures the pretensions to solidity and self-sufficiency of 
theological texts which purport to wholly explain sexual difference. 1ApocJas, too, in its 
discussion of theology and anthropology, does not map out all the contours of a complex 
intellectual problem, but rather it discusses only a small set of issues which are important for 
preparation for martyrdom. The text does not reject coherence, but a complete and self-sufficient 
envisioning of human sexual difference does not appear to be its primary end. In the next 
chapter, I will consider a set of further discussions of sexual difference which follow in the 
dialogue, when James asks about a group of female disciples and martyrs. These discussions 
reflect an improvisational search for space within various early Christian traditions for the 
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honoring of female disciples and martyrs. Completeness and self-sufficiency are not swept aside, 
but they appear to be secondary goals in these discussions.  
These multiple articulations of sexual difference in 1ApocJas, then, have only provisional 
and partial coherence. For thinking more clearly about how these partial and provisional 
articulations work, I have found useful the writing of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick on sexual 
difference. Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet offers a theoretical discussion of sex, gender, 
and sexuality which is premised on the notion that a broader array of differences exist than are 
accounted for in most contemporary discussions. Under the deceptively simple banner of the 
axiom, “People are different from each other,” Sedgwick reminds us that these “inconceivably 
course axes” of sex and sexuality, as well as race and class, cannot capture the breadth of lived 
human difference.40 As one example, the modern notion “sexuality” must encompass much more 
than only homosexual or heterosexual definition to consider how the same acts may be 
understood entirely differently, how object choice may be more or less fixed and more or less 
intellectually freighted, and so on.41  
She insists that while these various methods of mapping out human difference are not 
philosophically systematized, they should be reasonably well understood among a contemporary 
audience. “Probably everybody who survives at all has reasonably rich, unsystematic resources 
of nonce taxonomy for mapping out the possibilities, dangers, and stimulations of their human 
social landscape.”42 The phrasing Sedgwick uses to describe these resources is a little 
confusing—how can there be “resources” of “nonce taxonomy”? If something is a resource, one 
expects it can be used and re-used, not used once and never again, as “nonce” suggests. My 
                                                 
40
 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 22. 
 
41
 Ibid., 24–26. 
 
42
 Ibid., 22–23. 
 123 
 
reading here is that Sedgwick uses the word “nonce” to emphasize that these unsystematic 
cultural resources are available for improvisational uses in the moment, peculiar to the particular 
problems for which they may be activated, and which may or may not be repeated. The key point 
I take from Sedgwick here is that cultural resources exist, though in a disorganized state, for 
various kinds of mappings of sexual difference.  
I will argue that 1ApocJas seems to be depending on rich, unsystematic resources for 
thinking about sexual difference. The different answers which 1ApocJas gives to the question 
“concerning femaleness” offer insight into the unsystematic taxonomies of human difference 
available to and active for Christians living in a situation of possible persecution.  1ApocJas 
finds spaces within early Christian traditions for articulations of sexual difference which allow 
for the honoring of female disciples and martyrs. These articulations can only be seen if one 
begins by discarding the assumptions that ancient Christian articulations of sexual difference are 
monolithic and that these texts reinscribe masculinism in a simple and straightforward way.  
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Chapter 5: The Seven Women Whom All the Generations Bless 
In this chapter, I will draw together two strands of analysis from the previous sections. In 
the third chapter, I interpreted the passages on the “seven women … whom all the generations 
bless” in terms of the readings of scripture which underlie the discussions. In the fourth chapter, I 
argued that the theology of 1ApocJas allows for multiple articulations of sexual difference based 
on its envisioning of multiple female divine figures. Here I will argue that in the passage on the 
seven women, 1ApocJas builds from this theology a set of provisional articulations of sexual 
difference that explain the power and prestige of these honored women.  
The passages on the seven women follow after the completion of Jesus’ long revelation 
speech. This speech is marked as the climax of the dialogue. After much prompting from James, 
Jesus finally tells him, “I will reveal to you your salvation” (TnaCwlp nak ebol µpekswte; 
19.22–24). The speech which follows contains precisely the revelation James required. James 
feels his fear dissipate, and when the speech is complete, he says to Jesus, “I have come to 
believe all these things, and they are properly placed within what is in my soul” (aei® [pi]steuïe 
enaû throu aïuw auHµ [p]etHN t/aïyuch kalws; 25.5–17). One might expect this to mark the 
end of the dialogue. Instead, James asks a new series of questions, inquiring of Jesus about his 
female disciples. Only after Jesus has answered these further questions does the dialogue 
conclude, and only then does James go off for his martyrdom.  
James’ questions about the seven women must be important, given that he asks them after 
he has received full theological revelation. Yet these seven women are new characters; they have 
no antecedent in the text. I suggest that, by the logic of 1ApocJas, James asks these questions 
precisely because of the foregoing discussion of theology and its implications for sexual 
difference. This theological economy has left open questions about sexual difference. Jesus’ 
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discussions of sexual difference have mostly treated “femaleness” as the negatively-valenced 
aspect of the divine plurality. Salvation has been figured as the triumph over this femaleness. 
However, Jesus has also told James to invoke the power of female divine figures, who appear to 
be part of the positively-valenced plurality of the divine realms. The text asks, how can this 
theology harmonize with the stories of these seven women whom we hold in particular honor? 
Further, Jesus will present these women to James as moral exemplars to be followed in his 
preparation for martyrdom. They must find space for authorizing these women in order for the 
exhortation to martyrdom to be complete. The remainder of the dialogue consists of James and 
Jesus seeking to find justification for honoring these women. These passages demonstrate the 
multiple taxonomies available to 1ApocJas and the diverse set of ways in which sexual 
difference might be re-articulated within this Valentinian economy.  
Rabbi, I have come to [believe] these things, and they are properly within what is in my 
soul. Still I will ask you this, who are the seven women who have become your disciples 
and all the generations bless them? I am amazed that, although they are in weak vessels, 
they have attained powers and perceptions. 
 
rabbei aei® [pi]steue enaû throu auw auHµ [p]etHN tayuch kalws eti Tnavine 
µmok epaû nim ne TsΩFe nsHime ntar maqhteue nek auw naû se® makarize µmau 
NCi Ngenea throu auw anok T® moûHe je euHN nagCion nCwb auw auCine nHnCom 
mn HNaisqhsis (25.15–26) 
 
James says that he has come to understand all that has been revealed to him. This knowledge 
about the nature of the cosmos and the nature of the human enables James to become prepared 
for martyrdom. Again, that James has further questions suggests that this revelation has 
nonetheless been insufficient or incomplete. James says that he is amazed at the spiritual 
achievements of the seven female disciples of Jesus and the honor in which they are held. These 
women have not been mentioned previously in the text, but their presentation suggests that the 
reader ought to already know them. As already discussed above, this passage bears similarity to a 
passage in the Sophia of Jesus Christ. SJC also mentions “seven women who were his disciples” 
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(savFe NsHûme ete neumaqhteue naF; BG 77.13–15). The content of SJC beyond this 
opening does not contain significant parallels to 1ApocJas, which suggests again the existence of 
an independent tradition of seven female disciples of Jesus.1 It is impossible to determine exactly 
what this tradition consisted of beyond the attribution of discipleship to a set of women. A 
hypothesized tradition about seven women disciples can explain, at least, why the women would 
be introduced as if the reader or hearer should recognize them. The text assumes some degree of 
expertise from its readers regarding this early Christian tradition. 
 In response to James’ amazement at the women, Jesus argues, “Properly are you amazed, 
but the son of man has come and revealed the secrets about the children of the light, so that they 
may have the secrets when they are revealed” (kalws ˚® moûHe alla aFei NCi pvhre mprwme 
aFouwnH ebol Nneqht etbe Nvhre µpouoûn jekaas euHN pe/t/ouonÓ ebol; 25.25–26.4). 
It seems that James should not be amazed about the achievement of these women because they 
have received revelation. The description of these women as “children of the light” links them to 
James through a reading of John. Jesus has previously mentioned “children of the One Who Is” 
who come to realize “what is theirs and what is not theirs” (11.4–7). The achievement of 
recognizing one’s own previously also appeared in the embedded dialogue in the long revelation 
speech (20.23–25). The state these women have achieved, then, receiving revelation and 
becoming “children of the light,” resembles the state that Jesus exhorted James to achieve 
through the inculcation of knowledge. This section foreshadows the later establishment of these 
women as moral exemplars for James.  
Jesus then moves on to describe the seven women in terms of a reading of Isaiah 11.2–3, 
which produces a group of honored female figures in the divine realms who have a special 
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relationship to Jesus. The text brings up this reading of Isaiah, then, to provide scriptural backing 
for the honoring of Jesus’ female disciples.   
The seven women, they are the seven spirits who are introduced in this scripture: a spirit 
of wisdom [and] intelligence, a spirit of counsel [and] strength, [a] spirit of reason and 
knowledge, a spirit of fear. When <I> passed by the land of the great ruler, the one who is 
called Addon, I went up to him, and he was ignorant. And when I left him, he thought of 
me that I was his son, and he favored me as his own son. And before I appeared in these 
places, these (spirits) were already among this people, in the place where no prophet 
spoke without the seven spirits. And these are the seven spirits who have preached about 
me through the mouths of the people, just as they were able to speak, because I had not 
spoken with all strength. But I have come and I have fulfilled (it). 
 
TsavFe NsHime ete/ neei ne savF µpna ne naiü evauNtou eHoun HN te/[i]g[ra]fh 
oupna nsofia H[i] m[Nt]sabe oupna nsojn/[e Hi] C/[o]m [ou]p/n/a/ [n]nou Hi soo[une] 
oup/na nHote Nter/e/<i>jwwbe npkaH µpnoC narc/wn petevaum[o]ute ero/F je 
addwn aeibwk eHoun varoF/ auw ntoF eFo nats/[o]oune N[t]erieiü de ebol µm/oF 
neFmeoue ero[ei] pe je an˚ p/eFvhre auw aFcarise naei Hws peFvhre µmin 
moF auw anok Ha teHh empaTouwnÓ ebol Nneei ma ara neuvoop NCi naei Hµ 
pilaos ete paei pe pma ete mpeprofhths vaje cwris pisavÏ µpna auw naei 
ne pisavÏ µpna Ntautave oeiv etbht HitN ttapro nNrwme kata qe/ n/tauC/m/Com 
ejoou ebol je µpijw NtCom thrß [a]n/ok de [ae]iei aeijwk ebol (26.4–27.2) 
 
This passage adds detail to the text’s imagination of the divine realms through a theological 
interpretation of Isaiah. Among the rulers who are the agents of femaleness, we now meet the 
great ruler Addon. He can be added to the toll collectors, the three who take away the soul, and 
other unspecified rulers. By contrast, these spirits of prophecy must be agents of the One Who Is, 
not of femaleness. They precede Jesus and inspire true prophecy about him. The text does not 
mention here the “undefiled Sophia,” but the description of the seven spirits was foreshadowed 
by the invocation of Sophia. Jesus further elaborates the positive plurality of the divine realms 
introduced through the higher Sophia. Sophia is no longer the only honored female inhabitant of 
the divine realms. The seven spirits are another group of female divine powers. The seven 
women disciples, by Jesus’ logic, deserve honor because of their typological relation to the seven 
spirits. The existence of female figures in the divine realms authorizes female disciples in this 
world. When 1ApocJas seeks to explain the blessedness of these female disciples, the 
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explanation draws from and elaborates upon the positive aspects of gendered plurality in the 
divine realms.  
 In these first passages on the seven women, then, Jesus rejects as unimportant an 
articulation of sexual difference based in bodily difference. He reveals the activity of various 
divine female figures, whom he claims as analogues for his women disciples. The positive 
aspects of plurality in the divine realms, within which there may be a variety of female powers 
and spirits, become the explanation for the honored status of these disciples.  
The next passage in the revelation offers an ethical interpretation of Isaiah 11.2–3. Jesus 
claims that James should take three of the seven women as objects of imitation. They are moral 
exemplars who have achieved the transformations to which James has been exhorted. This idea 
that the women might be models for imitation is suggested by the previous mention of them as 
“children of the light” who receive Jesus’ revelation, and it is confirmed here. 
Be persuaded by this other (example), which is that of Salome, Mary, and Arsinoe, whom 
I will introduce to you, since [they] are worthy of the One Who Is. For they have become 
sober, and they have cast off the blindness which was in their minds, and they have come 
to know who I am.  
 
® piqesqai on mpeeikeoua ete salwme mn mariHammhn auw arsinoh nai eTna® 
sunHista µmau nek e[u]µpva µpetvoop kai gar au® nhfe auw au[n]ouje [e]bol 
Ntm[n]tb¬le etHn [p]euHht au[w] au® noû mmoû je anok ouo[u] (27.25–28.5) 2 
 
                                                 
2
 In Nag Hammadi Codex V, this passage is not well-preserved, but the names Mary and Salome are clearly visible, 
and it is reasonable to reconstruct [ars]inoh. There is a remaining lacuna before “Arsinoe” which Schoedel had 
hypothesized contained “Martha.”  If this reconstruction is correct, then there are four names in the NHC version 
and three in the TC version. I think it is more likely that the reconstruction by Uwe-Karsten Plisch and Imke 
Schletterer here is correct. They hypothesized that the lacuna could read “Mary [Magdalene]” and that there would 
be only three women listed. Since the TC version also lists only three disciples here, Plisch’s hypothesis seems to 
have good support. Brankaer and Bethge have suggested that four disciples are still more likely, and it could have 
been “[another Mary].”  In this case, the two Marys could have been conflated in the production of the Tchacos 
Codex. As such, NHC V refers to Mary, Salome, and Arsinoe, and it may refer again to another Mary. Uwe-Karsten 
Plisch and Imke Schletterer, “Die (erste) Apokalypse des Jakobus (NHC V,3),” in Nag Hammadi Deutsch (ed. 
Hans-Gebhard Bethge et. al.; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), 304–310; Brankaer and Bethge, Codex Tchacos, 
243–244. 
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As I have argued, each of these characteristics matches to an exhortation that Jesus has 
previously made to James.3 The earlier suggestion that these women precede James as Jesus’ 
disciples and as recipients of revelation is confirmed. This passage serves as well to explain why 
James has asked about the seven women. They are exemplars whose lead James must follow in 
his progress in knowledge and self-transformation. 
The names of these women are significant. 1ApocJas provides their names as if this is 
important information, yet it fails to give any further explanation of their importance. In a 
learned discussion, Silke Petersen demonstrates that other early Christian texts also link these 
particular women with each other and that they do so within a context of debates regarding 
sexual difference.4  One finds Mary and Salome together heading to Jesus’ tomb in Mark 16.1. 
Further, a Syriac fragment, hypothesized to be dependent on Tatian’s Diatessaron, tells a version 
of the empty tomb story in which an otherwise unknown Arsinoe joins Mary and Salome.5 The 
Manichean Psalmbook II 192.21–22 also includes Arsinoe along with Mary, Martha, and Salome 
as disciples of Jesus.6  1ApocJas, then, likely draws on stories told of women disciples, which 
built upon gospel passages and developed traditions of honored women who could serve as 
paradigmatic Christians for the community of 1ApocJas.7   
                                                 
3
 See chapter 3, pages 92–95. 
 
4
 Petersen, Zestört die Werke der Weiblichkeit!, 248–253. 
 
5
 William L. Peterson, “An Important Unnoticed Diatessaronic Reading in Turfan Fragment M-18,” in Patristic and 
Text-Critical Studies: The Collected Essays of William L. Petersen (eds. Jan Krans and Joseph Verheyden; Leiden: 
Brill, 2011), 88–93. 
 
6
 See Richard Bauckham, “Salome the Sister of Jesus, Salome the Disciple of Jesus, and the Secret Gospel of Mark,” 
Novum Testamentum 33 (1991), 258; Marjanen, The Woman Jesus Loved, 213; Petersen, Zerstört die Werke der 
Weiblichkeit!, 252. 
 
7
 Petersen’s analysis, drawing on work by Judith Hartenstein, locates these revelation dialogues within the 
reception-history of the Gospels and related literature. As Christians told stories about Jesus and his disciples, they 
often turned to the post-resurrection setting to lay out further teachings of Jesus and further stories about important 
disciples. Petersen, Zestört die Werke der Weiblichkeit!, 40–43; Hartenstein, Die zweite Lehre, 298–311. 
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Salome and Mary are particularly notable here. When early Christian literature depicts 
Jesus in conversation with a female disciple, that disciple is almost always either Mary or 
Salome.8 In 1ApocJas these women appear as ideal disciples of Jesus, women who have received 
revelation and transformed themselves accordingly. It makes sense that, in presenting women 
who have received revelation, 1ApocJas would consider women who were remembered as being 
dialogue partners of Jesus. This tradition explains how they received special revelation. As I will 
argue below, Mary and Salome also play roles in early Christian discourses about sexual 
difference and so their presence here foreshadows the larger discussion of sexual difference that 
is to follow.    
These passages also help explain why James was concerned to ask about these women. 
His preparation for martyrdom depends on his proper imitation of their example. After 
presenting Salome, Mary, and Arsinoe to James as moral exemplars, Jesus explains how they 
have become moral exemplars using a sacrificial metaphor drawn from interpretation of 
Leviticus. 
This is according to the foreknowledge of the Father, because he sent me as a priest. And 
in every place are reckoned the first-fruits and the firstborn [in] the [great sacrifice]. One 
receives the first-fruits and assigns sacrifices and offerings. But I do not act in this way. 
Rather, I receive the first-fruits of the defiled ones so that I may send them up 
[un]defiled, so that the true power is revealed. For the defiled has separated from the 
undefiled and the work <of the female> has attained to the male. (Or, “the true work has 
attained to the male.”) 
 
paû kata tepronoia µpiüw/[t] je aFtnoou µmoû Nouhhb auw/ [H]µ ma nim sehp Nte 
naûü N/[n]a/parch auw Nvrp m/m/iüs/e/ H[µ pe]e/[inoC Nq]u/os ete paei p/[e] vaFji 
Nnaparch auw va[Fr]wve Nqusia Hi prosfor/[a] anok de NteeiHe an all[a] 
e/v/aûji Nnaparch Nnetj/[aH]m Ntatnoousou euo N/[at]jwHm j[e]kaas 
esnaouw/n/H ebol NCi tCom µme je apjwHµ pwrj ebol eumNtatjwHµ auw fwb 
<NtesHi>me aFkatanta efaut (28.6–28.20) 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
8
 For Mary, see DialSav 131.19–144.22; John 20; Gospel of Thomas 21; SJC 98.9, 114.8; Gospel of Mary 10.10–
17.7. For Salome, see Gospel of the Egyptians, GosThom 61. See Petersen, Zerstört die Werke der Weiblichkeit!, 
94–241.  
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The Nag Hammadi version is too fragmentary to compare the first sentences, though “burnt 
offerings” (HenClil; V 41.8) and “first-fruits” ([a]p/arch; V 41.11) can both be read, confirming 
the priestly comparison. The final section of the passage is mostly preserved. It reads, “…so that 
the power [of truth] is revealed, that the perishable has gone up to the imperishable, and the work 
of femaleness has attained to the work of maleness” ([j]eäkaas [eseou]wnÓ ebol NCi tCom 
[Ntmhe j]e apitako aF®cwriü [eHr]aû epiattako auw [f]wb NTmNtsHime aF®katanta 
eHraû efwb NteûmNtHoout; V 41.13–18).9  Where the Tchacos Codex reads “true work” 
(fwb µme), Nag Hammadi Codex V, which luckily is extant for a few lines at this point, reads 
“the work of femaleness” ([f]wb NTmNtsHime) (41.17). This is a significant divergence. 
Editors of the Tchacos Codex have argued that this divergence arose from a scribal error, 
suggested by the divergence of the TC version here from the NHC V version as well as by the 
problematic logic of the passage. The statement “the true work has attained to the work of the 
male” does not connect cleanly to the logic of the passage preceding it. The passage has set up an 
expectation that an object or person in a defiled state should be transformed to an undefiled state. 
The “true work” does not need to attain anything. It is not defiled. The passage’s doubtful 
meaning could suggest a scribal error. Further, a plausible hypothesis for the cause of this error 
can be extrapolated from the physical alignment of the writing in the codex. The phrase tCom 
µme appears just two lines above, and the µme construction could have been carried down. For 
these reasons, I follow Kasser/Wurst and Bethge/Brankaer in hypothesizing a scribal error here, 
and I think the better reading of 1ApocJas here is “the work of the female” or the NHC V “the 
                                                 
9
 Schoedel had hypothesized “the power [of God]” (tCom [µpnout]eä) in the lacuna on line 15 in NHC V. Given 
given that the TC version reads “the true power,” I find Brankaer and Bethge’s hypothesized reconstruction here 
“the power [of truth], that…” (tCom [Ntmhe j]eä) to be more likely. See Brankaer and Bethge, Codex Tchacos, 125. 
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work of femaleness.”10 However, as I will discuss later, the existence of a scribal error here may 
provide evidence that the logic of the text here was not easy for ancient scribes to follow.  
This discussion of sexual difference, contrasting the work of the female with the work of 
the male, develops from a reading of Leviticus.  Leviticus distinguishes between “blemished” and 
“unblemished” sacrificial offerings. 1ApocJas identifies the priest in Leviticus who only receives 
“unblemished” offerings as an anti-type of Christ, by connecting the notion of being blemished 
to categories of defilement and perishability. One can understand Christ as a superior form of the 
priest. Unlike the priest in Leviticus who receives what is already perfect, Christ takes what is 
defiled or perishable and transforms it to the undefiled or imperishable. This priestly comparison 
serves to explain how the women have become exemplars. They have been transformed by 
Christ. By his giving of revelation, Christ has enabled these women to turn from the defiled to 
the undefiled, to achieve salvation and moral perfection.  
 The mention of the “work of femaleness” or “the work of the female” in this passage then 
connects the discussion of the seven women to earlier theological discussions of sexual 
difference. “Femaleness” and “the female” in 1ApocJas function as technical terms, referring to 
Achamoth, the lower Sophia. At the same time, a similar state of undefilement has been 
previously attributed to the higher Sophia. Once again, the discussion of the seven women seems 
to depend upon certain theological articulations of sexual difference. Here, the concept of “the 
work of femaleness” is raised for the first time in the text. To explain how this passage functions, 
                                                 
10
 Both Kasser/Wurst and Bethge/Brankaer propose the emendation “the <female> work” (fwb <NsHi>me). The 
reconstruction of a definite noun here that I suggest (“the female”; fwb <NtesHi>me) has three benefits. First, it 
produces a better parallel within the TC version, as the work of the female attains to the (definite) male. Second, it 
accords better with the NHC V version, wherein we see “the work of femaleness,” referring to the divine figure 
responsible for creation. Third, it accords better with the language of 1ApocJas up to this point, where the terms “the 
female” and “femaleness” have a technical referent of Achamoth.  
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I need to contextualize the notion of “the work of femaleness” within ancient Christian discourse 
on sexual difference. 
 
The Works of Femaleness 
This passage in 1ApocJas calls for the surpassing or triumph over “the work (or works) 
of femaleness” in the context of a discussion about female disciples, including Mary and Salome. 
This same set of concerns and characters—the triumph over the work of femaleness and these 
particular female disciples—appears not only in this text, but in two other places in early 
Christian literature. In the Dialogue of the Savior, Mary talks about “the work of femaleness” 
with Jesus. In the Gospel of the Egyptians, preserved by Clement of Alexandria in the third book 
of his Stromateis, Salome questions Jesus on the topic of “the works of femaleness.” The 
association of Mary and Salome with the “works of femaleness” suggests that 1ApocJas is 
engaging with a known ancient tradition. DialSav offers an articulation of sexual difference on 
bodily and practical lines, reading “the works of femaleness” to refer both to particular capacities 
for gestation and birthing, and to sexual practices. In the Stromateis, it is possible to see the 
contours of a larger debate. Clement responds to others who have read “the works of femaleness” 
as having a particular bodily meaning, and he focuses instead on intellectual and emotional 
differences.  
The Dialogue of the Savior consists of a dialogue between Jesus and his disciples, of 
whom Judas, Matthew, and Mary are named in the text as preserved.11 Toward the end of the 
                                                 
11
 For the text and translation of the Dialogue of the Savior, see Stephen Emmel, ed., Nag Hammadi Codex III,5: 
The Dialogue of the Savior (NHS 26; Leiden: Brill, 1984), 37–95. See also Martin Krause, “Der Dialog des Soter in 
Codex III von Nag Hammadi,” in Gnosis and Gnosticism: Papers read at the Seventh International Conference on 
Patristic Studies, Oxford, September 8th–13th, 1975 (ed. Martin Krause; NHS 8; Leiden: Brill, 1977); Helmut 
Koester and Elaine Pagels, “Introduction,” in Emmel, Nag Hammadi Codex III,5, 1–17; Pheme Perkins, The Gnostic 
Dialogue: The Early Church and the Crisis of Gnosticism (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 107–112; Marjanen, The 
Woman Jesus Loved, 79–93; Petersen, Zerstört die Werke der Weiblichkeit!, 79–90. 
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text, Jesus discusses practices of prayer. He states that prayer should occur “in the place where 
there is no woman.” His disciples Matthew and Mary then respond: 
 The Lord said, “Pray in the place where there is no woman.”  
Matthew said, “Pray in the place where there is [no woman], he tells us, meaning, 
“destroy the works of femaleness,” (erikatalue Nn[e] Hboue NtmNtsHime) not 
because there is any other [manner of birth], but because they will cease [giving birth].” 
 Mary said, “They will never be obliterated.”12 
 
This saying, in DialSav, defines the “works of femaleness” in terms of the production of 
children. When women cease giving birth, the “works of femaleness” will be destroyed. Mary’s 
response is ambiguous, and the conclusion of the discussion following Mary’s response is not 
preserved. Both Robert Doran and Silke Petersen read Mary’s response as an assertion that 
women will not be obliterated, although the “works of femaleness” will cease.13 In that case, the 
text makes an argument for sexual renunciation in order that no one gives birth. The discussion 
of sexual difference here locates difference in a particular bodily and practical way. In much 
ancient medical literature, women’s difference was localized in the womb.14 In DialSav, this 
bodily difference expands to incorporate practical difference: sexual intercourse along with the 
bodily processes of gestation and birth are classified as “works of femaleness.” To “destroy the 
works of femaleness” in DialSav means to cause certain bodily processes to cease by refraining 
from sexual activity. In this articulation, men and women differ according to bodily organs and 
processes, and particular sexual practices are coded as female because of their relation to 
                                                 
12
 NHC III 144.15–23. Translation Emmel, slightly altered. I have translated Nn[e] Hboue NtmNtsHime here as 
“works of femaleness” (144.19–20). 
 
13
 Robert Doran, “To Bear or not to Bear: The Argument for Abstinence in the Greek Gospel of the Egyptians,” in 
Women and Gender in Ancient Religions (ed. Stephen Ahearne-Kroll, Paul Holloway, and James Kelhoffer; 
Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2010), 179–180; Petersen, Zerstört die Werke der Weiblichkeit!, 210–211. 
 
14
 “The female has her illness in common with the male, she suffers from constriction or from flux, either 
chronically or acutely.”  The only differences appear in the “functions” of “conception, parturition, and lactation,” 
and in the “particulars” or “localizations” of her diseases. Soranus, Gynecology 3.5. Translation from Owsei 
Temkin, trans., Soranus’ Gynecology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1991). 
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women’s bodies. I will return to this point, but what I want to draw from DialSav is that it would 
be possible to read “the works of femaleness” as an articulation of bodily difference. 
The range of possible interpretations of the “works of femaleness” becomes apparent in a 
discussion from the third book of Clement of Alexandria’s Stromateis.15  Clement is engaged in a 
dispute with multiple opponents when he brings up the “works of femaleness.” By describing the 
opinions which these opponents hold, he provides a useful, if highly polemical, compendium of 
possible interpretations of the “works of femaleness” in ancient Christian discourse of sexual 
difference. Clement describes these opponents as, on the one side, extreme libertines who place 
few restrictions on lawful sexuality, and, on the other side, extreme ascetics who call for 
complete celibacy for all.16 The rhetorical strategy of depicting his opponents as extremists 
allows him to arrogate to himself the presumedly superior middle position. He accepts the 
occurrence of sexual intercourse in marriage, but calls for Christians to renounce and extirpate 
all passion and desire. Only sex in the absence of desire is acceptable. As Kathy Gaca puts it, for 
Clement, “it is flagrant adultery to experience even a flutter of the sexual appetite.”17 
                                                 
15
 For translation, see John Ferguson, trans. Clement of Alexandria: Stromateis: Books One to Three (Fathers of the 
Church 85; Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1991). For Greek text, see Otto Stählin and 
Ludwig Früchtel, eds., Clemens Alexandrinus : Stromata Buch I–VI (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1985). 
 
16
 Stromateis, 3.5.40 
 
17
 Gaca, The Making of Fornication, 270. As Gaca points out, Clement’s purported middle position differs only 
slightly from that of his “ascetic” opponents in comparison to the vast gulf between him and the “libertines”. On 
Clement and sexual difference, see also Jean-Paul Broudéhoux, Mariage et famille chez Clément d’Alexandrie 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1970); David Hunter, “The Language of Desire: Clement of Alexandria’s Transformation of 
Ascetic Discourse,” Semeia 57 (1992), 95–111; Kari Elisabeth Børreson, “God’s Image, Man’s Image? Patristic 
Interpretation of Gen. 1.27 and 1 Cor. 11.7,” in The Image of God: Gender Models in the Judeo-Christian Tradition 
(ed. Kari Elisabeth Børreson; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 187–209; Denise Kimber Buell, “Ambiguous 
Legacy: A Feminist Commentary on Clement of Alexandria’s Works,” in A Feminist Companion to Patristic 
Literature (ed. Amy Jo Levine; London: T&T Clark, 2008), 26–55; Judith L. Kovacs, “Becoming the Perfect Man: 
Clement of Alexandria on the Philosophical Life of Women,” in Women and Gender in Ancient Religions, 401–425; 
Dunning, Specters of Paul, 51–74. 
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 When Clement discusses the “work of femaleness,” he is engaged in a dispute with his 
rhetorically constructed ascetic opponents. He takes up the interpretation of a passage from an 
otherwise lost text, the Gospel of the Egyptians. Clement quotes the text, provides a short 
summary of his opponents’ views, and then provides his own interpretation. 
Those who attack God’s creation under the pious name of self-control quote the words 
spoken to Salome, which we have mentioned previously. I fancy the passage comes from 
the Gospel according to the Egyptians. They maintain that the Savior personally said, "I 
am come to destroy the works of femaleness." "Femaleness" refers to sexual desire, and 
its works are birth and decay. So what are they to say? Has this world order been undone? 
They could never say so. The universe remains in the same condition. But the Lord did 
not speak falsely. In reality he brought to nothing the works of desire—the love of 
money, or winning, or glory, craziness over women, a passion for boys, gluttony, 
profligacy and the like. The birth of these means decay in the soul, if we become "dead in 
sins." This is what is meant by "female" lack of self-control. Birth and decay in creation 
are bound to take place in accordance with the divine principle until the time of total 
dissolution and the restoration of the elect, an event through which the beings which are 
mixed up with the material world are also assigned to their true condition.18  
 
Clement claims later that his opponents interpret these snippets of the Gospel of the Egyptians as 
a straightforward call to celibacy, a claim that “marriage … is a sin.”19 In the Gospel of the 
Egyptians, it seems that Jesus has told Salome that she must “destroy the works of femaleness.” 
Clement later cites another passage from GosEg in which the savior is asked by Salome, "How 
long will human beings go on dying?" He responds, "As long as women give birth."20 Based on 
these snippets, we can conjecture that the Gospel of the Egyptians was concerned with the nature 
of the human life-cycle. It is impossible to know with any more precision what the Gospel of the 
Egyptians was about, but the text apparently took the notion of the “works of femaleness” to 
                                                 
18
 Stromateis 3.5.63 (Ferguson). 
 
19
 Ibid., 3.5.67. 
 
20
 Ibid., 3.5.64.  
 
 137 
 
refer to pregnancy and birth.21  Clement mocks his opponents for undermining the order of 
creation in the name of “self-control,” and he claims they have interpreted this saying of Jesus as 
a straightforward call to sexual renunciation. For these opponents, if Clement is correct, the 
“works of femaleness” refer to pregnancy and birth. They exhort Christians to renounce sexual 
practice in order to end the cycle of birth and death. Clement’s opponents, then, interpret “the 
works of femaleness” in the same way as the Dialogue of the Savior. Sexual difference is 
mapped on bodies and practices, and by ceasing sexual practices that lead to the birth of children, 
the “works of femaleness” are destroyed. 
 For Clement, by contrast, the saying of Jesus has an allegorical meaning. The “works of 
femaleness,” he says, simply refer to “sexual desire.” What Christians are called to renounce, 
then, is not sex, but desire. The death and dissolution which follow from the “works of 
femaleness” are not caused by birth, but by the lack of self-control when the person remains 
ruled by his or her passions. When one practices self-mastery, seeking to extirpate passion rather 
than renouncing sex, one destroys “the works of femaleness” in accordance with the ruling of 
Jesus. “Femaleness” is defined here according to an understanding of the passions by which to be 
moved by the passions was to take a passive and therefore feminized role. Dunning explains that 
the passions function for Clement “as a troubling force internal to the soul, one which can render 
the human being passive (and therefore must be countered through active techniques of self-
control and mastery).”22 This argument works by a bodily, sexual analogy. The intellect or soul 
                                                 
21
 On the possible original arrangement of GosEg, see Petersen, Zerstort die Werke der Weiblichkeit!, 203–210. 
Petersen argues that GosEg was not necessarily calling its readers and hearers to sexual abstinence, but instead it can 
be reconstructed as describing a new state of humanity. Doran and Klauck both read these passages as unambiguous 
exhortations to sexual renunciation. Doran, 179–180; Hans-Josef Klauck, Apocryphal Gospels: An Introduction 
(trans. Brian McNeil; New York: T&T Clark, 2000), 57–58. 
 
22
 Dunning, Specters of Paul, 70. On this connection between the passions, passivity, and femininity, see also 
Hunter, “The Language of Desire;” Stowers, A Rereading of Romans, 42–82; Martin, The Corinthian Body, 198–
228; Moore, God’s Beauty Parlor, 146–169. 
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which is moved by the passions thus becomes “passive” in relation to them. This passivity is 
analogized to a “passive” female body as the receptive partner in sexual intercourse. Clement 
articulates sexual difference according to the passions and according to the mode of governance 
of the self and the soul. He advocates practices of ethical transformation by which “feminine” 
desire may be extirpated and replaced with “masculine” self-control.  
 For my purposes, it is not important precisely who Clement’s opponents might be or the 
exact sense of the passage in the Gospel of the Egyptians. These different interpretations and 
multiple embedded citations demonstrate the existence of a complex debate over the 
interpretation of the phrase, “the works of femaleness.” For 1ApocJas to bring this concept into 
play, at such a crucial place in the text, constitutes an engagement with this ongoing debate as 
reflected in Clement’s text. 1ApocJas shares with Clement, DialSav, and GosEg not only the 
terminology, but also the names of Mary and Salome as female disciples who have received 
revelation. By mentioning “the work of femaleness” within the discussion of the female 
disciples, 1ApocJas enters into the ongoing discussion among Christians over what these works 
might be. 
 1ApocJas’ use of “the work of femaleness” differs from all the interpretations put 
forward by Clement. 1ApocJas has already given the reader the tools to understand 
“femaleness,” which has been identified with Achamoth, the divine figure responsible for the 
creation of this world. The “works of femaleness” must refer not simply to birth nor to the 
passions, but to all those created aspects of the world which draw their being from Achamoth 
rather than from the One Who Is. To “attain to the work of maleness” is to return to primal 
oneness within the One Who Is (13.22–14.2). The dissolution of the work of femaleness, then, 
refers to the surpassing of femaleness in the process of human salvation. Sexual difference for 
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Clement depended on a theory of the emotions and a set of practices. In 1ApocJas, “femaleness” 
is mapped according to a theological myth. 
 While the articulations of sexual difference in 1ApocJas and Clement differ significantly, 
they seem at first to invoke similar gendered hierarchies. As Dunning argues, Clement’s vision 
of human perfection “is always already implicated in the eschatological translation of the female 
into the male.”23 The achievement of self-control that Clement exhorts to his readers needs to be 
understood as a triumph over desire, which he has defined as “the work of femaleness.” 
Clement’s vision of human perfection and sexual difference fits in this sense with the discussion 
of femaleness in 1ApocJas. Christ’s action enables these women to proceed from defilement to 
undefilement so that they can enter into the perfection of the divine realms. The rupture in the 
divine realms was caused by femaleness. The work of femaleness attains to the work of maleness 
when they come to be wholly within the One Who Is. The articulation of sexual difference, then, 
suggests femaleness as differentiation must be overcome in human salvation. This passage 
makes the claim most strongly, by differentiating the “work of femaleness” from the “work of 
maleness.” This sounds like Clement’s economy, in which the perfection of these women can 
only be understood in terms of a transformation to maleness.  
The problem for such a reading of 1ApocJas is that we have already met the “undefiled 
Sophia” and the seven spirits. Becoming undefiled and fully enmeshed within the divine realms 
does not necessarily correspond to an eschatological transformation to maleness in 1ApocJas. I 
                                                 
23
 Dunning, Specters of Paul, 52–53. Dunning goes on to argue that Clement’s system fails to attain coherence 
because Clement is unable to fully separate desire from the human person. The “desire” whose extirpation Clement 
advocates is already implicated in the division of male and female. The perfect maleness of God and the ideal 
Christian, then, cannot be fully “male” without desire and the sexual relationship. Dunning sees lurking here again 
the “specter of Paul”, as it is Adam’s sexual desire which cannot be fully eradicated in the envisioning of the perfect 
Christ. “If some aspect of epithymia resists externalization, but is in fact internal to the fallen Adam–not only as 
prototypical generic human but also as the prototype of masculinity–then to overcome that desire, God must 
ultimately eradicate both male and female.” Ibid., 72. Because the concern of 1ApocJas is not desire but rather the 
ultimate origin of the aspects of the self and the world, 1ApocJas diverges from Clement at this point. 
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argue that this difficulty in the text can be explained with reference to the two Sophias and the 
two aspects of plurality in Valentinian theology. The earlier section on the spirits of prophecy 
aligned the seven women with the higher Sophia and other female figures fully within the divine 
realms. In this section, by contrast, the authorization of Mary, Salome, and Arsinoe works by 
radically distinguishing them from the lower Achamoth. They are thus doubly honored. Not only 
do these women have a typological connection to divine spirits of prophecy, they are also wholly 
free from the control of the rulers and Achamoth.  
Thus, two quite different articulations of sexual difference serve to establish Mary, 
Salome, and Arsinoe as honored disciples. Each of these claims is dependent on one of the 
aspects of plurality in Valentinian theology. Salvation can be figured as a surpassing of 
femaleness because of Achamoth. To be saved, one must free oneself from any association with 
the negative aspect of divine plurality, the world created by femaleness. In this articulation of 
sexual difference, femaleness relates to maleness as the inessential aspect of reality to be 
discarded in salvation. However, 1ApocJas also recalls the higher Sophia by describing the 
transformed state the women achieve as “undefiled.” The contrast between Achamoth and 
Sophia suggests that these women have been perfected, removed from the line of Achamoth and 
rejoined to the line of Sophia. The perfecting of the female without her corresponding 
transformation to maleness implies an articulation of sexual difference which allows for 
perfected humanity to be female or male, in relation to either male or female powers in the divine 
realms.  
While these two articulations of sexual difference can be explained in relation to the 
text’s theology, they still conflict rather than complement each other. The reinstatement of 
masculinism implied by the discussion of the “work of femaleness” does not leave room open for 
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the honoring of women in relation to divine female figures. On the other hand, when 1ApocJas 
invokes the divine Sophia and the spirits of prophecy in relation to the seven women disciples, 
there is no concomitant rejection of the male. The two strategies here conflict, and they do not 
mirror each other in their differences.  
Further evidence for this tension appears in the textual record of 1ApocJas. In the 
Tchacos Codex, the passage on the “work of the female” appears to have been altered due to a 
scribal error. It reads, “the true work has attained to the male” (28.19–20). Based on comparison 
to the NHC V version and on grounds of internal logic, I have treated this passage as simply an 
error—it should have read, “the work of the female has attained to the male.” My analysis shows 
however that this more likely reading still does not solve every interpretive problem. The 
discussion of the “work of the female” in 1ApocJas suggests that attaining to the divine realms 
requires a complete transformation to maleness. This discussion conflicts with the earlier 
passages in which a variety of female figures appear in the divine realms. Further, James’ 
preparation for martyrdom requires the imitation of honored female disciples and martyrs, 
implying a power relationship in which these women are authorized above James. A variety of 
tensions in the text arise due to the phrase, “the work of the female.” It is possible, then, that the 
textual variant in the Tchacos Codex reflects a scribal correction of a problematic passage, 
because of uncertainty over the meaning of the text.  
 Another textual variant provides some support for my interpretation of the textual 
variants. When James first introduces the seven women in his question, the Tchacos Codex 
reads, “who are the seven women who have become your disciples and whom all the generations 
bless?” (25.18–22). NHC V differs here. It reads, “Who are the [seven] women who have 
become your disciples, and look, all women bless you” (T[sav]Fäe NsHime nim ne Ntau[® 
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ma]qhths nak auw eis H[hhte] se®makarize µmok/ [N]Ci sHime nim; V 38.16–20). In the Nag 
Hammadi version, the seven women attest to the blessedness of Jesus. The Tchacos Codex 
version, on the other hand, establishes the women much more clearly as honored disciples whose 
blessedness will require some explanation. The Tchacos Codex may reflect a tradition in which 
the female disciples were considered relatively more important to the meaning of the text. If this 
is true, it could follow that the copyists of the TC might be more troubled by the tensions 
produced by the passage on “the work of the female.” These textual variants help to demonstrate 
the existence of overlapping and conflicting articulations of sexual difference in the text.  
 
The Three Women Martyrs and the Power of Imitation 
  1ApocJas seeks out these different possible articulations of sexual difference in order to 
establish the honored status of the seven women disciples. The passage following the discussion 
of the “work of femaleness” confirms the importance of the seven women for the text’s 
exhortation to martyrdom. Having received Jesus’ explanation of his priestly transformation of 
his disciples, James responds with another confusing question about “the three,” and Jesus tells 
him about three female martyrs.  
(James:) Rabbi, these three, then, perished and did not suffer, when they were worthy and 
were persecuted by [others] and things were said about them which are not (true)? 
(Jesus:) James, it is not necessary for anyone to perish. These three, they are separated 
from a place of faith, for [they have received] hidden knowledge. These are the names of 
the three: Sapphira, Susanna, and Johanna. 
 
rabbei TvomNte Ce autako mpouHise kai mhn euvanµpva auw Nsepwt Nswou 
ebol HitN k/e/l/a/u/e/ auw Nsetamoou enete Nsevoop an  
ûakkwbe Nvve en Holws ete laoue tako Tvom/n/te ete neû ne [s]eporü[∆ e]bol 
euma µpistis [auji g]a/r µ[ps]o/o/une eqht [na]ei ne nran NtvomNte [s]a/ppira mN 
so/usanna mN [i]wanna (28.21–29.6) 
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James’ question could appear to be a non sequitur, but it follows within the logic of the text. 
1ApocJas has consistently linked the need for transformation of the self to preparation for 
martyrdom. James follows this logic in asking about three female martyrs. These women “were 
worthy,” just as the earlier women were “worthy of the One Who Is.” They have been 
persecuted, just as Jesus has been and just as James will be. My reading here differs from the 
primary English translation of the Tchacos Codex version. Meyer and Gaudard translate 
euvanµpva as “they deserved (it),” suggesting that the women were rightly persecuted. I think 
it is highly unlikely that this passage should be understood as Meyer and Gaudard take it. The 
word “persecuted” appears at one other point in the text, describing a great Christian leader 
(25.9). As Brankaer and Bethge point out, the far more likely translation of the intransitive µpva 
is “were worthy,” not “deserved.”24  Nowhere else in the text is martyrdom a bad thing, and 
nowhere else in the text is sympathy shown to persecutors rather than the persecuted.  
One might suggest there is a negative connotation to the description of the women being 
“separated from a place of faith.” If they have received a “deserved” punishment, then it could 
follow that these women are a negative example for James.25  I think that within a text so 
positive about martyrs, the initial assumption should be that persecuted martyrs are not imagined 
to deserve their fate. Further, as Antti Marjanen points out, the text has elsewhere talked about a 
progress of Christian spiritual development which begins with faith and progresses to 
knowledge.26  When Jesus predicts his resurrection at the end of the first dialogue, he explains 
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 Brankaer and Bethge, 246. 
 
25
 Funk, “The Significance of the Tchacos Codex,” 513–514. Funk claims that 1ApocJas presents an “exemplary 
distinction of good and bad female disciples.” He draws this conclusion from his reading of 27.6–9, where James 
asks if some of the disciples are more honored than others. There is a certain logic to this, since you would expect 
Jesus to contrast more and less honored disciples in response. However, the presentation of the three suggests 
instead that they are also highly honored disciples and models for James’ imitation in preparation for martyrdom.  
 
26
 Marjanen, “The Seven Women Disciples,” 542–543. 
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the purpose of his reappearance. “[And many] will turn toward faith, and they will increase in it 
until they come to knowledge” (oun/ [HaH de] napwäwne eHo[u]n etp/iöst/[is] auw Nse® 
auxa[n]eä NHhtß [va]Ntou/eäi/ epso[oun]e; 16.12–15). Knowledge follows upon faith as a 
higher state of attainment. Based on this interpretation, Brankaer and Bethge plausibly fill the 
lacuna on 29.3 to explain that the women have separated from a place of faith not as punishment, 
but because they have now acquired knowledge. Brankaer and Bethge take the “hidden 
knowledge” as the further blessing received by these women martyrs, and I have followed their 
suggestion in my transcription and translation.27 
Thus, the women should be understood as martyrs worthy of praise and forerunners to 
James. James asks whether they have perished and whether they have suffered. The statement, 
“it is not necessary for anyone to perish” does not reject martyrdom. Rather, this corresponds to 
the consistent interpretation 1ApocJas has presented of martyrdom and death. When Jesus re-
appears after his crucifixion, he says, “I did not suffer at all and I did not die” (18.8–9). The text 
does not deny the bodily death of Jesus, but rather his eternal, essential aspect survived bodily 
death unharmed. The three women, like Jesus, have not truly perished in that their souls survive. 
The readers and hearers urged to inculcate knowledge and prepare for martyrdom can see in 
these women the ideal toward which they are practicing.  
 Two of the names for these women, Susanna and Johanna, also appear in the list of Jesus’ 
women disciples in Luke 8.3. 1ApocJas might record a memory of these women as ideal 
disciples, but their connection to martyrdom is unclear. With Sapphira, by contrast, her 
presentation as an honored disciple requires some explanation. In Acts 5, Sapphira speaks falsely 
to the community of the apostles about profits which she and her husband derived from the sale 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
27
 Brankaer and Bethge, Codex Tchacos, 247. 
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of land. For this crime, she is struck down and killed in their midst, apparently by the power of 
God. This means that unlike Susanna and Johanna, Sapphira’s death is narrated in the New 
Testament. Susanna and Johanna do not have any connection to martyrdom or death within the 
early Christian tradition. Sapphira does. Perhaps an against-the-grain reading here could extract 
Sapphira the martyr from Acts 5. If one imagines that her death was unjustified and that she was 
a true disciple like Susanna and Johanna, then Acts 5 could be read as a martyrdom story. 
1ApocJas has evinced a capacity for a negative portrayal of the twelve disciples, and so possibly 
it could be presenting here a critical reading of the Acts story.28     
This is a necessarily speculative reading, but it does have some internal textual support. 
James’ final question to Jesus is unclear, and this martyrological interpretation provides a 
possible explanation of what it means. The Coptic reads Nsetamoou enete Nsevoop an, 
and there is no obvious antecedent for at least one of the third-plural pronouns with the first verb. 
Meyer and Gaudard propose that James asks whether the women “have been told things which 
are not (true).” Brankaer and Bethge, however, suggest that this line may refer to the reading of 
Acts. It could also mean, “things were said about them which are not (true)” in reference to the 
negative portrayal of Sapphira in Acts 5.29 It is not true, James’ question implies, that Sapphira’s 
death was justified. Using the strategies of martyrdom discourse, 1ApocJas resignifies the death 
of Sapphira as a martyrdom. Thus Sapphira becomes associated with other honored female 
                                                 
28
 Vielleux, Les deux apocalypses de Jacques, 9–10; William Schoedel, “A Gnostic Interpretation of the Fall of 
Jerusalem: The First Apocalypse of James,” Novum Testamentum 33 (1991), 169–173; Antti Marjanen, The Woman 
Jesus Loved, 137–143; Hartenstein, Die zweite Lehre, 192–193. Even if the text is not entirely dismissive in its 
treatment of the twelve, their subordinate status to James is maintained. As Elaine Pagels has argued, this sort of 
implicit conflict was common in early Christian literature. Christians who rejected the apostolic succession through 
the twelve apostles often did so by telling stories which challenge the authority of the twelve. Elaine Pagels, 
“Visions, Appearance, and Apostolic Authority: Gnostic and Orthodox Traditions,” in Gnosis: Festschrift für Hans 
Jonas (ed. Barbara Aland; Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 1978), 415–430. 
 
29
 Brankaer and Bethge, Codex Tchacos, 247–248. 
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disciples of Jesus. In turn, Johanna and Susanna become associated with one of the first Christian 
martyrs. 
 James asks no more questions after he learns about the three women martyrs. The 
dialogue ends and he proceeds to his own death. It seems evident that these three women stand as 
moral exemplars for James. Mary, Salome, and Arsinoe were presented as models for ethical 
imitation. Now three women martyrs appear in the discussion, and Jesus praises them before 
James goes to be martyred. Jesus’ final revelations about the seven women provide James the 
final teaching to enable his preparation. He imitates them quite directly in his own martyrdom.  
 In antiquity, imitation presumes a hierarchical power relationship. As Elizabeth Castelli 
puts it, “first of all, mimesis is constituted through a hierarchy in which the model is imbued with 
perfection and wholeness, and the copy represents an attempt to reclaim that perfection.” The 
people striving to transform themselves implicitly establish the model as perfect and themselves 
as lacking in comparison. This establishes a clear power structure. “The question of authority is 
foregrounded in the mimetic relationship; the model has authority to which the copy submits.”30 
I argued previously that 1ApocJas reflects an ethical reading of the Gospel of John in which 
Christological sayings in John became the basis for practices of imitation. 1ApocJas exhorts 
readers and hearers to understand that they are children from the father, in the manner of Jesus. 
This understanding will then produce ethical transformation aimed at preparation for martyrdom. 
The structure of imitation and power, as described by Castelli, fits well with this Christological 
ethics. 1ApocJas exhorts readers and hearers to imitate the perfection of Christ.  
 The relations of power and authority grow more complicated when the seven women 
become models for imitation. The presentation of the women displaces Jesus from his position as 
the authoritative model. Jesus shifts to become the inimitable new priest, whose action enables 
                                                 
30
 Elizabeth Castelli, Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1991), 86. 
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the transformation of the first three women—Mary, Salome, and Arsinoe. James is exhorted to 
be transformed in the manner of the women, not to become priestly in the manner of Jesus. 
Because this passage displaces Jesus from his position as authoritative model, it maintains a 
relation of power between the model and the imitators while changing the identity of those 
actors. The perfection of these women, enabled by Christ’s intervention, authorizes them. Jesus 
in turn exhorts James to a practice of imitation. The status of the women as models for ethical 
imitation becomes more starkly clear when it is revealed that three of them were also martyred. 
 The text’s overriding goal of preparation for martyrdom here interweaves with its 
articulations of sexual difference. James is exhorted to imitate female disciples and martyrs in 
order to prepare for martyrdom himself. The power-laden logic of ethical imitation which the 
text has used now places a group of female disciples and martyrs in the space previously 
occupied by Christ. This helps to explain, I think, why the articulations of sexual difference in 
1ApocJas consistently serve to authorize these seven women in various ways. The consistency of 
the text in authorizing the women contrasts to its relative inconsistency in theorizing sexual 
difference. The rhetorical aims of 1ApocJas can be discerned here. The articulation of sexual 
difference as a coherent whole only matters secondarily to the primary goal of establishing the 
power and perfection of the seven women, whom James must imitate.31  
                                                 
31
 I can draw a contrast here to Jacques Lacan’s theory of sexual difference. In his Seminar XX: Encore, Lacan 
distinguishes between two possible gendered positions in discourse. One may speak from the side of the man or the 
side of the woman. He argues, however, that discourse is structured such that a speaker is presumed and expected to 
speak from the side of the male. To be a speaking subject, one must first presume one’s own coherence and the 
coherence of one’s speech. This coherence, according to Lacan, is symbolized by possession of the phallus. This is 
why speaking as a coherent, universal subject is classed as masculine in his system. Amy Hollywood summarizes 
his position, “Anatomically or genetically defined male and female human beings can occupy either the position of 
the masculine speaking subject or that of the feminine speaking subject (this flexibility is most clear, however, with 
regard to men). The difference between the two positions, as Lacan's notations show, is in the relationship they take 
toward the phallus, the transcendental signifier within male-dominant society through which meaning is fixed and 
grounded.” As Hollywood argues, this fixing and grounding of meaning is ultimately illusory for Lacan, as likewise 
is the possession of the “phallus.” He seeks then to speak not from the side of illusory wholeness, but from the side 
of the feminine speaking subject. Anyone who inscribes himself or herself into the role of the feminine speaking 
subject, he says, “will not allow for any universality—it will be a not-whole.” Lacan values and seeks after such a 
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 The precise contours of the relationship between these women and the divine realms are 
not fully worked out, but the authority of the women as exemplars is never questioned. In their 
moral perfection, their relation to Jesus, and their ultimate martyrdoms, these women have 
achieved precisely the preparation for martyrdom the text exhorts. In its improvisational usage of 
various available models of sexual difference, 1ApocJas seeks logical coherence but will 
sacrifice perfect coherence in service of finding justifications for the women’s status as models 
for imitation. While any association of 1ApocJas to historical martyrdoms must be speculative, 
the text’s insistence on the valorization of these women demands some explanation. It is not 
implausible that 1ApocJas might use gospel women to stand in for female martyrs who had 
previously been dialogue partners, just as it uses James as the paradigmatic martyr in training 
and Christian in dialogue whom readers and hearers should themselves imitate. The text’s 
insistence on not only honoring these female disciples and martyrs, but on making their imitation 
of central importance to the practice of preparation for martyrdom, might then reflect an 
engagement with the history of Christian martyrdom.  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
not-whole, anti-universal position, which he classes as feminine. No such valuation of the not-whole appears in 
1ApocJas. I have argued that 1ApocJas does not articulate an entirely coherent model of sexual difference, but this 
is not because it reflects an incomplete, not-whole, possibly feminine position. Rather, the difficulty arises from the 
improvisational use of a variety of resources to honor women martyrs and disciples.  Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, 
147; Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality (ed. Jacques-Alain Miller; 
trans. Bruce Fink; New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 81.  
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Conclusion: Sexual Difference and Martyrdom 
 The First Apocalypse of James marshals a variety of resources to establish “the seven 
women whom all the generations bless” as moral exemplars. I want to return here to the question 
of martyrdom and sexual difference. Scholarly discussions have focused on the “masculinizing” 
or “feminizing” strategies used in portraying male and female martyrs. As Stephanie Cobb 
summarizes the issue, Christian martyrdom texts authorized women by “illustrating the necessity 
and possibility of women moving toward ideals of masculinity,” while at the same time 
feminizing strategies “ensur[e] that the female martyr is safely placed back within the confines of 
proper, domestic femininity.”1 The logic of hierarchical sexual difference holds cleanly, even if 
some women might attain to a masculine state for certain purposes.  
 This logic does not hold so neatly in the First Apocalypse of James. I should note that the 
discussion of female martyrs does engage with one classic masculinizing strategy. 1ApocJas 
relates the power of women disciples and martyrs to their triumph over the lower divine figure 
“femaleness.” The women have become perfected and undefiled because they have surpassed 
femaleness. In the logic of the text, they recognize theological and anthropological truths, in 
particular that the body is not the self. The body derives from the “rulers” who were created by 
femaleness, and so this recognition constitutes triumph over femaleness. Thus for these women, 
“the work of the female has attained to the male.” They are masculinized according to a vision of 
sexual difference in which perfection attends only to maleness, and the perfection of the female 
entails becoming in some fashion male. I have argued that although this passage indeed invokes 
such a radical articulation of sexual difference, in the context of 1ApocJas it does not do so 
univocally. 
                                                 
1
 Cobb, Dying to Be Men, 122–123. 
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 Rather, the surrounding passages engage in strategies to honor these women which 
cannot be classified simply as masculinizing. They are honored and elevated to divine status 
through links drawn to their counterparts in the divine realms, the seven spirits of prophecy and 
the undefiled Sophia. Even the discussion of the women “attain[ing] to maleness” recalls the 
heavenly Sophia by stating states that they have become “undefiled.” The strategy here would 
therefore be better characterized as feminizing than masculinizing. It is through their association 
with female powers of the divine realms that the women are reckoned as honored disciples and 
martyrs. This is a feminizing strategy which does not serve to domesticate the women but to 
heighten their authority as moral exemplars. Indeed, the very capacity of these women to become 
martyrs and moral exemplars depends on their association with divine female figures. 
 These discussions of sexual difference do not concern only the female disciples and 
martyrs. Crucially, they are presented as models for ethical imitation by men as well as women. 
This presentation occurs literally in the text from Jesus to James, and rhetorically from the text to 
its readers and hearers. The interpretation of scripture in 1ApocJas enables these articulations of 
sexual difference. I have argued that the text’s exhortation to martyrdom is dependent on a 
reading of the Gospel of John. This reading seeks to bridge the gap in John between ethics and 
Christology by making the Jesus a model for imitation. The Christological statements of identity 
in John become the basis for an ethics of preparation for martyrdom in 1ApocJas. I see the 
relationship between John and 1ApocJas as an intertextual one, which means that I expect 
1ApocJas to be crucially shaped, in non-determinate ways, by its dialogical relation to John. This 
shaping plays out in the text’s discussion of moral exemplars. The method of connecting ethics 
and Christology produces a coherent reading of John, but when applied to Isaiah the results are 
different. The ethical exemplars shift from Christ to a set of seven women who are martyrs, 
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prophets and disciples. The seven women, who become ambiguous objects of identification for 
James and readers and hearers of the text, arise from the text’s interpretation of scripture. The 
intertextual relations between 1ApocJas, John and Isaiah provide key resources for the text’s 
articulations of sexual difference.  
Virginia Burrus suggests that one may imagine that martyrdom texts were composed and 
read by men who appropriated a “partly ‘feminized’ subjectivity” from their identification with 
the female martyr.2 Such a relationship appears clearly when James is exhorted to imitate female 
martyrs as moral exemplars. It is made possible by the intertextual relations between 1ApocJas, 
John, and Isaiah. This creates a complex doubling effect, as the strategies which authorize the 
female disciples in turn structure the practices of the self which James, and by extension readers 
and hearers of the text, are to undertake. Effective preparation for martyrdom depends on 
developing an association with the divine Sophia. At the moment of greatest drama in the text, 
when Jesus explains to James how he will defeat his captors in the divine realms, Jesus tells him 
to invoke the undefiled Sophia (TC 22.4–20, NHC V 35.5–23). By her power James triumphs 
and attains to the divine realms.3 His capacity to enact the “confession of faith in conduct” relies 
on the intervention of the higher Sophia. The economy of action enabled by these practices has a 
feminized and feminizing quality. 
 I believe that 1ApocJas’ capacity to articulate such non-masculinized visions of the 
perfect martyr are directly related to the text’s engagement with discourses of martyrdom. As I 
have argued, 1ApocJas rejects the critical importance of what Heracleon calls the “confession of 
the voice” which the martyr undertakes in the law court or the arena. There is no climactic 
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 Burrus, “Torture and Travail,” 71. 
 
3
 Einar Thomassen noted this peculiarity in the text, that Sophia takes on roles of both psychopomp and paraclete. 
Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 413. 
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interrogation scene or public confession in this text. However, 1ApocJas does describe an 
interrogation of the soul by a group of cosmic “rulers.” In this interrogation, the soul is to 
respond with a complex statement of identity that locates the true origin of humanity in the 
divine realms. Thus, 1ApocJas transposes the generic cliché of the martyr’s interrogation and 
final statement of identity into the divine realms. This displacement has the effect of expanding 
the confession of Christian identity from merely “I am a Christian” into a full elaboration of the 
nature of the perfected human that is based within a complex theological discussion. The text 
presents this full elaboration of the theory of the human in a form meant to be memorized, 
representing it as a ritual of repetition and dialogue. By including in this climactic dialogue a full 
elaboration of its anthropology and theology, 1ApocJas implicitly argued that this “confession of 
faith and conduct,” rather than the public proclamation of the voice, determines proper 
martyrdom. Much of the pressing importance of articulating a masculine version of the martyr’s 
virtue derived from the unrelentingly masculinist ideology of the arena. Because 1ApocJas has 
works to separate its vision of true martyrdom from these public confessions, I believe the text 
has a greater opportunity to articulate visions of the perfected martyr which can intermingle male 
and female or masculine and feminine characteristics.    
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Appendix: Outline of the First Apocalypse of James 
 
1) First Dialogue, before the death of Jesus   TC 10.1–16.25   NHC V 24.10–30.11 
 
a) Initial discussion of femaleness and theology TC 10.1–11.7     NHC V 24.10–25.5 
b) Jesus predicts his death, James voices his fear TC 11.7–12.4     NHC V 25.5–25.19 
c) Dialogue on scripture and salvation   TC 12.4–14.5     NHC V 25.20–27.12 
d) Dialogue on fear of persecution by world rulers TC 14.6–15.18   NHC V 27.13–28.3 
e) Jesus predicts his death and resurrection, departs TC 15.18–16.25 NHC V 28.3–30.11 
 
2) Interlude, the death and resurrection of Jesus  TC 16.26–17.22 NHC V 30.11–31.5 
 
a) Report of death of Jesus    TC 16.26–16.28 NHC V 30.11–30.14 
b) James as a comforter to the disciples   TC 16.28–17.15 NHC V 30.14–30.26 
c) James prays alone, Jesus returns   TC 17.15–17.22 NHC V 30.27–31.5 
 
3) Second Dialogue, after the resurrection of Jesus  TC 17.23–29.15 NHC V 31.5–43.19 
 
a) Jesus predicts James’ death, offers consolation TC 17.23–19.21 NHC V 31.5–33.28 
b)  “Long Revelation Speech” by Jesus   TC 19.21–25.14 NHC V 33.28–39.11 
a. Embedded dialogue with full revelation TC 19.21–23.10 NHC V 33.28–36.13 
b. History of the transmission of revelation TC 23.10–25.14 NHC V 36.13–39.12 
c) James proclaims his understanding   TC 25.15–25.17 NHC V 39.12–39.15 
d) Dialogue on the seven women   TC 25.17–29.15 NHC V 39.15–43.19 
a. Seven women and the spirits of prophecy TC 25.17–27.4   NHC V 39.15–40.3 
b. Discussion of three female disciples  TC 27.4–28.20   NHC V 40.4–41.19 
c. Discussion of three female martyrs   TC 28.21–29.15 NHC V 41.19–42.19 
 
4) Conclusion, the death of James    TC 29.18–30.26 NHC V 42.20–44.8 
 
a) James preaches to the disciples   TC 29.18–29.25 NHC V 42.20–42.24 
b) James is arrested and killed    TC 29.25–30.26 NHC V 43.4–44.8 
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